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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the field of strategy by way of its 
historical trajectory and to consider the major branches that constitute this 
broad, but fragmented discipline.  It is an interdisciplinary endeavour that 
draws specifically on systems theories and complexity theory as a way to 
enrich the field. The strategy field tends to be philosophically unreflexive. As 
a result it is dominated by an objectivist ontology, which underpins strategic 
choice. One of the aims of this thesis is to explore the implications for 
strategy, if instead, an interpretive stance, based on an ontology of social 
constructionism, is adopted. The literature has not fully explored and 
developed different ontologies in the context of strategy and hence has left a 
major gap in theorising about strategy. This thesis attempts to address that 
gap and therefore one of the contributions of the study will be a tentative 
theory of strategic enactment.  
This research attempts to answer the following key questions: 
1. What are the major theoretical frameworks and conceptual models 
that frame the field of strategy? 
2. How well do these frameworks and models contribute to strategy 
under conditions of high ambiguity and uncertainty? 
3. What contributions may be made by applying complexity theory to 
the field of strategy? 
4. What are the implications of adopting an interpretive approach to 
strategy? 
5. What are the implications of strategic enactment on strategic 
leadership? 
 Page vi 
Given that these research questions are of a philosophical and theoretical 
nature, the research methodology and approach is one based on theoretical 
exploration. It is therefore not an empirical study, but a conceptual one 
embracing both breadth and depth.  It is broad in that it covers multiple 
literature sets which include bodies of knowledge in organisational theory, 
leadership, strategy, systems thinking and complexity theory. It is deep in its 
interrogation of core conceptual constructs that are pertinent to the strategy 
frame of reference and in its comprehensive coverage of the major topics that 
circumscribe the field.  While it relies on an extensive coverage of existing 
texts it is not a hermeneutic study from a methodological point of view. It 
does not purport to interpret and to elicit the meaning of texts. The term 
interpretive in the title instead refers to the ontological notion of sensemaking 
and interpretation that is central to strategic enactment. Interpretive in this 
sense is not an interpretation of texts in a hermeneutic fashion, but 
interpretive in relation to enacting reality. Despite being a theoretical study it 
still draws on deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning. 
The study makes several contributions.  It re-conceptualises strategy in a way 
that lends itself to be generalisable across all sectors, approaches strategy 
formulation and implementation as a single intertwined process, interrogates, 
combines and integrates strategy-related and other concepts in way that has 
not been done before, provides a theoretical basis for scenario planning and 
demonstrates how it may considered as a soft systems approach, presents a 
practical methodology for undertaking scenario planning,  critiques existing 
CAS-based theorising about strategy, leadership and organisation and draws 
out the potential of complexity theory for strategy and leadership. The final 
contribution of this study is a tentative theory of strategic enactment that 
highlights key constructs such as identity and agency that have been under-
emphasised in the strategy literature. Such a theory offers alternative 
explanations from that of strategic choice, and is able to deal with the 
phenomenon of emergence in organisational settings. It is unique in that it 
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integrates complex adaptive systems with an interpretive approach to 
organisational strategy.  
The following may be identified as key findings of this study: 
 
• Strategy is still a pre-paradigmatic field and hence its theoretical 
underpinnings are of necessity eclectic. 
• While strategic choice is the dominant approach, many of its tenets 
are contested, especially when organisations are considered as 
complex adaptive systems. 
• Deliberate strategy is not possible as all forms of strategy are 
ultimately emergent. 
• Agency is an important construct in strategy. Agency does not reside 
in the key power brokers alone, but extends to all organisational 
actors and their structural networks of relations. Agency is also 
invested in non-human actors in the form of artifacts. 
• Agency is limited to micro-level actions and does not embrace macros 
states of the system. 
• Identity is an important construct in strategy. The identity of agents is 
shaped in their interactions with other agents. Who they are impact 
on what they can and cannot do, and also impact who they construct 
themselves to be. In this sense there is a strong link between agency 
and identity. 
• Identity is also shaped in situated activity in practice and therefore 
strategy-as-practice is important. 
• Strategic enactment presents alternate explanations for the utility of 
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C h a p t e r  1 - I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Introduction 
Strategy is a flourishing area of inquiry and practice. Academics, executives, 
practitioners and hundreds of consultants (for whom strategy is a source of 
livelihood, and a generous one at that), all seek to identify appropriate strategy 
theory and best practice, especially in the postmodern world of hyper-
competition, complexity and turbulence (Volberda, 2004). Strategy affects 
millions of us as the big decisions made by the power brokers in organisations 
whether big governments, global multilateral organisations, security 
establishments, transnational corporations or local organisations, ostensibly 
result from their strategies.  
I use the term strategy to broadly embrace other cognate terms such as 
strategic management, strategic planning, strategic thinking, strategy 
formulation and implementation. Strategy may be considered as concerned 
with both the means and the ends for large scale change. It has connotations 
of the future; whether that is organisational survival and longetivity in the face 
of a future, unpredictable environment for all organisations in general, or 
competitiveness, profitability and growth of commercial organisations, in 
particular. When it comes to strategy it is the future of the organisation itself, 
at whatever scale, which is at stake.  
Despite the tendency by some to highlight the military roots of strategy by 
dating back to the writings of Sun Tzu, strategy became an academic field of 
study in its own right in the latter half of the 20th century, drawing primarily 
from economic theory, industrial organisation, organisational theory and later 
from other social sciences (Faulkner, 2002). Although there are a variety of 
classifications of strategy, for example, strategic choice, evolutionary, 
cognitive, political and cultural perspectives, the field has been dominated by 
strategic choice theory based on strongly rational and analytical approaches 
(Child, 1972; Moore, 2001; Porter, 1980, 1981; Stacey, 2003). Strategic choice 
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is based on the premise that there is an objective pre-given reality that can be 
understood by a few rational actors. These actors have the ability to choose 
an appropriate strategic position, and design or formulate the strategy. Once 
the strategy is formulated it is then implemented. This is based on a kind of 
technical rationality that is more suited to technical problems. It is based on 
the ability to predict, forecast and optimise. The goal is to achieve optimal 
outcomes based on the strategy formulation and subsequent implementation. 
Although this overly rational approach, especially in the guise of strategic 
planning, has been subject to significant critique it continues to dominate 
(Mintzberg, 1990; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998; Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985; Stacey, 1995, 2003). The assumption, which underpins much of 
organisational theory and strategy, of an environment that is predictable and 
knowable, implies that it is easy to offer prescriptions for engaging in strategy. 
By drawing on complexity theory, we may conceptualise social systems in 
general and organisations in particular, as complex adaptive systems (CAS). 
These have specific properties that have profound implications for the field 
of strategy. A key lesson is that it is not possible to stand outside the system 
and analyse the organisation and the environment, and design strategy. This 
makes it very difficult to come up with normative suggestions on how to do 
strategy. It also raises questions about who does strategy, because potentially 
everybody does strategy. This translates to strategy as a form of intertwined 
thinking-acting and is consistent with the strategy-as-practice approach 
(Jarzabkowski, 2005). 
Strategic choice approaches are not satisfactory for strategy-making under 
conditions of turbulence and high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty (Stacey, 
2003). Most contemporary organisations operate in such conditions. 
Globalisation and concomitant levels of integration and interdependence 
between markets, economies, institutions and organisations compound the 
problem. The higher the levels of inter-dependence the higher is the level of 
non-linearity and hence higher levels of turbulence and uncertainty (Sterman, 
2000).  There is therefore a need for alternate approaches to strategy that take 
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cognisance of such dynamics and non-linearities. The sub-field of 
organisational dynamics is therefore pertinent to strategy. This in turn leads to 
further problems that strategic choice does not address adequately, such as 
bounded rationality, satisficing behaviour, differing motivations, and power 
relationships which all feature because human actors now become central. 
The various schools of strategy (Mintzberg, et al., 1998) such as the political 
school, the cultural school, the entrepreneurial school etc., have addressed 
some of these issues. The literature has highlighted the importance of 
emergent forms of strategy. Despite these advances and broadening of 
perspectives, there is still much work to be done if alternate approaches to 
strategy are to challenge the dominance of strategic choice. Scenario planning 
is one way for dealing with environmental uncertainty and turbulence 
(Ringland, 2002; Schwartz, 1998; van der Heijden, 1996; van der Heijden, 
Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, & Wright, 2002). Although beneficial in practice, 
scenario planning is still under-theorised. The concept of emergence and 
attempts by learning perspectives to incorporate emergent strategy offers 
promise. Emergent strategy within the ambit of the learning school is covered 
in Chapter 2. Emergence deals with the idea that entities have properties that 
are attributes of the whole entity but which do not exist as attributes of any of 
the parts in isolation – rather it is the relationships between the parts that 
enable such attributes to emerge. This is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Although there has been some strategy-related literature (Anderson, 1999; 
Cunha & Cunha, 2006; Kurtz & Snowden, 2003; Mason, 2007; Stacey, 2007) 
that considers complexity theory, the strategy field has, by and large, not 
drawn the full benefit of this body of knowledge. This is significant because it 
provides a basis to deal with some of the challenging issues that plague the 
field of strategy, and can contribute to strategic approaches that may counter 
the dominance of strategic choice. These include dealing with uncertainty and 
ambiguity, deliberate versus emergent strategy, non-linear relationships, firm-
environment boundary, and perceived implementation failures. 
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Although there has been some spill-over into public sector strategy, much of 
the literature still focuses on business or commercial organisations (Ferlie, 
2002). Where ideas of strategic management are applied in non-commercial 
contexts, existing models and frameworks have to be “force-fit”, not fully 
taking into account the completely different nature of the context, issues and 
constraints of the non-commercial sector (Wilkinson & Pedler, 2003). A case 
is to be made that strategy and organisation are so intertwined that wherever 
we have organising, strategy is applicable. It may therefore be applied to 
government, business, NGOs, international institutions, and even other 
organised formations within civil society such as community-based 
organisations, coalitions, and other ‘movements’. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the field of strategy by way of its 
historical trajectory and to consider the major branches that constitute this 
broad, but fragmented discipline. By doing this, I shall be able to ascertain the 
state of the art in the field, expose the gaps, reveal the logical flaws in many of 
the extant approaches to strategy, discover which approaches and 
perspectives are dominant and which ones have been marginalised and why, 
and to determine the extent to which social constructionism and complexity 
theory do or do not inform the field of strategy. Furthermore, it will enable 
me to locate my work appropriately within the field, drawing on its strengths 
and to identify opportunities for making a contribution.  
The study considers the espoused theory of strategy as presented by strategic 
choice with the theory-in-use by way of a critical interrogation of the 
literature.  It is an interdisciplinary endeavour that draws specifically on 
systems theories and complexity theory as a way to enrich the field. Systems 
theory has a long history embracing many strands including cybernetics, 
general systems theory, autopoiesis and system dynamics, and may be 
considered as a trans-discipline (Jackson, 2000). Complexity theory while 
complementary in some ways to systems theory, had its own separate genesis 
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primarily at the Sante Fe Institute and followed its own independent 
development trajectory (Kauffman, 1995a; Waldrop, 1992).  
The strategy field tends to be philosophically unreflexive. As a result it is 
dominated by an objectivist ontology, which underpins strategic choice. One 
of the aims of this thesis is to explore the implications for strategy, if instead, 
an interpretive stance, based on an ontology of social constructionism, is 
adopted. This is termed strategic enactment. Smirchich & Stubbart (1985) 
alerted us a long time ago to different ontologies in the context of strategy. 
Faulkner (2002, p. 13) noted that this insight of Smirchich and Stubbart has 
“profound implications”. While I concur with this, the strategy literature has 
not fully explored and developed it, and hence has left a major gap in 
theorising about strategy. This thesis attempts to address that gap and 
therefore one of the contributions of the study will be a tentative theory of 
strategic enactment.  
Research questions 
This research attempts to answer the following key questions: 
1. What are the major theoretical frameworks and conceptual models 
that frame the field of strategy? 
2. How well do these frameworks and models contribute to strategy 
under conditions of high ambiguity and uncertainty? 
3. What contributions may be made by applying complexity theory to 
the field of strategy? 
4. What are the implications of adopting an interpretive approach to 
strategy? 
5. What are the implications of strategic enactment on strategic 
leadership? 
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Methodology and approach 
Given that these research questions are of a philosophical and theoretical 
nature, it is natural that the research methodology and approach is one based 
on theoretical exploration. This study therefore is not an empirical study. 
“One of the important criteria for evaluating theory is the 
extent to which it runs ahead of existing empirical 
research in terms of alerting us to research opportunities 
hitherto unanticipated.”  
(Kilduff, 2006, p. 252) 
 
The study, in aspiring to achieve the above, is a conceptual study embracing 
both breadth and depth.  It is broad in that it covers multiple literature sets 
which include bodies of knowledge in organisational theory, leadership, 
strategy, systems thinking and complexity theory. It is deep in its interrogation 
of core conceptual constructs that are pertinent to the strategy frame of 
reference and in its comprehensive coverage of the major topics that 
circumscribe the field.  Given that this is a theoretical study it is concerned 
with concepts and constructs. This means that although there was some level 
of reliance on books and other sources, when it came to interrogating 
substantive concepts covered in the literature the “centre of gravity” was on 
peer-reviewed scholarly journal articles. 
A theoretical study while not as common as empirical studies at PhD level 
within the business and management disciplines is nevertheless, an entirely 
legitimate and valid research endeavour.  
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“Theoretical research does not occur in a vacuum, it is 
rather the result of thinking about previous empirical 
research and of debating the different theoretical 
interpretations that others have made.” 
(Remenyi, Williams, Money, & Swartz, 1998, p. 32) 
  
“The theorist reflects on these ideas and using his or her 
intellectual capabilities constructs a new or different view 
of the situation, which sometimes may be regarded as a 
new theory. At the end of the theorist’s work conclusions 
are drawn and a claim is made that the researcher has 
added to the body of knowledge.” 
 (Remenyi, et al., 1998, pp. 31-32) 
 
Some authors contend that that the theoretical approach is more challenging 
and is less understood than empirical research and is therefore less popular. 
“The most important reason for this is that empirical 
research is less intellectually demanding than theoretical 
research and the risk of failure with a theoretical research 
project is greater than with an empirical project. As most 
masters and PhD candidates as well as their supervisors, 
are risk averse it is not surprising that the theoretical 
approach is less popular.” 
(Remenyi, et al., 1998, p. 47) 
 
It is important to note that while this study refers to an interpretive approach 
to strategy and it relies on an extensive coverage of existing texts it is not a 
hermeneutic study from a methodological point of view. It does not purport 
to interpret and to elicit the meaning of texts. The term interpretive in the title 
instead refers to the ontological notion of sensemaking and interpretation that 
is central to strategic enactment. Interpretive in this sense is not an 
interpretation of texts in a hermeneutic fashion, but interpretive in relation to 
enacting reality. 
A theoretical study such as this one has some similarities with qualitative 
research. This will be understood more clearly if we use the term research 
materials instead of data. In qualitative research the data from interviews, 
observations, and other forms of collection constitute the research materials 
which the researcher interprets and analyses. In the case of theoretical 
research, the frameworks, models, concepts, constructs, premises and 
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conclusions of a variety of authors constitute the research materials. The 
researcher analyses and interprets these in a way that is akin to that in some 
forms of qualitative research. For example, the notion of constant 
comparison that is done in grounded theory studies is also applicable in 
theoretical studies (Charmaz, 2000; Goulding, 1999; Locke, 2001). Similarly 
the researcher engages in clustering and works with themes and categories, 
but these are not always explicitly coded as in qualitative research. In 
theoretical research, the researcher engages in pattern matching, and applies 
deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning.  For example, deductive 
reasoning applies when the researcher draws out premises from one or more 
sources of literature and logically presents the conclusions from the premises 
and their conjunctions. Similarly, the researcher engages in inductive 
reasoning when attempting to generalise a finding from a few instances to a 
larger set of circumstances or when taking a concept that applies in one 
context as presented in the literature that he or she has interrogated and 
demonstrates how it applies in other contexts. This is similar to the case study 
method in qualitative research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Every source 
of literature such as a journal article that deals with a particular construct or 
concept represents a single case. In this sense, a theoretical study is like 
dealing with multiple sets of case study research.  
Abductive reasoning is a primary mode of operation when engaging in a 
theoretical study such as this one. 
“Abduction is a process of drawing conclusions that 
includes preferring one hypothesis over others which can 
explain the facts, when there is no basis in previous 
knowledge that could justify this preference or any 
checking done.” 
(Levin-Rozalis, 2004, citing Pierce, 1956, p.151) 
 
Quite often in a theoretical study there are little a priori hypotheses and no 
advanced presuppositions. The researcher, in the early stages of formulating 
the research topic and agenda, relies entirely on the literature and his or her 
own experience to define the problem statement and to formulate research 
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questions.  This is done though a process of abduction. Later, as the study 
progresses abductive reasoning continues to be applied as the research 
proposes tentative findings and constructs the best possible explanation for 
them. 
“Abduction is inference to the best explanation. It is a 
form of problem solving used in a diverse number of 
problems, from diagnostics to story understanding, to 
theory formation and evaluation, to legal reasoning, to, 
possible perception.”  
(Levin-Rozalis, 2004, citing Fox, 1998, p.1) 
 
Weick (1989) refers to theory construction as “disciplined imagination.” A 
theoretical study is a form of designing, conducting and interpreting 
imaginary experiments, as the researcher identifies key constructs and orders 
the relationships between them (Weick, 1989, p. 516). Furthermore, 
Eisenhardt (1989) indicates that an important aspect of theory building is 
through comparison of the emergent concepts, relationships, and hypotheses 
with the extant literature. 
One of the challenges in a study such as this one is the extent to which the 
researcher’s contribution is apparent to the reader and manifest in the work. 
At one level it is necessary to sketch out the terrain and hence there has to be 
coverage of the extant literature in a meaningful way.  
“[a] careful explication of relevant prior theory and 
research helps build causal arguments and signal the value 
added of your work...” 
(Kilduff, 2006, p. 252) 
 
Such a presentation tends to belie the underlying contribution of the 
researcher as the extent of the level of inductive, deductive and abductive 
reasoning of the researcher is not obvious to the reader, who has to make a 
judgement of the extent to which the work is merely a description of the state 
of the art in the field, and the extent to which the work represents the original 
and novel contributions of the researcher.  This is particularly a challenge 
when the work is entirely a theoretical study where the literature serves as the 
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research materials. It is therefore necessary to point out that the creative 
insights, pattern matching and contribution to theory development, may seem 
muted at first glance, but actually permeate the entire work and is embedded 
in every section and chapter. The comparison with qualitative forms of 
research discussed earlier, hopefully, demonstrates this point adequately. 
Ultimately, the reader will judge.  
“Theory – in the form of big ideas that can lead to new 
research questions – has an autonomy of its own and is not 
the summation of existing empirical research.”  
(Kilduff, 2006, p. 252, emphases added) 
 
The following section describes the researcher contributions more explicitly. 
Contribution to knowledge 
The study has a number of novel elements.  It re-conceptualises strategy in a 
way that lends itself to be generalisable across all sectors. Much of the strategy 
literature is limited to business or commercial organisations. Although this has 
spilled over to strategy in the public sector to some extent, it is still limited. 
This work, based on a proposed theory of strategic enactment,  extends the 
notion of strategy to any kind of organised formation including business, 
government, international (e.g. multilateral organisations), political parties, 
coalitions and movements (such as social, environmental, and liberation 
movements). 
It approaches strategy formulation and implementation as a single intertwined 
process and not two separate processes. Even key critics of strategic planning 
such as Mintzberg, who was one of the first to problematise this was at best 
able to signal the shift by using the term “formation” as opposed to 
formulation, but was forced to still retain separation between the two. The 
proposition that the failure of strategy is primarily a failure of implementation 
is challenged (Hrebniak, 2006; Mintzberg, et al., 1998). 
The thesis also makes a variety of separate but incremental contributions in 
each of the chapters. While some of the topics and their underlying concepts 
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have been partially explored elsewhere, they were done largely in isolation 
from each other. They have not been interrogated, combined and integrated 
before as has been done in this study.   
One of the strategy approaches that is able to deal well with environmental 
turbulence and uncertainty is scenario planning.  However, given that scenario 
planning originated from practice, and the innovations in the approach 
continue to emerge from the world of practice, it has been criticised for 
lacking theoretical support and justification. An important contribution of 
this study, therefore, is that it addresses this shortcoming, by providing a 
firmer theoretical basis for scenario planning. Indeed, it demonstrates that 
scenario planning may be considered as a soft systems approach. In addition, 
a practical scenario approach termed Futurescope is presented in detail in 
Appendix 1. It is meant to be readily applied by practitioners who wish to 
benefit from scenario work in engaging in strategy under complexity and 
uncertainty. Comparisons are made between Futurescope and other approaches 
to scenario planning. 
A further contribution of this study is the investigation of complexity theory 
in the social sciences and its application to organisations as complex adaptive 
systems. The philosophical underpinnings of emergence which are generally 
neglected in organisational theory are discussed. Complexity theory is usually 
applied to social systems in a metaphorical way. I interrogate the role of 
metaphor in theory construction and science and then present a model of 
metaphor in theory construction based on existing literature. While 
metaphorical application of complexity theory to social systems has merit, I 
have taken a step further by demonstrating that social systems are complex 
adaptive systems in a literal sense, and one does not have to resort to 
metaphor alone. Furthermore, I have shown how CAS may be considered a 
tool for organisational ontology. I elaborated the model of strategic choice, 
chance and determinism of De Rond & Thietart (2007) in the light of CAS.  
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The assumption that the key actors in strategy-making are those in leadership 
positions is critically analysed and contested.  One important contribution of 
the study is that all of the characteristics of CAS have to be taken into 
account, singly and together as a whole, if progress is to be made in advancing 
leadership theory in the context of organisations as CAS. This is important 
because, as I show later in this study, there are shortcomings in existing CAS-
based theorising about leadership and organisation when only some of the 
characteristics and features of CAS are taken into account.  
The final contribution of this study is a tentative theory of strategic enactment 
that highlights key constructs such as identity and agency that have been 
under-emphasised in the strategy literature. Such a theory offers alternative 
explanations from that of strategic choice, and is able to deal with the 
phenomenon of emergence in organisational settings. It is unique in that it 
integrates complex adaptive systems with an interpretive approach to 
organisational strategy.  
Limitations of the study 
Since this study is a theoretical one there is not yet a firm empirical basis for 
the findings.  An appropriate research design will have to be constructed to 
test the theoretical propositions underpinning a theory of strategic enactment, 
which were developed in this research.  
While the study has considered the practical implications and provided some 
direction on concrete tools for application in strategy-making, further work 
will need to be done. This is not a limitation of strategic enactment as such, 
but rather a challenge for any work that adopts an interpretive stance based 
on an ontology of social constructionism. It is not a straight-forward matter 
to provide normative prescriptions when the world and social reality is 
complex, ambiguous, turbulent and constantly in flux. 
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Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
This chapter provided the context and purpose of the study, the key research 
questions to be explored, the methodology and the theoretical contributions 
to be made. 
Chapter 2 – The Strategy Terrain 
This chapter describes the field of strategic management and the broad 
strategy terrain. It explores some of the major classifications and taxonomies. 
Further, it highlights some of the key debates and challenges. 
Chapter 3 – Resource Based View 
The Resource Based View (RBV) has become more prominent in the last 
decade. This chapter covers the RBV together with a complementary 
perspective, competitive strategy dynamics, which is practice focused, and 
which draws in elements of system dynamics. Finally, it extends the 
discussion to include the dynamic capabilities approach. 
Chapter 4 – Scenario Planning 
Scenario planning is a practice-based approach that attempts to deal with 
strategy under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty. However, it is under-
theorised. This chapter attempts to provide scenario planning with a firmer 
theoretical platform. 
Chapter 5 – Complexity Theory and Organisations 
This chapter is an extensive investigation of complexity theory as applied to 
organisations. It shows how organisations may be conceptualised as complex 
adaptive systems. Since complexity theory is often applied metaphorically in 
organisational contexts, the chapter also covers the role of metaphor in theory 
construction and science. 
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Chapter 6 – Leadership and Complexity 
This chapter explores the evolutionary trajectory of leadership. It then 
considers the implications for strategic leadership viewed from the lens of 
complexity theory.  
Chapter 7 – Strategic Enactment 
This chapter proposes a theory of strategic enactment by drawing on work 
covered in the earlier chapters. The basis of strategic enactment is complexity 
theory in the form of complex adaptive systems coupled with an interpretive 
stance based on a social constructionist ontology.  
Chapter 9 – Conclusions 
This chapter revisits the research questions in relation to the study, considers 
the contributions of the study, highlights its limitations, and offers concluding 
remarks. 
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C h a p t e r  2 - T h e  S t r a t e g y  T e r r a i n  
Introduction 
In this chapter, I draw primarily on the strategy literature to sketch out the 
major concerns and issues, and to highlight some of the categorisations and 
perspectives of strategy. I begin with a brief historical trajectory of how the 
field of strategy has evolved. Thereafter, I indicate the broad terrain of 
strategy by presenting a general set of questions that typify the major 
concerns of strategy. I show how many of the strategy tools and techniques 
applied in practice are a result of examining inter-relationships between 
subsets of these questions.  
This is followed by a description of classifications of strategy. I then proceed 
to engage in a wide-ranging discussion of different aspects of strategy from 
numerous perspectives including strategy-as-practice, strategising/organising 
duality, strategic change, actor-network theory and strategic enactment. This 
demonstrates that the field is not an integrated and coherent one, but is rather 
eclectic and still quite fragmented, typical of a pre-paradigmatic field.  
A brief historical trajectory 
Although some authors suggest that strategy is as old as humanity itself, or 
several centuries old emanating from Sun Tzu’s, “The Art of War”, or that of 
von Clausewitz, it has a history of some four decades as a systematic field of 
study (Faulkner, 2002). Classical strategy has its roots in post world war II 
America. It is often traced back to the groundbreaking studies of Alfred 
Chandler. Like any field of study, it is important to realise that it is not a 
single, linear trajectory, but rather would have faced a number of bifurcations 
over time. There are two distinct approaches to the early field of strategy. 
Chandler’s approach was that of the business historian. The field was “carved 
out” by academics from the Harvard Business School. Here, strategy was 
rooted in descriptions of real organisations, primarily business corporations. It 
was based on the experience of those at the helm of such organisations. 
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Indeed, as part of its teaching approaches, Harvard Business School often 
brought in these managers and practitioners as guest lecturers to teach their 
students of strategy. The remnants of this are still with us today, as the “case 
study” is ubiquitous in business school teaching. The second approach, dating 
back to the 1960s, was that of Igor Ansoff who argued for a more analytical, 
rational approach to the field of strategy (Faulkner, 2002).  
It was over a period of time especially the 1970s and 1980s that the field of 
economics started to penetrate strategy to the extent that strategy research 
started losing its rootedness with practice and rich data, and instead started to 
rely on large databases and surveys, utilising the analytical tools of statistical 
treatment. Strategy became somewhat detached from the practice that it 
purported to study. It also became wedded to instrumental rationality. The 
economic assumptions of rational expectations and market equilibrium 
became prominent. 
The incursion of economics dominance into strategy began with what was 
known as Industrial Organisation (IO) of Bain/Mason (Porter, 1981). The 
premise was that Industry Structure (S) determines Firm Conduct (C) which 
gives rise to Firm Performance (P). The IO paradigm was thus encapsulated 
into S-C-P. It was left to Michael Porter to take this SCP approach and apply 
it to the field of competitive strategy in the form of his 5 forces model. The 
pre-occupation was with industry structure and industry attractiveness. It 
must be noted that this view of strategy is a positioning view of strategy. Firms 
must locate themselves within a particular position in the market, given the 
characteristics of the industry. 
There is a third thread in the development of the field of strategy that is not 
always given sufficient attention. This is the role of the big consulting 
boutiques, such as McKinsey and Co. Each of these developed strategic tools 
which were then applied primarily by American corporations and later spread 
to other parts of the world. These tools even became synonymous with the 
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particular strategy boutique, for example the Boston Consulting Group 
(BCG) matrix. This third thread is equally important as the other two because 
it indicates how academics, consultants, and business practitioners influenced 
the work of others and how they collectively shaped the field of strategy.  
The strategy terrain: concerns and issues 
The field of strategy is considered to be fragmented (Volberda, 2004, p. 37). 
There are various approaches and categorisations. Mintzberg et al. (1998) 
offer one such categorisation by way of their ten schools. Other authors 
distinguish between strategy content, strategy process and the context in 
which strategy happens. Although strategy may be applied to the public sector 
(Ferlie, 2002, p. 279) and other settings (Whittington, Pettigrew, & Thomas, 
2002, pp. 481-483), much of the field of strategy is still concerned with 
commercial organisations. There are many different definitions of what 
strategy is. A simple way of exploring the strategy terrain is to examine what 
the key concerns or questions are.  I have constructed Table 2.1 to identify   
the major issues and concerns of strategists based on my overall sense of the 
field drawing from both the literature and my own experience of working in 
the strategy field. 
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What is the purpose of the organisation? 
What is our vision or strategic intent? 
What is our mandate and whose interests do we serve? 
What is the industry that we operate in? 
What are the characteristics of this industry? 
What are the “rules of the game” in this industry? 
What are the characteristics of industry growth? 
What are the critical success factors to thrive in this industry? 
What are the entry and exit barriers in this industry? 
What business are we in? 
Who are our suppliers and customers? 
What is our bargaining power over them? 
How do we segment the market and which segments do we serve? 
Which geographical areas do we serve? 
What is our share of the market? 
What products or services do we offer? 
How do we distinguish our products or services? 
Who are our competitors? 
How do we gain advantage over our competitors? 
What resources, skills, technology, knowledge and capabilities do we have? 
How do we deploy these for competitive advantage? 
How do we fund our activities?  
Who are our funders?  
What returns do they expect? 
How can we reshape the “rules of the game” to our advantage? 
How can we get efficiencies in what we are doing? 
What alliances and partnerships should we engage in? 
 
Table 2.1: Major issues and concerns of strategy 
 
Although this set of questions may not be exhaustive, it provides the broad 
scope of the concerns of strategy. The questions are not distinct and are not 
usually considered in isolation from each other. Many strategy tools and 
techniques are essentially a construction, based on a combination of a small 
subset of these questions, in the form of a matrix or some other relationship 
grid. For example, Porter’s 5 forces model is basically a consideration of a 
subset of questions related to the characteristics of the industry and the 
relative bargaining power of key stakeholders. By crossing the questions about 
1) which markets to serve, 2) distinguishing characteristics of products, and 3) 
considerations of efficiency and cost, we may arrive at Porter’s generic 
positioning matrix. The Boston Consulting Group (BCG) matrix is a cross 
consideration of the questions related to industry growth and market share. 
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The resource based view (RBV) and the dynamic capabilities approach 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) is an elaboration 
and deepening of the questions related to resources, skills and capabilities. 
Recent interest in innovation examines ways of changing the industry rules of 
the game and internal processes to arrive at innovative strategies (Hamel, 
1996; Markides, 1997; Tidd, Bessant, & Pavitt, 2001). As interest in leadership 
has increased, the roles of leaders in strategic development and in formulation 
of strategic intent and vision have also increased. The answers to most of 
these questions relate to strategy content. On the other hand, a separate line 
of literature suggests that the answers to the questions are not necessarily 
what are important, but rather how organisations arrive at the answers, that is, 
the strategy process, is of importance (Birkinshaw, 2004; Chakravarthy & 
White, 2002; Pettigrew, 1990; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996). Thus strategy 
content, process and context are all important considerations. 
The perspective adopted on what constitutes strategy differs according to 
context, organisational type, and industry structure. It is also dependent on 
who is engaged in strategy. This is not a trivial issue as we shall examine later 
in the chapter. Numerous authors have categorised the field of strategy based 
on where the actors concerned with strategy are placed in the organisational 
hierarchy. As a result, some make a distinction between levels of strategy as 
that of 1) corporate strategy, 2) business strategy and 3) functional strategy 
(Johnson & Scholes, 2002; Thompson & Strickland, 1999). This is a relic of 
the predominantly American multi-divisional (M-form) organisation(Mir & 
Watson, 2000). Corporate strategy is considered at the board level of the firm 
as a whole. The strategy content at this level is preoccupied with which 
businesses the firm needs to engage in, which markets to serve, how it will 
organise these businesses into strategic business divisions, how resource 
allocation will be distributed amongst the divisions, what common policies 
will apply to all divisions and other such considerations. Business strategy is 
conducted at a divisional level which focuses more specifically on products, 
technology, operations and market segments. The business strategies are 
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meant to be aligned to the corporate strategy. Functional strategy is 
concerned with different managerial and professional functions such as 
marketing, production, and engineering and how they are to align with the 
divisional and corporate strategy. This approach to strategy is a very linear, 
reductionist and mechanical one. It has been challenged by other approaches. 
For example the M-form organisation has been superseded by other 
“innovative forms of organising” (Pettigrew, et al., 2003). 
Traditionally, competitive advantage was thought to be created by the right 
product-market configurations and positions. This meant that firms need to 
supply products or services to meet specific market needs. If they are able to 
do this at a lower cost than their competitors, or are able to differentiate their 
products and services sufficiently from them, they will be able to accrue rents 
from these advantages. The resource based view (RBV), by contrast, suggests 
that advantage does not reside in the products and services in and of 
themselves, but rather in the underlying resources and capabilities that give 
rise to these products and services. If the resources are “valuable, rare, 
inimitable and nonsubstitutable” then the firm will be successful (Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000, p. 1105). The focus shifts from managing a portfolio of 
businesses (divisions) to managing a portfolio of resources, competencies and 
capabilities. This means that the corporate-divisional-functional strategy 
categorisation is untenable. 
Competitive strategy dynamics is a recent but relatively lesser known 
approach in the broader strategy literature.   I contend that it is a hybrid of the 
resource based view, the dynamic capabilities approach and asset-stock 
approach. The focus here is on the time-paths and patterns of the resources 
and capabilities (Warren, 2002). It is reminiscent of system dynamics stocks 
and flows (Warren, 2004). The competitive strategy dynamics approach offers 
promise if more attention is paid to the feedbacks loops that affect the flows 
to and from the assets, resources and capabilities stocks (Warren, 2005). 
Further, it takes into consideration intangible resources which are important 
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in a knowledge economy. The RBV, dynamic capabilities and competitive 
strategy dynamics approaches are covered in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Classification of strategy: the ten schools of strategy 
There are a variety of classifications of strategy. I shall explore several of them 
in this section. Perhaps the most common is that of the ten schools of 
strategy (Mintzberg, et al., 1998). 
The Design School 
Strategy is a process of conception of a key actor or actors. The CEO is the 
chief strategist and architect of the organisational strategy. The focus is on the 
strategic fit between the organisation and the environment in which it is 
embedded. There is a clear separation between thinking and acting which may 
be translated into a separation of strategy formulation and strategy 
implementation. The power brokers in the organisation are the thinkers and 
the lower level organisational members are the doers (Hrebniak, 2006). Not 
only is thinking separated from action, but thinking precedes action. Implicit 
in this approach is that strategy conception is of a higher order than merely 
implementation. Although strategy is the conception of the chief strategist it 
is made explicit so that it can be translated into action by the doers. 
Chandler’s notion of structure follows strategy is an important component of 
the thinking in the design school. Once the strategy is conceived, it has to be 
implemented. The structure of the organisation, which includes its reporting 
lines, organogrammes, processes of integration and differentiation, 
delegations of authority and culture, are all part of the structure of the 
organisation. The ubiquitous tool of SWOT emanating from the Design 
school indicates that there is not an inordinate emphasis on either the 
organisation or the environment (Mintzberg, 1990). Both are considered 
important if we wish to achieve strategic fit. Another popular strategy 
framework, namely the 7-S framework of McKinsey and Company, may also 
be considered as part of the design school. This framework is an elaboration 
of the structure, and hence there is a subtle shift towards the inner workings 
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of the organisation more than that of the environment. Since the 7-S 
framework is about achieving congruence it is also about strategic fit between 
the organisation and the environment. 
The Planning School 
The planning school (Brews & Hunt, 1999, p. 889; Faulkner, 2002, pp. 5-6) 
considers strategy as a formal process. It applies the same basic model of the 
design school, but it is more systematised and formalised. The central actors 
shift from the chief strategist to an “army” of planners. They design and plan 
the strategy which has to be approved by the executive and the chief 
executive officer. The planning school introduces the link between strategic 
planning and the annual budgeting cycle. The formalisation is a form of 
decomposition. The strategy is decomposed into goals, objectives, forecasts, 
checklist and budgets. This is a very technocratic approach to strategy. We 
have the same separation between thinking and acting as in the design school. 
The distinction is now between strategic planning and strategic 
implementation. The planning school may be considered as one that focuses 
on “predict and plan”.  The planners are a form of high priesthood that plans 
the strategy that the rest of the organisation will implement. Since it bypasses 
line managers who merely provide input into the checklists and templates of 
the planners, there is a disconnection between the strategy and operations 
systems, which is problematic for organisational action to achieve the strategy. 
The focus is on number crunching and strategic controls.  
The Positioning School 
In this school, strategy becomes an analytical process. The focus shifts from 
an infinite number of strategies as conceived by a chief designer or plans as 
prepared by planners, to identifying a few possible strategies which are 
feasible as positions in a market or industry, by considering the competitive 
forces in the industry (Porter, 1979, pp. 143-144). As opposed to the strategic 
planners, we now have the strategic analysts who analyse the industry to 
identify generic strategic positions and select from them. Thinking and action 
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is still separated. The thinking is based on the analysis, which identifies the 
feasible positions. It is then up to the doers to implement the strategies to 
secure those positions. As was the case in the planning school, the focus is 
still formal and based on calculations dependent on hard, quantifiable data. 
The definition of what constitutes meaningful data is that which is economic 
and quantifiable, and tends to disregard the softer aspects such as social, 
political, and cultural aspects which are non-quantifiable. The bias is towards 
big, mature firms, and towards stability. There is a shift in focus to the 
industry and away from the internal factors and capabilities of the 
organisation.  The planning school focuses on the external environment half 
of the SWOT, namely the opportunities and the threats. The Porterian tools 
such as the 5 forces, generic positioning matrix, and value chain analysis are 
all part of the positioning school (A. I. Murray, 1988, pp. 76-78; Porter, 1979, 
pp. 37-42).  
The PIMs database, and strategy approaches that depend on analysis of 
strategic groups also fall under this school. The Boston Consulting Group 
matrix may also be considered as part of the positioning school, except it now 
focuses on the positions of strategic business units of the diversified 
corporation. 
The Entrepreneurial School 
The entrepreneurial school shifts from prescriptive to descriptive accounts of 
strategy. Strategy becomes a visionary process. It is focused on the intuition, 
judgment, wisdom and experience of the single, visionary leader who has the 
entrepreneurial streak to identify and exploit opportunities. It is 
Schumpeterian in its search for new combinations that will contribute to 
“creative destruction”(Faulkner, 2002, p. 3). The focus is on growth of the 
enterprise as the visionary leader pushes the organisation to seek out new 
opportunities consistent with his (her) vision. Strategy is considered as a 
perspective of success embodied in an implicit image or vision which must be 
made explicit so that it is translatable for others to strive to achieve. Strategy-
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making is dominated by an active search for new opportunities.  Power is 
centralised in the leader or CEO, and large, bold decisions are made in the 
face of uncertainty. The growth of the enterprise is a significant objective. 
Strategy is both deliberate and emergent in the entrepreneurial school. 
“[E]ntrepreneurial strategy is both deliberate and 
emergent: deliberate in its broad lines and sense of 
direction, emergent in its details so that these can be 
adapted en route” (Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 125). 
 
Cognitive School 
Strategy is a mental process in the cognitive school. It occurs in the mind of 
the strategist. There are two branches within this school. The first takes a 
positivist and objective stance that captures images of an objective, external 
reality, and thus cognition is based in representation of the world. Such 
representations are in the form of mental schemata, scripts, maps, and mental 
models. This is based on an information-processing model of cognition. 
There is recognition of a number of biases in individual cognition based on 
the work of cognitive psychologists.  The second branch is a based on a non-
positivist, subjective, constructivist stance on reality, and thus cognition is 
based on interpretation. Once again, cognitive and knowledge structures such 
as schemata, scripts and mental models are important, except now they are 
not representations but rather constructions of external reality. Environments are 
enacted (Smirchich & Stubbart, 1985). In the cognitive school, there is less 
emphasis on the SWOT analysis of the design school, all of the formulaic 
approaches in the planning school, as well as the ‘objective” positions of the 
positioning schools. The focus is rather on managerial beliefs and 
predispositions, that impact on the future of the organisation. Analogy, 
metaphor, and symbolic gestures all feature more prominently. Vision is 
based on the interpretation of the strategist that gets translated into a 
collective image. Strategy becomes much more emergent as perspectives 
based on mental models, schemata and framing of how people consider the 
environment.   
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“Strategies thus emerge as perspectives – in the form of 
concepts, maps, schemas, and frames – that shape how 
people deal with inputs from the environment.” 
(Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 170) 
 
The Learning School 
Strategy is an emergent process in the learning school. There is a shift away 
from prescription of how to do strategy to describe how strategy happens. 
The learning school questions the proposition that a failure of strategy is a 
failure of implementation. It points to the flaws in the separation of strategy 
formulation and strategy implementation. The underlying concept is 
important. A separation of formulation and implementation amounts to a 
separation of thinkers (designers, planners, analysts, entrepreneurs) and doers 
(implementers lower down in the organisation). This in turn amounts to a 
separation in thinking and acting, which is challenged by the learning school. 
Strategy is no longer based on a grand design as conceived by the strategist, 
nor is it elaborate plans from the planning school, nor even strategic positions 
that have been carved out before hand. Rather, it is the little actions and 
stream of decisions made over time which results in the strategy. The birth of 
this school has been traced back to Lindblom’s “muddling through” and later 
“logical incrementalism” (Quinn, 1978). The learning school picks up on the 
idea that when there has been major strategic change, it rarely occurs from a 
formal planning process. Instead, they occur from little, often ad hoc, actions 
made by different people in different parts of the organisation without any 
collective intent, that over time coalesce into a new direction. In many cases 
these are based on accident, chance and serendipity. This has significant 
implications for strategy, as it is now no longer a single, all powerful person 
(design school) that is the strategist. Neither is it a group of planners 
(planning school), analysts (positioning school), nor a visionary leader 
(entrepreneurial and cognitive schools). Many individuals anywhere in the 
organisation can contribute to the strategy. The strategists are diffused 
throughout the organisation. 
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“[S]trategic initiatives often develop deep in the hierarchy 
and are then championed, or given impetus, by middle-
level managers who seek the authorization of senior 
executives.”  
(Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 186) 
 
Strategic learning occurs as actions are taken, feedback processes occur, and 
adaptations based on the feedback are made.  
“[S]trategies appear first as patterns out of the past, only 
later, perhaps, as plans for the future and ultimately, as 
perspectives that guide overall behaviour.”  
(Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 209) 
 
The Power School 
According to the power school, strategy formation is the outcome of a 
process of negotiation. The underlying assumption is that organisations are 
comprised of many actors with differing motivations, goals, objectives and 
desires. Therefore, strategy is subject to processes of bargaining and 
negotiation between competing interests and positions of actors. Since the 
exercise of power and influence is accentuated, the power school is inherently 
about politics. This will embrace both overt and covert forms of politics 
(Stacey, 2003). As there are often incompatible positions and interests, the 
power school also embraces conflict as a key variable in strategy making. A 
differentiation may be made between macro and micro power (Mintzberg, et 
al., 1998, p. 243). Micro power relates to actors within an organisation and how 
their inter-relationships affect strategy. Macro power relates to how 
organisations as a whole exercise power with broader stakeholders in the 
transactional and contextual environments (van der Heijden, 1996, pp. 6-8). 
This will include customers, suppliers, regulators, government departments 
and competitors. While the positioning school also focused on bargaining in 
the form of Porter’s 5 forces and industry analysis, there it was primarily from 
an economic point of view, whereas the power school considers bargaining 
from a much broader perspective and looks at power other than that of 
competitive and economic power. The application of game theory in strategy 
falls under the power school. The work on strategic alliances, co-opetition, 
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strategic manoeuvring and the focus on networks of organisations also fall 
under the power school umbrella. 
Strategy as position and ploy is more prominent than strategy as perspective 
in this school and strategy tends to be emergent.  
The Cultural School 
In the cultural school the organisation is conceptualised as a collective social 
system and strategy is considered as a collective process. This is driven by the 
organisational culture that is rooted in the fundamental assumptions, beliefs, 
values, norms and practices that are shared by organisational actors. These are 
shaped through processes of acculturation and socialisation. These are 
primarily tacit and may often be non-verbal. However, there are also 
processes of indoctrination by application of organisational propaganda in the 
form of top management speeches, gestures, myths, and manipulation of 
symbols. These become embedded in the material artifacts of the organisation 
in the form of vision and values statements, newsletters, memoranda and 
reports. There is therefore a complex interaction between implicit and explicit 
culture and between actors and the material culture. They inform, shape and 
constrain each other. A statement attributed to Winston Churchill, “we shape 
our buildings and then they shape us” underlines this. Culture, while a 
collective phenomenon, manifests itself in individual behaviour.  Culture is 
the lens by which people interpret the world, and is therefore a perceptual 
filter. Different organisations faced by the same environment interpret the 
world differently and hence may be said to operate in different environments. 
The organisation’s dominant logic is determined by its culture, and the cues 
that it chooses to focus on in the environment are determined by this 
dominant logic. Paradoxically, in the cultural school, strategy is deliberate, 
though not necessarily conscious.  
Mintzberg et al.(1998) place the resource based view of strategy under the 
cultural school, albeit they refer to that as the hard face of the school. This 
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placement appears to be a little curious. While inimitability of resources may 
be partly due to the underlying culture of the organisation, the RBV is a much 
broader approach to strategy as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
While the power school fragments the organisation into competing 
perspectives and agenda of actors, the cultural school unifies the organisation 
in the form of collective intentions and cognition. This highlights the 
downside of culture which hinges on strategic stability and hence a reluctance 
to change in the face of a changing environment. 
The Environmental School 
In the environmental school, strategy is considered as a reactive process. The 
central actor is the external environment which constrains the organisation. 
The environment is presented in the form of general forces, to which the 
organisation is subject to. One thread in the environmental school is that 
based on contingency theory. The organisational form and actions are 
contingent on the circumstances and context in which it finds itself i.e. the 
environment. In stable environments, mechanistic forms of organisations 
suffice, while in unstable, turbulent environments, other, more adaptable 
forms of organisations are required. A second thread is the population 
ecology view of organisations (Hannan & Freeman, 1997, p. 929). It needs to 
be stressed that here the unit of analysis shifts from a single firm or 
organisation to the population of organisations. This is a neo-Darwinian 
approach that applies the variation-selection-retention model. A birth of an 
organisation is akin to a new variation introduced into the population. It has 
to attract resources from the environment. Given the fixed total resources 
available (carrying capacity) it has to compete for resources within the larger 
population of organisations. The fitter the organisation is, the greater its 
ability to survive. Organisations have to find feasible and viable niches in the 
environment in which they survive otherwise they will be selected out by the 
processes of neo-Darwinian evolution. At the extreme, there is no role for 
leadership in the environmental school as the organisation is subject to the 
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vagaries of the forces in the external environment, and thus the school 
becomes one of extreme determinism (Hafsi & Thomas, 2005, p. 515). 
Configuration School 
Strategy formation is a process of transformation in the configuration school. 
It is a stage or lifecycle model of organisations and strategy. An organisation 
may be described in terms of a stable configuration of its characteristics. The 
configuration refers to the strategies, structure, technology and culture, 
processes and other organisational characteristics. During periods of stability 
the organisation adopts a particular form suitable to the context. In this 
regard it is a form of contingent approach similar to the environmental 
school. The configuration school attempts to tie in various aspects of all the 
other schools and tries to be “all things for all purposes”. 
“The key to strategic management, therefore, is to sustain 
stability of at least adaptable change most of the time, but 
periodically to recognise the need for transformation and 
be able to manage that disruptive process without 
destroying the organization.” 
(Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 305) 
 
“Accordingly, the process of strategy making can be one 
of conceptual designing or formal planning, systematic 
analyzing or leadership visioning, cooperative learning or 
competitive politicking, focusing on individual cognition, 
collective socialization, or simple response to the forces 
of the environment, but each must be found at its own 
time and its own context.”  
(Mintzberg, et al., 1998, pp. 305-306) 
 
Stability is interrupted by transformation, where an organisation leaps to 
another configuration. The configuration school seems to be a stages model 
of organisations. The organisation has stable configurations for long periods 
of time. When faced with shocks from the environment, or discontinuous 
change, it will be transformed and move to a new state with a new set of 
configurations. This is consistent with the model of punctuated equilibrium, 
where there are long periods of stability punctuated by discontinuous change, 
resulting in a shift to a new equilibrium. 
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An alternate categorisation 
In this section, I offer an alternate categorisation of the field of strategy by 
considering two main determinants. The first is the underlying assumptions of 
ontology, and the second is the extent of agency and volition of the strategic 
actors and to what extent they can control the outcomes from their collective 
actions. 
Based on these considerations strategy may be classified as 1) strategic choice, 
2) population ecology, 3) learning and 4) emergent approaches. Although I 
shall describe each of these approaches briefly here, I shall revisit emergent 
approaches to strategy in a later chapter after we have explored complexity 
theory, as the latter is consistent with a complex adaptive systems 
sensemaking methodology. 
Strategic choice 
Strategic choice (Child, 1972) is a rationalist approach to strategy. It is based 
on an ontology of objectivism. It assumes that there is an objective reality that 
may be studied and understood by a small group of organisational actors. It 
makes a clear distinction between the organisation and the environment both 
of which are real and objective. This, single, objective reality may be probed 
using the tools of positivist science. This has been, and continues to be, the 
dominant approach to strategy. It assumes that a single or a small group of 
actors may stand outside of the system and be able to design and implement 
strategy.  Actors may take deliberate action to respond to changes in the 
environment, hence leading to a fit between organisation and environment.  
It is noted that in strategic choice there is the classical distinction between 
thinking and acting, between strategy formulation and strategy 
implementation. It will incorporate the design, planning and positioning 
schools of the Mintzberg et al. classification. Managers are able to design and 
choose a strategy, hence strategic choice. Implicit in this approach is that 
actors have full agency and volition, and are able to achieve the intended 
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results from acting on that agency and volition. The unit of analysis may be 
either the industry or the firm. 
Population Ecology 
The population ecology approach (Hannan & Freeman, 1997) shifts the 
emphasis to a population of organisations that evolve in an external 
environment. It is also based on an objectivist ontology. It is a neo-Darwinian 
perspective that assumes that organisations are subject to the vagaries of the 
environment, and if they are unable to find an appropriate niche they will be 
selected out. In this view, there is little volition and agency on the part of 
strategic actors. This is similar to the evolutionary school of the Mintzberg et 
al. classification. The unit of analysis is the population of organisations. The 
import of this school is that there is very little agency and volition on the part 
of human actors within the organisation. It therefore has an undercurrent of 
fatalism.  
Learning approaches 
The learning approach (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996) to strategy is akin to 
the learning organisation view of organisations in general. It includes aspects 
of the entrepreneurial school, the power school, the cultural school, the 
configuration school and the learning school in terms of the Mintzberg et al. 
classification. The assumption is that in order for organisations to survive, 
they must be able to change at a rate equal to or greater than the rate of 
change of the environment. Here, human actors have full agency and volition, 
but the focus is on the group agency in the form of collective learning, action 
and change. Although this approach has merit in that it broadens the scope of 
who participates in strategy making, it perpetuates the dominant managerial 
discourse of top management and the professional elite, and is a form of 
control through ideological commitment. It is also limited in that it will not 
apply under conditions of disagreement and dissent amongst organisational 
actors. The underlying assumption is that there is a level of shared consensus 
and commitment. 
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Where the strategic choice perspective assumes that the environment may be 
known and understood, the learning approach assumes that the environment 
is too fast changing and turbulent, and therefore the rate of learning within 
the organisation must be equal to or greater than the rate of change in the 
environment. It is therefore a weak form of strategic choice. As long as the 
rate of learning is high enough, the environment may still be known and 
therefore organisational actors may be able to choose and implement a 
strategy. The notion of vision is very important in the learning approach. It 
acknowledges the issues in the power school, but considers power as 
something bad that must be minimised, and therefore, the learning approach 
proposes mechanisms for overcoming power differences in the organisation.  
Emergent Perspective 
An emergent approach (Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 189; Quinn, 1978, p. 387; 
Stacey, 2003) to strategy takes as its point of departure that strategy is not a 
result of conscious and deliberate actions that have been planned and 
designed in advance. Rather, strategy emerges through a variety of 
organisational interactions and processes that become a consistent, coherent 
pattern in a stream of actions over time. Mintzberg and Waters (1985, p. 258) 
very early on made the distinction between planned, emergent, deliberate and 
realised strategies. I shall reiterate this very briefly. If the strategy that was 
planned is realised, then we may term that deliberate strategy. If the strategy 
that was planned does not happen, it may be termed as unrealised strategy. 
Strategy that is different from what was planned and emerges over time into a 
coherent pattern of actions, may be referred to as emergent strategy that is 
realised.  
This perspective incorporates aspects of the learning school, power school, 
evolutionary school and the cognitive school. This is the arena of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1991, pp. 125, 132) and satisficing actions. This 
perspective draws its justification from complexity theory.  
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Strategy in crisis 
Due to the proliferation of theories and perspectives some authors lament 
that strategy is in crisis, is fragmented and is in a state of disintegration 
(Hambrick, 2004, p. 91; Volberda, 2004, p. 37). Some authors have even gone 
to the extent to state that the traditional understanding of the concept of 
strategy may have passed (Farjoun, 2007, p. 198). It is acknowledged that 
strategy is a vast field of knowledge, and draws from a variety of underlying 
disciplines, especially in the social sciences, including economics, psychology, 
sociology, marketing, and organisational behaviour. Given the disparate 
research agendas and the perceived fragmentation, the field may be in danger 
of losing its coherence, becoming indistinguishable from adjacent fields and 
being absorbed into them. There has therefore been a call for more 
integration and consolidation. Hambrick (2004, pp. 93-95) suggests the 
following in order to remedy this deficiency. 
There should be renewed interest and better integration between strategy 
content, strategy process and implementation. Those focusing on strategy 
content tend to ignore the implications for implementation and the 
constraints that are faced in real organisations. This tends to over-simplify 
and may result in far-fetched and implausible strategies. This belies the 
complex nature of strategic processes. Presently these are studied too much in 
isolation from each other, and researchers working in these different areas 
seem to live in different “fact universes”(Gerzon, 2006, p. 121).    
The tendency to assign anthropomorphic qualities to organisations gives rise 
to ignoring the human element in much of strategy research. This needs to be 
remedied in some way whether it is taking into account the human strengths, 
predispositions, or weaknesses, biases and frailties. Ultimately, it is people that 
are engaged in organisational work. If this richness is stripped out, it leaves 
many gaps in our understanding. 
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The field needs to overcome “its fetish about novelty” (Hambrick, 2004, p. 
94). The academic journals are loathe to publish material that is not new. This 
is a disincentive to rework and replicate previous research, and thus the field 
moves relentlessly forward towards new conjectures and hypotheses without 
deepening our knowledge of what is already known. 
Further, the strategy field is also obsessive about theory. As a result, work that 
tends to be descriptive about every day organisational phenomena, do not 
easily get published in major journals, unless it is able to make a significant 
theoretical contribution. This, according to Hambrick, is counter-productive. 
He notes that other fields regularly “publish articles that report descriptions 
of complex phenomena, as well as unexplained associations between 
phenomena” (p.95). 
Volberda (2004) also acknowledges that the strategy field is very fragmented, 
and is full of varying prescriptions and directions on successful strategy and 
performance. It is also full of inconsistencies and contradictions (Hafsi & 
Thomas, 2005). It may therefore benefit from integration and consolidation, 
from an academic standpoint. Volberda suggests that what is required is 
synthesis and not necessarily integration for the field to move forward. He 
argues that the force toward integration leads to theoretical frameworks that 
become disconnected from practice and strategic problems in the real world. 
Citing Mahoney (1993), he notes that strategy is still a pre-paradigmatic field 
(Mezias & Regnier, 2007), and there is therefore benefit in pluralism that 
draws concepts and theories from other fields to enhance our understanding 
of strategy. Synthesis from his point of view does not require a single, 
unifying paradigm, with universal laws and concepts, but rather requires a 
form of clustering into a few major groups of strategy problem areas. He 
proposes clustering into three strategy schools, namely the boundary school, 
the dynamic capability school and configuration school. While, I tend to agree 
with his basic notion of how to achieve synthesis, the final clusters that he 
arrives at, is in my view, quite idiosyncratic with insufficient articulation of the 
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rationale and justification for how it was arrived at. Further, it does not cover 
the strategy terrain in a broad enough way, ignoring for example the learning, 
political and cognitive approaches.  
Further critique of the field is that much of the research is dominated by 
instrumental rationality, and on the reliance on large statistical databases with 
large sample sizes. This is far removed from the richness, complexity, 
ambiguity and messiness of strategy as experienced by organisational 
practitioners. Strategic management is seen as obsessed with theory and 
disconnected from the world of practice (Hoffman, 2004, p. 213) and has 
relatively little influence on the formulation of public policy (Mahoney & 
McGahan, 2007, p. 79). 
“In particular an unholy coalition seems to have emerged 
between a dominant theory (rational choice theory) 
(Ostrom, 1998) and a dominant research methodology 
(Large N research).” 
(Heugens & Mol, 2005, p. 119) 
 
This raises the question of the relationship between strategic choice, chance 
and determinism in strategy. De Rond & Thietart (2007, p. 537) present the 
following conjectures in order to theorise about this: 
Conjecture 1:  Causality is a necessary condition for freedom of choice. 
Conjecture 2: Chance coincidences can open up new avenues for further 
choices. 
Conjecture 3: Strategic choice is in itself insufficient to account for strategy. 
Conjecture 4: Causal backgrounds are necessary in order for us to interpret 
and exploit chance events. 
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“Strategy results from a complex interplay between 
chance and choice as mediated by causal background.” 
De Rond & Thietart (2007, p. 544)  
 











Figure 2.1: Strategic choice, chance and inevitability 
Source: De Rond, M., & Thietart, R.-A. (2007, p.546) 
 
This theoretical position is one attempt to resolve the dilemma of deliberate 
or emergent strategy. Realised strategy may only be deliberate if the strategic 
actors have strategic choice. To the extent that they believe they do, they will 
act, take decisions and hold themselves and others accountable for these 
actions and decisions. Determinism and strategic choice may be seen as polar 
opposites on a continuum. Extreme determinism implies that outcomes are 
based on teleological cause-effect relationships. Therefore, causal 
relationships are central to determinism. Strategic choice implies that human 
actors may intervene in the world (organisational contexts) to achieve desired 
ends by employing selected means. Paradoxically, however, strategic choice 
also depends on causation. In order to intervene, strategic actors have to 
work on the presumption of cause-effect relationships that make their choices 
and actions meaningful. This is the very basis of means-ends relationships. 
Where does chance fit into this scheme? Extreme determinism, while denying 
strategic choice, would also deny chance. However, chance events are not 
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inconsistent with causation. What chance does is enable different possibilities 
to materialise. Given path dependence, random events do not only effect a 
single period, but leave their traces on the future possibilities of the system. 
Furthermore, chance events may be magnified by positive feedback to the 
extent that they overwhelm the behaviour of the causal process. This is 
manifested in path-dependence. Since strategy is also dependent on the 
micro-processes and little actions that coalesce into patterns of actions over 
time, strategic choice is insufficient to account for strategy. This is given 
further support from a complex adaptive systems view of organisations.  
Finally, according to De Rond & Thietart (2007, p. 546) “causal background 
is a precondition for chance insofar as organizational actors rely on it for 
interpretation, prioritization, legitimization, explanation, and sanctioning  or 
discarding alternatives”.  
A critical perspective of strategy implies that we have to go back to some of 
the foundational assumptions of the field. It has been argued by Ruef (2003, 
p. 243) that the ultimate goal of the field, that of profit maximisation, is an 
institutional construct.  Further, given that the emergence of strategic 
organisation is conditioned by history, then the principles that the field has 
accepted as normative need to be considered not as ahistorical, but rather as a 
product of institutional developments (Ruef, 2003, p. 243). 
Strategising and organising 
There has been recognition that while strategy and organisation have been 
considered distinct and separable, there may actually be a strategy-
organisation duality. This is marked by two separate but related shifts. The 
first shift is the recognition of the duality to the extent that strategic 
organisation has become conjoined and considered one single endeavour 
within the field of strategy. This is particularly marked by the creation of a 
new strategy journal, titled Strategic Organization. In an article of the inaugural 
edition of this journal, Whittington emphasises that strategy and organisation 
are fundamentally connected (Whittington, 2003). The second shift which is 
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possibly more profound is that of a shift from the noun forms of strategy and 
organisation to the verb forms of strategising and organising, respectively. 
Further, the terms elide into each other to become strategising/organising. 
Strategising shifts the focus to the active processes of strategists engaged in 
strategy-making. That is, strategising is something that people do, and the 
interest is in doing strategy. One may already detect a shift to that of practice 
and the practice turn in the field of strategy, that has led to its own subfield 
termed strategy-as-practice. The focus in the latter is on strategy as a type of 
work and not just a property or feature of organisations (Jarzabkowski & 
Whittington, 2008).  
While the strategy-as-practice approach has claimed to have taken a more 
reflexive position of strategy, others have contested this view (Carter, Clegg, 
& Kornberger, 2008b). They argue that strategy from its seminal stage has 
had the imprint of modernist and instrumental rationality. The strategy-as-
practice approach seems to be wedded to addressing the needs of practising 
managerial elites (Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2008a). This coupled with its 
pre-occupation with the “real”, means that it is stuck in the tradition of 
functionalism.   
“From an epistemological point of view, the strategy as 
practice approach seems to resemble a crude version of 
positivism that understands practice as being ‘closer’ to 
reality and delivering a ‘more accurate’ description of the 
real world.”  
(Carter, et al., 2008b, p. 88) 
 
Other criticisms are that the idea of practice is ambiguous and not well 
defined, that the distinction between practices and processes are muddled, the 
focus is on top managers with insufficient attention to complex networks of 
actors, little discussion on language, symbols and artifacts used in strategy 
making, and too much focus on formal procedures rather than those that 
emerge spontaneously. A further critique is that while there is a huge body of 
work in sociology that is well known and has contributed to organisation 
studies, strategy-as-practice which claims to have a strong sociological 
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perspective, has not used these insights except in “an ornamental way” 
(Carter, et al., 2008a). 
“It does so with the aplomb of a colonialist newly 
‘discovering’ an already peopled continent, for whose 
existing inhabitants scant regard is given.”  
(Carter, et al., 2008b, p. 85) 
 
The verb form of organising reflects the interest in the dynamic process and 
fluidity of organisation in opposition to the stable structure and fixidity of 
organisation. The strategising/organising perspective is concerned with the 
micro-activities of strategists in every day practice and in the “murmurings of 
everyday life” (Whittington & Melin, 2003, p. 44, citing De Certau, 1984). 
“We use the phrase organizing is strategizing to capture the 
central argument that organizing and strategizing are parts 
of the same managerial processes, and that, therefore, 
they cannot be treated as separate managerial activities.” 
(Achtenhagen, Melin, & Mullern, 2003, p. 75, emphases 
in the original) 
 
Organising is defined as: 
“the creation and use of structural practices and 
coordination processes by internal stakeholders to enact 
the organization’s identity, culture and interests” 
 
while strategising is defined as:  
“planning, resource allocation, monitoring and control 
practices and processes through which strategy is 
enacted.”  
(Colville & Murphy, 2006, p. 632) 
 
There are four strands in the broader social sciences that underpin the 
strategising/organising approach. These include complementarities in 
economics, postmodernism, the practice perspective and structuration theory 
(Whittington, 2004).   
Complementarities refer to the increasing returns to other activities by doing 
one activity. It is related to a virtuous circle driven by positive feedback of 
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activities that mutually reinforce each other through networked and web-like 
relationships. While complementarities in economics often focuses on these 
network effects and positive externalities generated by activities done by one 
firm for other firms, the same underlying synergistic logic operates within a 
single organisation as well. One aspect of this is how the dynamics of 
organisational relationships impact strategy, and how strategy-making 
influences the structural components of organisation. 
Postmodernism questions the sharp distinctions, fragmentation and 
specialisation embedded in modernism. It is destabilising in its effects, and 
merges distinct boundaries into a new kind of holism, yet at the same time 
deconstructing grand theories and narratives.  The sharp distinction of 
strategy and organisation in their particular ordered sequence is therefore no 
longer tenable. Strategy and organisation are a new whole.  In addition, 
postmodernism shifts from static structures to dynamic processes, hence the 
support from strategy to strategising and organisation to organising.  Verb 
forms are preferred in postmodernism.  
“… a postmodern style of thinking is one which eschews 
thinking in terms of accomplishments, of nouns, end-
states, insulated, discrete social entities and events. 
Instead it is a style which privileges action, movement, 
process and emergence.” 
(Chia, 1995, p.593, cited in Whittington & Melin, 2003, p. 
43) 
 
The practice perspective in social theory has as a central focus, situated 
activity in practice. It is interested in what people do as practitioners in shared 
sets of practices and activities. Thus, the focus is on micro-activities and the 
little improvisations made by practitioners as they navigate a complex world 
of practice. This naturally leads to the concept of learning from effective 
practice. The kind of learning that is needed for effective practice does not 
rely on formal learning but rather that type of learning that is drawn from the 
practitioners’ habitus, defined as: 
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 “the accumulated schemes of perceptions, thought and 
action derived from their pathway through life.”  
(Whittington & Melin, 2003, p. 44) 
 
Habitus is second nature to the individual, embedded in his history, is tacit 
and embodied, and leads to responses as second-nature, producing practices 
spontaneously, naturally and barely consciously.  
“[H]abitus acquires through experience an integrated, if 
fuzzy, coherence” 
 (Whittington & Melin, 2003, p. 44). 
 
Thus, the practice perspective heightens the active sense of 
strategising/organising, the rootedness in what practitioners do, and the kind 
of skills that are not easily reducible to conventional scientific approaches. 
These skills are non-formulaic, highly contextual and difficult to transmit. 
Learning and practice shapes processes within organisation and is integral to 
organising.  Moreover, the practices in strategising and organising call on 
similar skills and techniques (Whittington, Molloy, Mayer, & Smith, 2006). 
Structuration theory refers to the duality of structure and agency. Structure is 
intertwined with action as action gives rise to structural relations, which in 
turn animates and constrains actions. This has implications for leadership, as 
it is not the lone, heroic efforts of leaders that determine organisational 
futures. Leader’s actions are constrained and enabled by the structural rules, 
resources, and routines, which they themselves shape and construct. 
However, the rise of structural relationships which subsequently enable and 
constrains leader’s actions, are also shaped and constructed by wider set of 
actors within social contexts. Structuration theory is aligned to processual 
approaches to strategy with its focus on creating, and recreating structures. It 
therefore has a contribution to the strategising/organising perspective. 
 Page 42 
“Organizations can be viewed as continuous and 
intertwined processes of strategizing and organizing, as 
dynamic entities rather than just as static structures and 
strategic positions.” 
(Achtenhagen, et al., 2003, p. 75) 
 
Colville & Murphy (2006) argue that the change of pace in the external 
environment, leading to uncertainty and unpredictability is the driver from 
strategy to strategising / organising. They cite the case of pharmaceutical firm, 
Eli Lilly, and indicate how first strategy was pre-eminent, then the move to 
equal weighting given to strategy and organisation, and finally to 
strategising/organising. They suggest that leadership is the key element that 
connects strategy and organisation and enables strategising / organising. Here 
leadership is about a bigger role for human agency, and is understood from 
the perspective of sensemaking.  
“[S]trategy and organization emerge from local 
cumulative actions viewed retrospectively.”  
(Colville & Murphy, 2006, p. 674) 
  
The focus is on how people organise to make sense of fuzzy cues and 
enacting the result back to achieve a more orderly world. Paradoxically, the 
action shapes interpretation retrospectively (p.671). 
Under the ambit of strategising/organising, attention is drawn to new 
theoretical and practical insights by considering organisation as pluralistic 
contexts (Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006). This is a different view of strategy, 
where the organisation is not reified as a coherent whole. Pluralistic contexts 
imply that organisations have stakeholders with sufficient power to make 
demands that legitimately influence the strategic goals of the organisations. In 
many cases these strategic goals are competing, incompatible and conflicting. 
Pluralistic internal stakeholder demands leads to multiple organising contexts 
and processes that are tied to the identity and professional goals and 
associations of the differing groups, while pluralistic stakeholder demands 
leads to multiple strategic processes which may not be compatible with each 
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other (Colville & Murphy, 2006). Jarzabkowski & Fenton (2006) present the 






































































































Figure 2.2: Association between organising and strategising pressures 
Source: Jarzabkowski, P., & Fenton, E. (2006, p.637) 
 
They identify three problems as a result of the interdependence between 
organising and strategising in pluralistic contexts: 
• Pluralistic organising pressures have unintended strategising 
implications 
• Pluralistic strategising pressures strain organising capacity 
• Protracted tensions between organising and strategising 
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In order to address these problems, organisations need to strive for ongoing 
mutual adjustment between organising and strategising. They identify the 
interdependent mode 
 “as an ideal state in which organizing and strategising are 
mutually reinforcing, creating organisational practices that 
are tailored to the demand of different strategic goals, and 
strategizing practices that recognise the interests and 
identities of different organizational groups.” 
(Jarzabkowski & Fenton, 2006, p. 642)  
 
This requires ongoing dialogue on a regular basis with a wide spectrum of 
organisational actors, with the aim of achieving common ground by placing 
the various interests within the wider context of multiple positions, interests 
and goals. Interdependence is not a steady-state but an ideal that the 
organisation has to strive for, dealing with the small imbalances between 
strategising and organising that occur daily, and making the necessary mutual 
adjustments. 
The separation of strategic planning and implementation which dominates 
much of the literature has also been problematised. One way of dealing with 
it is to consider strategy as a “perennially unfinished project” (Knights & 
Mueller, 2004) that implies that it is a continuous process of self-formation 
and reconstruction. This is a much more dynamic view of strategy. The idea is 
that projects are made up of a variety of stakeholders that have different 
power and demands. Strategy appears as different configurations as the 
organisations attempts to placate the diverse sets of stakeholders and fulfil 
their demands.  
“Like the subjectivities or identities of the various 
stakeholders that strategy seeks to manage, the corporate 
or managerial subjectivity of strategic agents is also 
multiple, often fragmented, fragile and precarious.” 
(Knights & Mueller, 2004, p. 56) 
 
One of the rationales of the strategy as project notion is to overcome the 
subjectivist or objectivist poles of strategy. It is positioned as reflective of a 
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discourse approach to strategy. The latter treats strategy as a discourse or 
narrative where organisations are dominated by words, texts, stories and 
conversations. The discourse approach in some ways dissolves the 
subjectivist-objectivist duality.  The objectivist stance assumes that the 
organisation is subject to general forces from the environment, but does not 
take into account the mutual shaping between the environment and the 
internal relations. These relations are dependent on the social architecture that 
is constituted in the subjectivities of the people that make up the social 
architecture of the organisation. Further the organisation-environment 
boundary is itself problematised, as this boundary is not fixed. A subjectivist 
stance posits that the environment is subject to interpretation but at the same 
time gives sovereignty to the managers, but does not take into account how 
the mindsets of managers are in themselves constituted and mediated through 
sets of social relations. 
“Far from a neutral notion, the ‘environment’ is politically 
constructed as the demon or dragon that, simply for 
purposes of self-survival, has to be slain or controlled.” 
(Knights & Mueller, 2004, p. 57) 
 
The strategy-as-project concept considers how strategy has the unintended 
side effects of transforming individuals into subjects, and therefore shapes 
and impacts their self-identity, as they engage with the various activities in 
strategy-making. This in turn depends on the various demands made by the 
stakeholders in the “project” and the configurations that are continuously 
reconstructed. 
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Actor-network theory 
I now turn to what actor-network theory has to say about strategic 
organization.  
“[A]ctor-network theory is best thought of as a language 
rather than as an explanatory framework” 
(Steen, Coopmans, & Whyte, 2006, p. 304)  
 
Actor-network theory focuses on micro-foundations of organisation, disrupts 
the dichotomy between structure and agency, and considers the exercise of 
agency and choice of individuals. In actor-network theory, conventionally 
what has been considered structures are configurations of human and non-
human actors interacting together and thus structures are not stable entities, 
but are rather fleeting, and emerge out of confrontation and interactions. In 
actor-network theory what presents itself as an actor may not be a single 
individual, but may be an entire network (Czarniawska, 2006, p. 1554). 
Resources within the organisations are no longer static, but are dynamic, 
heterogeneous assemblages of human and non-human actors. Agency is not 
thought of as intentionality but rather it becomes a form of distributed action 
with structure and agency shaping each other. As indicated by McKiernan & 
Carter (2004, p. 5) “strategy is mediated through a broad gamut of 
technologies that possess agency”. 
“Instead of a single actor in control, we have to be open 
to the possibility that it is an amalgam of people in 
various positions as well as technologies, regulations, 
memos, etc., that produce the effect of strategic 
organization.” 
(Steen, et al., 2006, p. 107) 
 
Actor-network theory lends itself to situations of uncertainty, flux and 
change, because that is where new associations are formed.  It therefore 
affords the opportunity to methodologically link in with strategy-as-practice 
approaches. Both focus on the micro-activities of organisation life, and 
situated activity in practice. There is no longer a preoccupation with fixed 
boundaries and categories. In strategy-as-practice, the human actor is centre 
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stage to the extent that we are interested in how (s)he does strategy. Actor-
network theory disrupts the relations between this human actor and the 
activities, and other non-human actors. Furthermore, agency is not just 
invested in human actors, but rather in non-human actors in the form of 
objects and technologies as well. Elsewhere, in my discussion of complexity 
theory (Chapter 5), I use the term artifacts to address these, and consider 
them as agents. This is very similar to agency being invested in non-human 
actors, as in actor-network theory. While the actions of individuals are 
important, it is not isolated from the relations and connections that make 
these individuals purposeful. Strategy-as-practice researchers are typically 
concerned with “lived experience and the mutual constitution of actors and 
their worlds” (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008, p. 104). It therefore 
eschews positivism and is not concerned with objective reality. 
The role of number systems in strategy-making has raised some interest 
(Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2006). In conditions of ambiguity and plurality, 
numbers enable action to occur. This “action at a distance” is enabled 
because numbers contain the properties of mobility, stability and 
combinability. Mobility is the possibility for agreed conventions to be 
transported from one point to another. Stability provides for shared meaning 
through accepted norms and conventions. An example of this is the standards 
and conventions of generally accepted accounting principles. Combinability is 
the property that allows numbers to be aggregated, compared and converted 
into alternate numbers in the form of ratios. They also allow normalisation of 
numbers for comparison. The quantification of aspects of reality into 
numbers is driven out of the necessity for trust to enable action at a distance. 
Therefore, number systems are required under conditions of distrust and 
pluralistic decision contexts.  
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“By definition, however, quantification transforms rich 
and complex realities into more abstract and thinly 
described representations. Their claim to objectivity is 
therefore inherently suspect.”  
(Denis, et al., 2006, p. 353) 
 
This use of number in strategy-making links into actor-network theory, in that 
we note how number-based and quantification systems assume strong 
elements of agency, to the extent that users of numbers are seen to be 
detached from the decisions that they make based on those number systems. 
Therefore numbers are a political tool that allows strategic actors to influence 
and marginalise contesting positions and present an “aura of neutrality”. The 
application of technologies of quantification is also important as they are 
embedded in micro-practices of strategy making, and are therefore an 
important component of the strategy-as-practice perspective. Numbers are a 
form of “constructing objectivity” (p.360). 
The issue of agency is not a straight-forward one, however, as exemplified in 
the following quotation. 
“The number system in fact provided a means for people 
to consent to the closure of institutions, yet distance 
themselves from the decision. Not they, but the numbers, 
were responsible for the final fateful choice.” 
(Denis, et al., 2006, p. 368) 
Strategy as “Serious Play” 
An interesting model of strategy-making is that of strategy as serious-play 
(Roos & Victor, 1999). This is based on the work of these authors at the 
Strategic Imagination Lab at the International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD) in Switzerland. The work is a research effort at 
developing and refining a conceptual framework from conducting 
experiments on strategic challenges faced by real strategy-making teams. 
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The model is shown below: 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Strategy as serious play 
Source: Roos, J., & Victor, B. (1999, p.354) 
 
The authors suggest that superior strategies depend on originality, and this in 
turn requires strategic imagination. Strategic imagination is defined as an 
emergent process based on the interactions between three distinct types of 
imagination. 
Descriptive Imagination 
This type of imagination is drawn from framing images and representations of 
a complex world. It is a matter of sifting through large amounts of data drawn 
from analytical processes, identifying patterns and regularities and 
constructing images of the environment.  They include most of the 
conventional strategy tools such as five forces, value chain analyses, SWOT, 
portfolio analyses, a variety of 2x2 strategy matrices, and even scenarios and 
Morgan’s “images of organization” as techniques for stimulating the 
descriptive imagination.  
Creative Imagination 
This refers to creativity that generates new opportunities that are inherent but 
not previously realised. The authors suggest that creativity plays a central role 
in many of the suggested mechanisms on strategy-making, such as 
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skunkworks, intrapreneurship teams, and visioning. The focus is on 
innovative possibilities. They state that the strategy literature refers to the role 
of analysis before any attempts at strategic creativity. They caution that some 
organisations may opt for strategies that are so different that they become 
disconnected from major stakeholders. These stakeholders do not understand 
and therefore do not legitimise the new strategies. This is a problem as these 
are the stakeholders that enable access to the strategic resources that are 
required. The inherent danger of creative imagination is “flights of fantasy” 
that lose touch with reality. 
Challenging Imagination 
It is with this type of imagination that: 
 “we negate, defame, contradict and even destroy the 
sense of progress that comes from descriptions and 
creativity…It is with our challenging imagination that we 
find the disillusioning, the absurd and the outrageous in 
everyday experience.”  
(Roos & Victor, 1999, p. 350) 
 
The challenging imagination is based on deconstruction and sarcasm. The 
danger is that the challenging imagination does not provide an alternative for 
the object of deconstruction once it has been dismantled. 
It is the complex interplay between these three kinds of imagination in a 
social context that leads to strategic imagination. The result is an emergent 
process that is consistent with Mintzberg’s emergent strategy. This has three 
major elements, 1) construction of knowledge gathered from analysis and 
experience, 2) sharing of meaning from such knowledge and 3) 
transformation of identity assimilating the new knowledge. The authors state 
that during the strategy-making process much of it is concerned with what 
could be, and hence is akin to “make believe”. They connect this insight 
related to the social dynamics of strategy-making with learning from 
anthropology and social psychology that relates to “play”. Therefore strategy- 
making is a form of “serious play” where executives agree to participate in a 
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learning experience that is collective and has intellectual, emotional and social 
elements (p.352). 
“[I]t is an activity that draws upon the interrelated domain 
so the intellectual, emotional and social life of the 
organization. Since the strategic imagination must be an 
organization-wide imagination, the strategy process must 
not only stimulate the individual’s imagination. The 
strategy-making process must enable the transformation 
of the individual imagination into something that is 
shared.”  
(Roos & Victor, 1999, p. 352) 
 
The strategy-making model from this work therefore highlights that strategy-
makers draw on their strategic imagination, when there is an emerging 
strategic idea that can be shared. This is done through a process of story-
telling about the possibilities, which then impact on transforming their 
identities that incorporate the new knowledge. 
In later work, reported by researchers from the Imagination Lab, they 
explored the use of a multimodal approach to strategy. They note that 
Morgan’s application of metaphors and images of organisation indicate the 
importance of multiple perspectives and views in order to get a richer 
understanding of organisational life. However, when it comes to strategy- 
making the “effect of strategy imagery on strategy making itself has not been explored 
in the literature” (Burgi & Roos, 2003, p. 69, emphases in original). This is 
what their research attempted to address. They draw on the work of Piaget 
who demonstrated that knowledge was constructed in the mind while there 
was active construction in the world. This indicates that knowledge 
construction is dependent on more than reading, writing and speaking, to 
include physiological aspects. If this idea is coupled with Gardner’s multiple 
intelligences, beyond mathematical and verbal, then a strong case is made for 
multimodal approaches to imagery including pictorial/visual, verbal/ 
narrative, and spatial/kinaesthetic. Since strategy-making conventionally tends 
to be highly abstract there is an assumption that it has to be highly cognitivist. 
The multimodal approach experimented with by these researchers focuses on 
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a more concrete approach to strategy-making that is underpinned by 
constructionist perspectives of knowing. Their work was a form of action 
research, in the case of one strategy-making team in a single organisation. The 
research indicated success in the application of the strategy-making process in 
relation to previous processes that were followed, and that it was more 
effective than other means. They note that there are challenges to generalise 
their findings. However they further state: 
“And, as action research that seeks to access and 
understand the subjectivities that affect the imagery of 
strategy makers, techniques have to be used that allow 
such access even at the cost of a broader, more objective 
cross-sectional sample of different factors affecting the 
strategy formulation.” 
(Burgi & Roos, 2003, p. 76) 
 
A paradoxical lesson from this work is that since much of imagery of 
organisational life is abstract and seeks to reduce information, the multimodal 
approach deepens understanding of reality, reducing the level of abstraction 
felt by strategy-makers. 
In a later paper on the ongoing work of the Imagination Lab, Roos, Victor, & 
Statler (2004), report further on “serious play”. It considers the conventional 
technologies that are used in strategy-making workshops. These technologies 
are usually whiteboards, flipcharts, PowerPoint presentations, and at times 
computer support and group decision-making tools. These are generally two-
dimensional media. They introduce three-dimensional media, in the form of 
LEGO blocks, into the strategy-making process. The introduction of this 
simple technology has a profound impact on the way strategy-making is 
conducted. The LEGO blocks are used by participants “to make and express 
meaning” (p. 552). They present a framework that focuses on two variables 
that are changed. The first variable as already mentioned is media. The use of 
the LEGO blocks, shifts from two-dimensional to three-dimensional, and 
presents a tactile dimension to the work that strategists engage in. This 
introduces a connection between hand and mind, which, they hypothesise 
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affects the outcomes. The second variable that they consider in their 
framework is that of mode. The mode in conventional forms of strategy 
making is primarily cognitive. The introduction of the new media widens the 
mode to include affective aspects and additional processual elements. The 
mode therefore is now expanded to include cognitive, emotional and social 
interaction elements. The mode is also important in another way, which 
relates to the intentionality behind which strategy-making occurs. There has 
long been the consideration of strategy as deliberate or emergent. Roos, 
Victor, & Statler (2004) note that by the introduction of the LEGO blocks 
media, the mode is expanded to include both deliberate and emergent 
perspectives of strategy making. One of their early hypotheses in using the 
“serious play” approach is that by changing the media and the mode, and 
thereby the strategy process, it will lead to a change in the strategy content. 
This means that if their hypotheses are valid they have discovered an effective 
bridge between strategy content and strategy process.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Media and mode in strategy as serious play 
Source: Roos, J., Victor, B., & Statler, M. (2004, p.564) 
 
This leads us to consider what other aspects can serve such a bridge. How do 
we facilitate a change in the strategy content by changing the strategy process? 
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Does this mean that different forms of processual approaches, automatically 
impact on strategy content? 
They offer three case studies of the application of “serious play” in strategy 
making. In one of the sessions, they offered participants an assortment of 
LEGO materials in predefined strategic management categories including 
resources, connections, people and dynamics, together with usual two-
dimensional materials such as flipcharts, transparencies and whiteboards. 
They observed that participants were easily able to present their ideas, 
concerns and opinions around challenges and opportunities that they faced. 
This was supported by improved participation in groups. In explaining what 
they built, they told “elaborate stories” that exhibited strong affective 
dimensions. They attributed meaning to shapes, sizes, and colours of the 
LEGO blocks. Some included temporal dimensions.  
Although in one of the cases, strategy-makers seem to revert to the dominant 
approach, there was nevertheless some impact on the outcomes. The other 
two cases appear to support the hypotheses. 
“Overall, our observations and associated literature 
supports our initial hunch that changing the medium and 
the mode constraints on strategy processes can lead to 
changes in strategy content.” 
(Roos, et al., 2004, p. 560) 
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The lessons from this work are summarised below: 
• Play is an activity that is voluntary and not forced. It can be 
encouraged and supported but not imposed. 
• Serious play draws on descriptive, creative and challenging 
imagination so that participants see their organisational reality 
differently from “normal reality”. 
• It integrates cognitive, social and emotional dimensions of experience. 
• Despite drawing on intentionality it stimulates emergent outcomes on 
organisational issues and challenges. 
• In order to achieve innovative strategy content, organisations require 
innovative strategic processes. 
• Play develops the capacity to understand meaning and the ability to 
recognise social rules such that participants act and communicate 
according to them. 
• Manipulation of material brings in an integrative link between hand 
and mind, and offers new ways to interact with the world. 
• The constructions utilising the new medium of LEGO bricks is a 
form of creating analogues of mental models of participants, and 
therefore shared construction means new, shared mental models. This 
has links to the learning organisational literature. 
• The research shows the benefits of non-positivist approaches to 
strategy. 
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“Instead of making an observer-independent, 
retrospective account of processes conducted after they 
unfolded, we have tried to make observer-dependent, 
real-time observations of events after they unfolded, and 
without knowing the outcomes in advance.” 
(Roos, et al., 2004, p. 564, emphases added) 
 
We may also consider to what extent the “serious play” intervention relies on 
the use of metaphor and analogical reasoning, and whether there is merit in 
combining the application of metaphor and analogy together with the change 
to three dimensional media. Another avenue worth further investigation is the 
use of other three dimensional media, that rely more heavily on the tactile 
dimensions. I would suggest that this could be extrapolated to potter’s clay or 
play-dough, as here the tactile dimensions are accentuated. We may also 
consider how the cognitive aspects may be temporarily suppressed by 
suppressing the dominant sense of sight. So we could ask participants to use 
the potter’s clay while they are blindfolded. This extends the potential of 
metaphorical and analogical reasoning by emphasising different sensory 
faculties.  
Finally, we may consider how the use of the LEGO blocks to present a 
representation of the organisation, contributes to sensemaking. 
The strategy-as-practice perspective focuses on practices which includes tools, 
procedures and routines that are deployed in the strategy-making process. 
This in itself provides a theoretical rationale for the strategy as “serious play” 
discussed in this section. Managers do not just design abstract strategies and 
structures, but also construct physical objects with which to communicate 
them (Whittington, et al., 2006).  
A case has been made that there is a need for more process thinking in 
strategic organization. This is about understanding “movement, activity, 
events, change and temporal evolution” (Langley, 2007, p. 271). One 
implication of this is that the application of strategy tools in strategy-making is 
in itself not static, nor are the organisational routines that underpin them. 
 Page 57 
Examples include the resource based view and the dynamic capabilities 
approach. Routines “are recursively reproduced and yet adapted each time 
they are invoked” (2007, p. 275). 
Minocha & Stonehouse (2007) note that strategising tends to favour the 
verbal and the “text”, that is strategising is seen as “disembodied”.  So 
although strategy has followed the linguistic turn also found in organisation 
and management studies, it has been slower in taking the “bodily turn”. They 
call for taking into consideration the impacts of the body on strategising.  
“In calling for acknowledgement of the body we urge the 
study of non-verbal gestures, sounds, silences, gestures, 
voices and the overall physicality of strategizing 
processes. However, study is not limited to the physical 
body but also its embodiment – the meaning-made body 
(Bourdieu, 1977:75), the lived body (Grosz, 1994, 1995), 
the becoming body (Styrene, 2004:104).”   
(Minocha & Stonehouse, 2007, p. 437) 
 
They wish to elaborate the strategy-as-practice approach, and indeed draw 
heavily on Whittington’s agenda for strategy-as-practice. They consider each 
of his research questions from a body-aware perspective.  It offers important 
linkages with appropriate methodological approaches such as performance 
ethnography. Their suggestion may be important in considering strategy in 
pluralistic and multi-cultural approach contexts especially if there are 
indigenous traditions that are in themselves more bodily-aware. 
Strategic enactment 
Conventional approaches to strategy consider organisations as stable and 
enduring, and strategic change is what happens between these stable states. 
This is further underpinned by organisational routines that are stable patterns 
of behaviours and actions that are recurrent and repeatable. This means that 
organisations are prior and change is a property of organisations. An alternate 
conception is that change is ontologically prior to organisations (Tsoukas & 
Chia, 2002). The focus is on how organisational change is a reweaving of the 
webs of beliefs, and hence actions of organisational actors as they interact 
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with each other. For example, Amason & Mooney (2008) show how framing 
strategic issues differently as either opportunities or threats lead to different 
actions and outcomes. 
These different conceptions of change date back to the different philosophies 
of Democritus and Heraclitus (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005). Democritus 
considered reality as made up of stable substances, which only changed in 
terms of properties and features. Heraclitus considered reality as a 
constellation of processes and not stable things, and hence his oft repeated 
quote that “you can’t step into the same river twice.”  
Much work on strategic change is based on synoptic accounts of change 
which has an outside-in focus providing snapshots of organisational states. 
This is a stage model of change, outlining the various states over different 
points in time. However, such synoptic accounts lose the “open-ended 
microprocesses that underlay the trajectories described” and misses the 
“fluidity, pervasiveness, open-endedness and indivisibility” that are the 
distinguishing characteristics of change (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002, p. 572). “We 
say that the acrobat on the high wire maintains her stability” (p.572) but do 
not pay sufficient attention to the constant adjustments that she is making to 
deal with the micro-imbalances as she moves on the tight-rope. The same 
applies to organisational routines. We focus on what is stable in these 
routines, but at the level of individual action and interactions, routines are 
constantly adapted, re-arranged and are situated “ongoing accomplishments” 
(Tsoukas & Chia, 2002, p. 572, citing Feldman 2000, p.613). Change is 
therefore experienced by practitioners as an unfolding process, as they adapt 
to local situations and contingencies, based on local and tacit knowledge. In 
addition, knowledge and action can be understood to develop together 
(Hatchuel, 2005). The routines that appear stable at one level of abstraction 
are dynamic at another, as rules and actions are adapted at a more detailed 
level.  
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“There is a stable core in a category, consisting of 
prototypical members, which accounts for the stability 
with which the category is often applied. However there 
is also an unstable part, consisting of nonprototypical 
members, which its situated application may bring 
about.” 
(Tsoukas & Chia, 2002, p. 573) 
 
Organisational routines, therefore, have stable characteristics, but also a 
dynamic, unstable part which differs in application in context.  All of this 
means that a stages model of strategic change, based on synoptic accounts of 
change tends to privilege strategic change that is planned and deliberate while 
ignoring the emergent nature of change resulting from micro-processes, 
improvisation and situated action. 
If change is ontologically prior, and it is dependent on local context, local 
actions and adaptations of routines, then clearly the idea that the strategist is 
the chief executive or are a select group of top managers becomes untenable. 
This means that potentially all actors influence the strategy that ultimately 
emerges, and potentially all actors are strategists. Furthermore, since 
improvisation is a recursive process of action and adaptation, thinking and 
acting are very closely intertwined, meaning that strategy formulation and 
strategy implementation is a single process. It means that strategy is enacted 
through local actions and not through bold and grand strategic moves that are 
conceptualised by strategists and then implemented by lower level 
organisational participants. 
A structuralist-functionalist approach takes a positivist stand that considers 
reality as objective and fixed. A constructivist approach suggests that reality is 
constructed by organisational actors through their interactions and changing 
webs of belief. A constructionist approach goes further in identifying how 
social reality is constructed. It suggests that this happens through language 
and discourse. Rather than using language to discover the objective reality out 
there, language has been invented to create the world that we know. Ford 
(1999) suggests that there are two forms of constructed realities, namely first-
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order and second-order realities. First-order realities are made up of un-
interpreted data and facts. They are accessible, verifiable and based on 
empirical processes and shared knowledge that have accumulated over long 
periods of time. An example of a first-order reality is the price of a 
competitor’s product or the current exchange rate between two currencies. It 
could also refer to properties of physical substances such as the atomic weight 
of gold and silver. First-order realities imply that new knowledge is unlikely to 
cause us to radically revise our understanding of the phenomena that it refers 
to. It is important to note that although first-order realities may appear to be 
like that of reality based on a structuralist-functionalist ontology, they are not. 
They require a set of shared conventions, linguistic agreements and 
understandings. The first-order realities are themselves constructed, unlike the 
structuralist-functionalist approach where concepts, words and terms reflect 
the objective real world referents. The terms in our discourse in the latter are 
representations while in first order-realities they are social constructions.  
Second order realities are based on interpretations of the events and facts in 
first-order realities. They create reality separate from first-order reality in that 
there are consequences from our interpretations that lead to actions which 
give rise to events in a subsequent first-order reality. Let us take the example 
of a competitor that reduces the price of a product (first-order reality) that 
competes with ours. We may interpret that as a strategic move to encroach on 
our market share (second-order reality). Based on such an interpretation we 
retaliate by lowering our prices on a whole suite of our products, and launch a 
product in a market segment where our competitor is dominant in order to 
send out a strong symbolic message. This leads to successive price cuts in the 
industry resulting in a price war and hence all prices settle at a new lower 
equilibrium (first-order reality). 
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“Because second order represented realities provide the 
context in which first-order realties are present, changes 
in second-order representations can lead to fundamental 
and practical changes in an organisation regardless of what 
happens to first-order realities.”  
(Ford, 1999, p. 483, emphasis added) 
 
Organisations may be considered as networks of conversations constituting 
first and second-order realities. Important organisational processes such as 
planning, budgeting, and managing are all interconnected conversations that 
make up the organisation. These conversations result in commitments that 
become part of recurrent conversations which have predictable broad 
patterns of activity. An example of this is an order fulfilment process. Such a 
process invokes a recurrent conversation that is embedded in functions and 
activities, and hence organisational routines. Therefore, we can see that 
organisational routines that are normally considered stable and enduring are 
actually forms of recurrent conversations.  
Strategic change may now be conceived as a result of shifting conversations 
within organisations. As such there is no single “the” change (Ford, 1999), that 
is implemented. Rather, it is  
“an unfolding of conversations into already existing 
conversations and how a ‘change’ occurs to participants 
will depend on the second-order, represented realities 
within which they engage the unfolding dynamic.” 
(Ford, 1999, p. 487) 
 
This indicates the importance of languaging which is defined as a process in 
which language is not only maintained but is developed and enhanced (Von 
Krogh, Roos, & Slocum, 1994) . The use of words and terms are not static, 
but are changed taking on new meanings, or shifts of emphasis and context, 
or creating new metaphorical connotations. 
Here again we see that change is now improvisational, and not scripted in 
advance, but rather the script is written as it is enacted. Therefore strategy is 
emergent, unfolding in a dynamic, adaptive, improvisational fashion. 
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However, there is now some place for intentionality. If we wish to enact a 
new strategy and organisation change, we may intentionally bring in new 
conversations to extend, revise or delete existing conversations. It must be 
noted, however, that while we may have intentionality and agency in injecting 
new discourse, we do not have any control of how the conversations, and 
hence the emerging strategy will unfold. Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi 
(1994, p. 365) indicate a “complex interrelationship among symbolism, 
sensemaking and influence”. 
Generalising strategy 
If we consider the various schools of strategy and the myriad perspectives 
that we have explored, we note that the preponderance of the effort is on 
commercial organisations. The very notion of strategy has embedded in it the 
idea of competition. This is particularly the case when we consider 
competitive strategy and how competitive advantage may be sustained. The 
focus here is usually on strategy content. However, we know that other 
literature considers strategy process. The literature on strategic change may 
also be considered together with that of strategy process. It is my contention 
that strategy is generalisable across all kinds of organising formations, not just 
commercial organisations. If we stay wedded to strategy content this is 
difficult to do. However, if we take a process approach, then it leads itself to 
such generalisation. The central question shifts from how to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage to that of how does the organisation adapt 
and co-evolve in an uncertain future. This is supported by a definition of 
strategy as a consistent pattern of action over time. Such a definition does not 
constrain us to a commercial setting. The central question then shifts to how 
do organisations achieve a consistent pattern of action over time? This 
perspective means that much of what has been covered earlier in this chapter 
applies equally well to non-commercial organisations.  
Many of the strategy tools may be applied across sectors and are generic. 
There are others, however, that do not translate as easily. There is another 
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caution in that while I make the case that strategy is applicable across sectors, 
I do not mean that such other sectors must necessarily become like 
corporations. In other words, it will not be helpful if universities, for example, 
start mimicking private sector organisations as that undermines their viability.  
I consider viability to mean an organisation will be able to survive in a 
turbulent, uncertain environment while retaining its core identity. The notion 
of identity is critical and there has been insufficient attention to it in the 
strategy literature. Viability and identity go hand in and hand. The question 
that is raised is what are the boundaries of identity? The danger is that if 
identity is defined too narrowly, it is overly constraining and hence adversely 
impacts viability. In the context of fast changing, turbulent environments, it is 
important that organisations need to have the ability to adapt, to change and 
to redefine themselves. The issue is how much they change. I shall use an 
analogy here. We can identify a species as being similar to identity. As long as 
the change does not destroy the species then the identity may be shaped and 
adjusted. If, however, the identity changes to such an extent that the 
organisation may no longer be identified as part of its original species, then 
we may say that that organisation has been destroyed. It is morphologically 
something else. The point that I am making is that the over-corporatisation of 
non-commercial entities mean that more and more organisations of other 
species start to look like corporations. Their identities are thus destroyed. The 
application of strategy and strategic thinking must not lead to this as then it is 
destroying an important element of society and value to humanity.  
If we wish to do a comparative study of different organisation species type, 
then it becomes important that we understand the various contexts of those 
species types. Strategy context is therefore as important as strategy content 
and strategy process. 
So, for example, if we are considering strategy in the public sector we need to 
understand the “publicness” and what it means. If we are looking at NGOs 
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we have to understand what is distinctive about NGOs and similarly, 
international agencies and social movements.  
Discussion 
Table 2.1 listed a number of questions that highlights the key issues and 
concerns in the field of strategy. A closer inspection of these indicates that 
most of them are framed from the point of view of commercial organisations. 
Many of the strategy models or frameworks that are derived from a 
consideration of these questions also tend to privilege commercial 
organisations. Thus, we have a very restricted view of strategy. As we have 
seen in the resource based view of the firm, the underlying issue is that of 
sustainable competitive advantage. Thus, much of the framing of strategy is 
around the profit motive and competitive advantage. Even though some of 
the strategy models have been applied in non-commercial settings such as in 
government departments, universities, schools and non-governmental 
organisations, an uncritical translation of the key concerns of strategy into 
these contexts are problematic. Every model has embedded in it value 
positions, and the primary one in models designed for commercial settings is 
that of the profit motive. Values travel with their models. Thus, a more 
critical stance is warranted when we apply such models to non-commercial 
settings otherwise they are likely to have several unintended consequences. 
An argument may be made that when academics and theorists develop 
theoretical and conceptual models for application in practical settings, the 
values embedded in the models need to be made more explicit. Part of good 
theorising is clarifying the boundary conditions of models and theoretical 
frameworks. When do these models apply and when do they break down? 
The suggestion is not meant to be limiting because it is of enormous benefit 
to take learning from one field of endeavour or context and apply it to others. 
Nevertheless, there are always dangers of uncritical application and hence this 
issue is an important one. 
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Even if we restrict the discussion to commercial settings for now, the 
preoccupations in strategy as indicated in Table 2.1 has other problems. It 
tends to favour one set of stakeholders, namely shareholders, over others. 
However, organisations serve a much broader set of stakeholders and society 
at large. Therefore, strategy should not ignore the demands and goals of these 
other stakeholders. Moreover, organisations are multiple and plural, and a 
focus on competitive advantage and the profit motive alone is a very 
reductionist approach. The questions in Table 2.1 reveal that much of the 
strategy field is pre-supposed on an objectivist ontology. There is little 
appreciation for how interpretation and construction of reality feature, and 
how they are important determinants of strategic actions. 
The delineation of strategy into corporate, business and functional strategies 
is limiting in that it treats organisations from a very linear perspective. This is 
the classical organisation-as-machine bureaucracy. This conception of 
organisation has been critiqued from a systems thinking perspective (Jackson, 
2003; Morgan, 1997). Once again, this categorisation belies the 
preponderance of strategy with commercial organisations and one that is less 
relevant to other forms of organising. 
A conclusion that is drawn from this chapter is that strategy is a broad and 
diverse field of endeavour. Yet it still remains highly fragmented, disintegrated 
and there is little in the way of cumulative knowledge. There has therefore 
been a call for more consolidation and integration.  If this is not achieved, the 
field is in danger of becoming subsumed into the base disciplines especially in 
the social sciences or into adjacent fields. Others, such as Volberda (2004), 
have argued that integration is not yet achievable, and therefore what is 
required is synthesis. While this is a noble goal, the attempt made by him 
towards synthesis is quite idiosyncratic. The question is what should be the 
basis for the synthesis? Until this is remedied, other attempts are likely to be 
just as idiosyncratic. 
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The position that I take on this matter is that strategy is still a relatively young 
field, and the argument that it is a pre-paradigmatic one has merit. Therefore 
there should not be any rush to achieve integration. This is given even more 
weight because it draws from a variety of base disciplines. Therefore it is, and 
should be, an inter-disciplinary endeavour. Plurality gives it richness.  
Strategy research is dominated by instrumental rationality relying on large 
statistical databases and large sample sizes. This is because of the heavy 
influence of economics. Although learning from other social sciences has 
begun to influence the field, there is a long way to go. As a result, research has 
become too disconnected from practice, and has been criticised for having 
relatively little influence on public policy. 
The principles of the field need to be considered from a historical standpoint, 
and that they are a product of institutional development needs to be 
recognised. As one example, the goal of profit maximization is an institutional 
construct and not a value free objective phenomenon. 
Traditionally, strategy and organisation have been considered as distinct 
concepts. Recent work, especially from the strategy-as-practice sub-field 
indicates that strategy and organisation are intertwined, and there is merit in 
reframing them in the verb form as strategising-organising. Strategy-as-
practice has been criticised as still having the modernist imprint, especially 
because it is wedded to the interests of the managerial elite, and that it is also 
still stuck with an objectivist ontology. Despite this criticism of strategy-as-
practice it has made a significant contribution to a much richer understanding 
of strategy, and its focus on situated activity in practice. Furthermore, it helps 
in identifying the close links between strategy and organisation and in 
strategising-organising. The strategy formulation-implementation dichotomy 
that is so strong in the dominant approaches to strategy has been 
problematised. The idea of strategy as an unfinished project helps to deal with 
this. This approach may be seen as aligned to that of strategy-as-practice, but 
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it also brings another perspective to strategising-organising in the form of 
highlighting the important of discourse. Where strategy-as-practice has been 
criticised in terms of its functionalism, strategy as unfinished project, brings in 
interpretation and social constructionism in the form of discourse. It also 
highlights that the organisation-environment distinction is not “innocent”. 
Rather it is based on constructions of the social actors involved. 
Actor-network theory offers us a new language for understanding strategy. 
While it is consistent with strategising-organising, and strategy-as-practice, it 
offers us a more complex understanding of agency. Agency no longer resides 
with human actors alone, but agency is invested in artifacts. Furthermore, 
there is now more fluidity between structure and agency. An area that has not 
received sufficient attention in the literature is that of the technologies of 
quantification. The use of numbers, as we have seen, gives an “aura of 
neutrality” and a way of constructing objectivity.  As these technologies of 
quantification are applied, there is a steady detachment from the socially 
constructed nature of the phenomenon. Eventually, actors start to believe 
that these are objective facts. Moreover, such number systems are invested 
with agency. At its extreme, when “facts” (read, the numbers) speak for 
themselves, decisions are taken as if they were not made by the human actors 
involved. Number systems are integrally involved with situated activity in 
practice and are therefore an important component of strategising-organising. 
An important aspect of strategy is the suite of the strategy tools that are 
employed. These include strategy indabas1, planning sessions, and the 
associated technologies that are deployed during group strategy processes. 
The technologies include whiteboards, flipcharts, PowerPoint presentations 
and over-heads. Strategic frameworks and conceptual models such as SWOT 
analysis, Porter’s 5 forces and the BCG Matrix are also part of the 
                                                 
1 In the South African context, this term refer to a strategy breakaway session, usually attended by senior 
management of organisations (public and private) conducted in a place of retreat away from the office. 
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technologies deployed in group strategy sessions. The strategy as “serious 
play’ research offers innovative approaches by changing the mode and media 
in group strategy processes. Perhaps an even more significant contribution of 
that research is that it notes the change in identity of human actors in the 
process of strategy-making. This appears very promising in relation to a 
theory of strategic enactment. “Serious play” offers potentially a better 
understanding of the relationship between strategy content and strategy 
process, and may serve as a bridge between deliberate and emergent strategy.  
It encourages the application of metaphor and analogy and is explicit in 
getting actors to represent the organisation metaphorically.  
While conventional approaches to strategy consider organisations as stable, an 
alternate conception is that change is ontologically prior to organisations. 
What we then have is a constant flux or a “sea of change”. This alternate 
framing shows that organisational change is a reweaving of the beliefs of 
organisational actors. It also calls into question the widespread assumption 
that routines are entirely stable. Routines themselves are dynamic in their 
application. When we take a strategising-organising view, we realise that 
routines are constantly being adapted in situated activity in practice. Another 
contribution towards a theory of strategic enactment may be drawn from the 
work of Ford (1999) on shifting conversations. Change is viewed as the 
dynamic unfolding of conversations. There is a place for some level of 
intentionality and hence agency. If we wish to achieve organisational change, 
it means changing the nature of conversations and injecting new 
conversations into strategising-organising. This in turn affects first-order and 
second-order realities as theorised by Ford (1999). This is entirely consistent 
and aligned with sensemaking. Strategic enactment is therefore a form of 
strategic improvisation.  
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C h a p t e r  3 - T h e  R e s o u r c e  B a s e d  V i e w  
Introduction 
This chapter covers the resource based view of the firm, and its extension 
referred to as the dynamic capabilities approach. While the resource based 
view offers a very different perspective to that of industry analysis approaches 
to strategy, the chapter explores the framework of  Amit & Schoemaker 
(1993) which attempts to bridge the two perspectives. It is important to 
understand that the resource and capabilities perspective are as a result of 
particular characteristics of asset-stock accumulations. These characteristics 
are, therefore, discussed. Finally, the chapter presents the competitive strategy 
dynamics approach that includes elements of the resource based view, 
dynamic capabilities approach, and system dynamics. 
Resource based view  
While the industrial organisation approach to strategy focuses on the industry 
and the external environment, the resource based view (RBV) of the firm 
turns its gaze inward to the firm itself. The premise is that sustainable 
competitive advantage is not achieved from product and services but rather 
from the underlying resources that give rise to the products and services. The 
industrial organisation approach places emphasis on the Opportunities and 
Threats in the conventional SWOT analysis, while the RBV places emphasis 
on the Strengths and Weaknesses of the conventional SWOT analysis. One of 
the arguments of the RBV is that in rapidly changing environments, products 
and services do not render stable advantage, while the underlying resources 
do. The basic logic of the RBV is that firms are made up of bundles of 
heterogeneously distributed resources. Provided that these resources are 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable,  referred to as the VRIN 
attributes of resources, they will be able to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Resources have been categorised as 
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physical resources, financial resources, technological resources and intellectual 
resources. It is important to note that 
 “resource endowments are ‘sticky’: at least in the short 
run, firms are to some degree stuck with what they have 
and may have to live with what they lack.” 
(Teece, et al., 1997, p. 514) 
 
It is not only the resources that are important, but also the firm’s capabilities. 
Grant (1991) defines capabilities as teams of resources that work together. 
These are seen as akin to organisational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
He asserts that  
“[o]rganisational routines are regular and predictable 
patterns of activity which are made up of a sequence of 
coordinated actions by individuals.”  
(Grant, 1991, p. 122) 
 
In this reading, capabilities are sets of interacting routines. Competitive 
advantage may be sustained if the resources have particular characteristics. 
These include durability, transparency, transferability and replicability. These 
attributes are categorised and described according to Grant (1991)as follows. 
Durability 
Resources and capabilities depreciate or erode over time. Different types of 
resources become obsolete at different rates. For example, as a result of 
technological advancement, machinery becomes obsolete more rapidly. On 
the other hand resources such as brands, reputation and image may take a 
longer time to erode under normal circumstances. They are more susceptible 
to catastrophic loss, however. An example is that of a pharmaceutical firm 
whose reputation may be damaged by a drug that unintentionally leads to 
poisoning of patients. This exemplifies the idea that different resources can 
have differing rates at which they are built up and that at which they 
depreciate. It also shows the differing build and erosion rates of the same 
resource. 
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When resources tend to be based on the tacit knowledge of key individuals 
then they are not as durable, because they are lost if these individuals leave the 
firm. Patents, by contrast, lock in resources for fixed time periods and 
therefore have high durability. 
Capabilities may be more durable than resources because they rely on teams 
of resources, and may be retained when some of their underlying resources 
are lost. This may be achieved, for example, by replacing certain individuals, 
or through buffers and redundancy of knowledge within the teams of 
resources.   
Social capital, which is based on relationships between individuals and the 
levels of trust within groups, are more durable than human capital, as the 
latter relates to the knowledge that resides within individuals (Cohen & 
Prusak, 2001, pp. 3-8). Capabilities are based on systemic relationships 
between resources and are therefore more durable. The more durable the 
resource or the capability, the longer the competitive advantage may be 
sustained. 
Transparency 
Transparency is related to how easy it is for competitors to understand and to 
imitate a firm’s competitive advantage. The constraints in achieving this relate 
to information transparency. Competitors need to understand what the 
competitive advantage is and what the underlying capabilities and associated 
resources are.  The relationship between resources and capabilities, and the 
relationship between capabilities and competitive advantage determine the 
level of transparency. There is a high level of transparency if there are a few 
highly visible resources which together form one capability that is the source 
of competitive advantage. An example of this would be a patent that is about 
to expire, together with a single piece of equipment which constitutes a single 
capability that is the source of competitive advantage. By contrast, the level of 
transparency is low if there is a combination of resources some of which may 
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be implicit or tacit that gives rise to a capability. If there is a need for a high 
level of co-ordination of resources and several interlinked capabilities, then 
the level of transparency will be low. The higher the transparency the less 
enduring is the competitive advantage. 
Transferability 
Transferability refers to the ease with which competitors are able to procure 
the necessary resources and capabilities. Resources may be available in factor 
markets at similar or lower cost than that of the incumbents. In such cases, 
the competitive advantage will not be sustainable. There are limits to 
transferability of resources. These are as a result of geographic immobility, 
information asymmetries, tacit know-how, and other firm-specific resources, 
as well as legal impediments. Geographic immobility refers to the relative 
location of key resources in relation to the incumbent and competitor firms. 
It can refer to a situation where a plant is located close to the source of its raw 
materials (e.g. a bauxite source for an aluminium smelter) or close to factor 
markets for specialised employees.  Information asymmetries refer to the 
knowledge that a firm has on productivity of resources not available to 
competitors, and hence asymmetries in resultant pricing, which puts 
competitors at a disadvantage. Firm specific resources refer to the use of the 
resource within a firm that renders it more productive than if the resource 
was used in another firm. An example is when a particular technology offers a 
firm economies of scope through its application in a variety of different 
processes for multiple products that share that technology. Thus, the 
productivity of the resource will be higher than that of another firm that is 
only able to deploy the same technology in a single process for a single 
product.  
Given that capabilities are embedded in systemic relationships they are more 
immobile than resources. 
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Replicability 
If a competitor is unable to acquire resources and capabilities through market 
transactions e.g. by buying in from factor markets or by acquisition of whole 
firms to acquire capabilities, then it will have to develop and build the 
resources and capabilities itself. In some sectors e.g. financial services it is easy 
for rivals to imitate resources through their own development. Tacit 
knowledge and complex arrangements of resources will make this more 
difficult.  
Grant (1991) raises the question of appropriability of rents even when a firm 
has access to resources that are not easily transferable or replicable. This has 
to do with the relevant bargaining power of actors within the firm, more 
specifically, between the firm and its employees. The extent to which the 
deployment of an employee’s skills depends on other resources and is 
enmeshed in organisational routines, determines who is able to appropriate 
most of the rents. The more it is embedded in such systemic relationships, 
and the more dependent it is on other resources, the more control the firm 
can exercise over the benefits that accrue from deploying the employee’s skills 
and know how. Grant (1991) offers the following prescriptive framework for 
strategy by beginning with the resources and capabilities that underlie its 
competitive advantage. 
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Figure 3.1: A resource-based approach to strategic development 
Source: Grant, R. M. (1991, p.115). 
 
Grant (1991, p. 117) suggests that  
“…business strategy should be viewed less as a quest for 
monopoly rents (the returns to market power) and more 
as a quest for Ricardian rents (the returns to the resources 
which confer competitive advantage over and above the 
real costs of the resources).” 
 
He goes further to show that even market power is based on the underlying 
resources. The logic is that one of the major contributors to market power is 
barriers to entry for others. These barriers to entry are dependent on  
“scale economies, patents, experience advantages, brand 
reputation, or some other resource which incumbent 
firms possess but which entrants can acquire only slowly 
or at disproportional expense.”  
Grant (1991, p. 117) 
Dynamic capabilities 
The resource based view on its own has been criticised as being too static, 
and insufficient as an explanation for sustained competitive advantage. The 
dynamic capabilities approach (Teece, et al., 1997) seeks to elaborate and 
enhance the resource based view. The term dynamic capabilities is used to 
describe organisational processes that may be routines in themselves or 
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“routines about routines.” These could include organisational processes such 
as strategic development, product development, order processing and logistics 
capabilities.  
Essentially, the dynamic capabilities approach considers how resources 
change over time, but more importantly focuses on the ability of firms to 
reconfigure sets of resources.  
Teece et al (1997, p. 516) define dynamics capabilities as: 
“… the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure 
internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments. Dynamic capabilities thus reflect 
an organisation’s ability to achieve new and innovative 
forms of competitive advantage given path dependencies 
and market position.”  
 
Dynamic capabilities refer to organisational processes and routines that 
create, combine, integrate and split existing resources. The argument is that 
new value arises from the application of dynamic capabilities. The notion of 
dynamic has a number of meanings. Firstly, it relates to the speed or velocity 
of markets or changes in underlying industry structure. Secondly, it relates to 
the dynamic way in which resources are manipulated to match the 
environmental requirements.   
The use of the word, capabilities, is to focus on 
 “the key role of strategic management in appropriately 
adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and 
external organisational skills, resources and functional 
competences to match the requirements of the external 
environment.”  
(Teece, et al., 1997, p. 515) 
 
It is noteworthy that this has resonance with organisational learning, yet the 
RBV literature does not pay much attention to the possible contributions 
from this body of knowledge. 
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 While dynamic capabilities are considered to be idiosyncratic in their detail, 
emergent, and path dependent, Eisenhardt & Martin (2000) argue that they 
also have common features, in the form of “best practices” that are known to 
be important components of such capabilities. For example, the use of 
concurrent engineering tends to be common in successful product 
development processes.  They further suggest that they have equifinality. 
Different firms can start off at different conditions, but are able to develop 
the dynamic capabilities that are different in their detail, yet have the same 
essential broad features and are more fungible and substitutable than 
suggested in the literature. From their point of view, dynamic capabilities, 
despite being idiosyncratic and path dependent, do not fulfil the VRIN 
criteria in their entirety. Therefore dynamic capabilities do not yield 
sustainable competitive advantage, but the resource configurations do.   
The purpose of Eisenhardt & Martin’s paper was to address one of the 
critiques of dynamic capabilities in the RBV approach which states that they 
are tautological in nature and insufficiently grounded empirically. In order to 
make their case, they focus on capabilities such as product development and 
the ability to develop strategic alliances. These have very strong empirical 
work but are not usually covered in the RBV literature. By focusing on the 
broad, common features of these capabilities, they arrive at their conclusion 
that dynamic capabilities are more homogenous, equifinal, and substitutable 
thereby violating the VRIN attributes.  They do not pay sufficient attention to 
the emergent, idiosyncratic, non-linear and path-dependent ways that dynamic 
capabilities are constructed. So although a competitor may replicate a dynamic 
capability that does have some of the common features of the incumbent 
firm, it is not the same dynamic capability that has been constructed. It is quite 
often the idiosyncratic detail that renders the competitive advantage. One 
example is the Toyota Production System. Although the broad features of it 
are well known and documented, it is very difficult for others to replicate this 
capability. Moreover, Eisenhardt and Martin have not paid sufficient attention 
to the systemic nature of dynamic capabilities. It is very difficult to replicate 
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an entire system without knowing the idiosyncratic detail of such a system, 
with its myriad inter-relationships and feedback loops. 
As Teece et al have shown, an important component of organisational 
processes and capabilities is the coordination mechanisms and routines used 
by managers. Citing, Clark and Fujimoto (1991), they indicate that there are 
significant firm-level differences in such coordination routines, and they are 
therefore firm-specific in nature. These firm-specific capabilities have an 
important impact on performance outputs, including quality and development 
costs.  
Factor markets are incomplete. Certain assets are firm-specific and non-
tradable. When a firm has such non-tradable assets or resources, then it can 
only earn rents from them by using those assets to develop products and 
services that are tradable. If a firm does not have an important non-tradable 
asset that is needed for a specific product or service, then it has to build that 
non-tradable asset (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). Examples include quality, dealer 
loyalty and R&D capability. Dierickx & Cool (1989) point out that the 
building of such non-tradable assets as strategic assets require adherence to a 
consistent set of policies over a period of time. In other words, the non-
tradable asset is a stock that accumulates over time, while the consistent 
application of policies and activities relate to flows over time. 
Strategic assets underlying sustainable competitive advantage 
Amit & Schoemaker (1993) present a framework where they incorporate both 
industry analysis and the resource based view. They identify Strategic Assets 
as a subset of the resources and capabilities that are scarce, non-tradable, 
inimitable, appropriable and specialised and that overlap with Strategic 
Industry Factors.  The basis for generating economic rents, at the industry 
level of analysis, is the capabilities and resources that are subject to market 
failure.  
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They note that these are determined at a market level 
 “through complex interactions among the firm’s 
competitors, customers, regulators, innovators external to 
the industry, and other stakeholders.” 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 36) 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Strategic assets framework 
Source: Amit, R., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993, p.37) 
 
Strategic Industry Factors are industry specific and may change over time. 
The firm’s Strategic Assets may be characterised by complementarities. This is 
because Strategic Assets in combination with each other may have higher 
strategic value than the sum of their values when considered in isolation and 
the combined value is higher than the cost of developing or deploying each 
one independently. This synergy in combination is known as positive 
externalities. 
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The task of strategic managers in generating economic rents is to understand 
the current and expected Strategic Industry Factors, and to focus on 
developing current and creating new strategic assets that match. 
In the same way that the Strategic Industry Factors are subject to complex 
interactions of factors in the external environment, the decisions around 
Strategic Assets are subject to high levels of uncertainty and complexity, and 
thus it is not possible to give specific prescriptions on their development as 
articulated below: 
“Given the competitive and changing context in which 
managers must decide which R&C to develop as their 
firm’s basis for competition, it is doubtful that decisions 
about which SA to develop and deploy can be optimally 
deduced from a general normative theory. More likely, 
continually changing heuristics will emerge that strive to 
better incorporate the uncertainty, complexity and 
organizational conflicts confronting managers.” 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 40) 
 
They show that decisions about resources and capabilities are made in the 
context of uncertainty, complexity and intra-organisational conflicts.  
Managers operate under conditions of uncertainty about the broader 
contextual environment which includes the PESTEL (political, economic, 
social, technological, environmental and legislative) trends, competitor 
behaviour and customer preferences. Complexity arises from inter-related sets 
of causes and events that determine the environment. Competitive moves 
arise from different interpretations of the environment. Since strategic decisions 
affect different organisational stakeholders differently, the stage is inherently 
set for intra-organisational conflict. Therefore managerial decisions that shape 
the resources and capabilities are done in the context of such uncertainty, 
complexity and intra-organisational conflict. 
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“Owing to uncertainty, complexity, and conflict (both in 
and outside the firm), different firms will employ different 
Strategic Assets, without any one set being provably 
optimal or easily imitated.” 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 44) 
 
An important contribution of their approach is that they include Behavioural 
Decision Theory.  This focus on cognitive biases and bounded rationality of 
managers is both a source of, and a response to uncertainty, complexity and 
conflict. Further, it serves to partially explain the heterogeneity of resources 
and capabilities, and hence their inimitability. It is therefore an extension of 
the resource based view. 
Asset-stock accumulation 
We have seen earlier in the RBV that one of the important components is the 
degree of inimitability. Dierickx & Cool (1989) highlight the underlying 
determinants of resource inimitability. Their fundamental insight which has 
profound implications is the basic principles of asset-stock accumulation. As 
indicated earlier when factor markets are incomplete, firms have to build non-
tradable assets (stocks) by applying consistent policies over a period of time 
(flows). They state,  
“[w]ithin the framework presented in this paper, a firm’s 
strategy involves choosing optimal time paths of flows, whereas 
its competitive position and hence its potential profitability is 
determined by the levels of its stocks.” 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989, p. 1510, emphases in the 
original) 
 
In this framework, resources are stock variables that accumulate over time. 
These asset-stock accumulations are changed by flows. The flows represent 
the instantaneous amounts of a resource that is being accumulated in the 
stock. There is therefore a mathematical relationship between a stock and its 
corresponding flows that determine their inter-related behaviour.  While the 
value of the flows may be changed instantaneously, the value of the stock is 
historically determined and may not be changed instantaneously. It is only 
through persistent patterns of changes in the inflows and outflows that the 
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values of the stock may be changed. An example is the relationship between 
HIV incidence (flow) and HIV prevalence (stock). If there was to be a 
mechanism to immediately halt the rate of HIV incidence, the current HIV 
prevalence cannot be reduced instantaneously. Unless there is a cure for HIV, 
the prevalence rate will only decrease as the stock of HIV infected people die.  
These asset-stock accumulations have a number of characteristics that directly 
affect the imitability of resources (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). These include: 
Time-scale diseconomies 
This is due to an asymmetrical relationship between time and other variables 
that lead to accumulation of asset-stocks. This simply means, for example, 
that halving the time and doubling other variables leads to less accumulation 
of the stock variable.  A common example is that of doubling of R&D 
expenditure over half the period of time. This does not achieve the equivalent 
level of R&D output. This may also be an underlying reason for the lack of 
success of similar types of “crash programmes”, for example in the project 
management environment. It may also contribute to Brooke’s law. Since 
many of the asset-stock accumulations are determined by multiplication of 
factors that determine the flow, it means that there are non-linear 
relationships between the variables. In practical terms this translates to longer 
term sustained commitments of inputs for results to be achieved. Another 
example would be the choice between a certain rate of marketing expenditure, 
over an extended period of time, as opposed to a higher rate of expenditure 
for a much shorter period of time. This will clearly lead to different results, 
even if the total spend was the same in both cases.  
Asset-mass efficiencies 
In certain asset-stock accumulations the current value of the stock determines 
the rates of the flows, which gives rise to asset-mass efficiencies. In system 
dynamics terms this translates to an underlying positive feedback loop which 
results in reinforcing behaviour. There is a positive feedback relationship 
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between the stock variable and the inflow to the stock. The simplest version 
of this is a compounding relationship between the stock and its associated 
inflow. This reinforcing behaviour translates to the notion that success breeds 
success. The firm with a higher level of resource will be able to build that 
resource much faster than one that starts off with a lower level of the same 
resource. For example, a firm with a higher level of R&D and scientific 
knowledge will be able to generate more knowledge much faster than one that 
has a lower level of that asset-stock. Similarly a firm with a higher customer 
base can accrue advantages much faster and grow that same customer base, 
through word of mouth, social contagion effects, bandwagon effects and 
herding behaviour. The customer base asset-stock may also affect other asset-
stocks, for example, through maintenance agreements, selling complementary 
products, better customer knowledge that impacts new product development 
and so on. Asset mass efficiencies are also achieved through network effects, 
for example when a firm is part of a network of firms with complementary 
products and services, such as Windows and Intel (Wintel), or motor vehicle 
manufacturers and associated dealerships. Asset-mass efficiencies may be 
considered as one explanatory factor for the increasing gap between 
developed economies and that of developing economies, especially in the era 
of the network economy that is knowledge-based. 
Another important consideration is when there are discontinuities that require 
a critical mass of the asset-stock (Dierickx & Cool, 1989, pp. 1507-1508). In 
some instances there are tipping points (Gladwell, 2000), or thresholds before 
any difference may be made. One example is the level of marketing spend 
below which there is no discernable difference to the impact that it may have 
on sales. 
Interconnectedness of asset-stocks 
It may be relatively easy for a competitor to replicate one resource or asset- 
stock, but it is much more difficult for them to do so, when they are part of 
an interconnected system of asset-stocks. Here the value of one or more of the 
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stocks influences the rate at which the other stocks accumulate. We have 
already seen examples of this when considering the notion of network effects 
in a web of firms, but the same principle applies to the interconnectedness of 
asset-stocks within the same firm. For example, higher levels of staff training 
influence product quality, which in turn impacts brand and reputation.  The 
example of customer feedback impacting product development as shown 
earlier applies here as well. While asset-mass efficiencies (Dierickx & Cool, 
1989, pp. 1507-1508) means that stock accumulations are dependent on the 
initial value of the same stock, the interconnectedness of stocks indicate that 
the value of the asset-stock accumulation is dependent on the initial values of 
other stocks (Warren, 2002, pp. 55-61). 
Causal ambiguity 
Causal ambiguity means that firms may have resource positions that are 
superior to those of competitors, and they are unable to replicate the resource 
positions because the causal relations that give rise to those positions are 
difficult for the competitor firm to understand (Dierickx & Cool, 1989, pp. 
1508-1509). It may even be the case that the incumbent firm knows that it has 
an advantage and that it is as a result of the inter-connectedness of asset-
stocks, but does not know how they are interconnected and what the causal 
relationships actually are. 
Asset erosion 
Every asset stock is subject to decay. In system dynamics parlance, this relates 
to stock outflows, in particular through a draining process. We may therefore 
refer to the “half-life” of an asset stock. If the decay rates are high, or in other 
words, a stock has a low half-life, then it becomes difficult for the firm to 
sustain its competitive advantage, as it increases the imitability of the asset 
stock. This translates to the need for the firm to “maintain” expenditures on 
the accumulation of the stock, to counter the asset erosion effects.  However, 
as Dierickx & Cool (1989, p. 1508) have indicated, it is important for firms to 
engage in punitive actions or credible threats when competitor firms enter the 
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market. They note, for example, that advertising expenditure is not a credible 
threat, while capacity or brand loyalty is. The reason is that the former are 
flows which may be instantaneously implemented by competitor firms 
themselves, whereas the alternatives are asset-stock accumulations that cannot 
be changed instantaneously. The lesson is that firms have to maintain values 
of their key stocks, and not allow them to erode to the extent that they are no 
longer credible threats to entry. 
Each of the characteristics of asset-stocks discussed above, though important 
on their own, also have systemic effects that impact the inimitability of 
resources. In summary, the asset-stock formulation denotes that the extent to 
which resources and asset-stocks are imitable is determined by the 
characteristics of stock accumulations discussed above. These resources and 
assets may be deemed strategic assets if they are non-tradable in factor 
markets, are inimitable and non-substitutable. The latter indicates that even if 
asset-stocks are inimitable they may be substituted by entirely new 
formulations of different asset-stock configurations. This is akin to replacing a 
whole system of inter-related stocks with others that become a source of 
competitive advantage. 
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Competitive strategy dynamics 
A combination of the RBV, the characteristics of asset-stock accumulations 
and system dynamics offers promise in terms of competitive strategy. Kim 
Warren has made significant contributions in this regard and developed a 
framework described as competitive strategy dynamics (Warren, 2002). It 
needs to be noted that Warren himself indicates how it is different from the 
RBV, and critiques much of system dynamics as it has departed, in his view, 
from its most powerful contributions (Warren, 2004).  These include: 
“[s]tock-flow analysis, complete with quantitative time-
path portrayal of all important system variables (especially 
of the stocks and flows themselves), cannot be avoided 
...” 
(Warren, 2004, p. 346, emphasis in original) 
 
His focus, therefore, is primarily on asset-stock accumulations, and “fact 
based” determination of timescales and time-paths of the flows that affect 
these asset-stock accumulations. 
System dynamics scholars and practitioners use the causal loop diagram 
(CLD) analysis in conceptualising, analysing and understanding the relevant 
systems. There has been debate within the system dynamics community itself 
about the pitfalls of the use of causal loop diagrams. These relate to not 
distinguishing between stock and flow variables, and therefore leading to 
misunderstanding some of the key stock-flow relationships.  
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An example given in Richardson (1986) is the relationships between 
population (stock) and births (flow). A depiction is provided below: 
 
Figure 3.3: Causal loop diagram of population and births 
 
The normal interpretation is that an increase in births leads to an increase in 
the population. Since this is compounding behaviour, by closing the loop, we 
note that an increase in population in turn leads to an increase in births. This 
is a positive feedback loop. However, reading the CLD in the opposite 
direction often leads to an error of interpretation. The normal reading of the 
CLD means that a decrease in births leads to a decrease in population. This is 
not the case as births can never decrease the population. All it means is that a 
decrease in birth leads to less of an increase in population than it would 
otherwise have been. It is only an outflow from the stock, e.g. deaths, which 
can lead to a decrease in the stock of population. The CLD does not make 
this distinction between Population as a stock and Births as a flow, thereby 
leading to such misunderstandings. 
Some proponents of system dynamics suggest that the stock and flow 
rendition is superior as this overcomes the conflating of the distinct nature of 
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On the other hand, a problem with the stock-flow rendition is that it is quite 
difficult to infer the feedback loops and their direction. Warren (2004) gives 
the example of how a stock of customers change, to demonstrate this point: 
 
Figure 3.4: Stock flow and causal loop diagram of customer acquisition 
Source: Warren, K. (2004, p.340). 
 
The above CLD and stock flow renditions are equivalent. However, there 
appears to be a contradiction in the direction of causality in the stock-flow 
rendition, which according to Warren may be quite confusing to novices.  
He further notes that neither the CLD nor the stock-flow notation deals with 
the difficulty that system dynamics promises to solve. This is an awareness of 
the time-path behaviour (and time-scale) of policy related variables. A 
fundamental principle of system dynamics is that structure drives behaviour 
(Sterman, 2000, p. 107). Neither the CLD nor the stock-flow rendition 
provides this information, and hence it is quite difficult to see how the 
underlying structure explains the behaviour. Warren contends that this is the 
intellectual challenge that system dynamics is supposed to solve, and fails to 
do this. In addition, the CLD does not capture the fundamental mathematical 
relationships of asset-stock accumulations, and may therefore lead to 
significant errors with the possibility for catastrophic actions in practice, 
based on flawed understanding. 
He goes further to suggest that system dynamics also has managerial flaws. In 
his view, neither the CLDs nor the stock-flow notation contain enough 
information about the problem situations, and do not help managers 
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and when. This means that qualitative system dynamics is of no real use for 
strategy and policy. However, as a counterpoint Coyle (2000, p. 225) has 
made the case that qualitative system dynamics is appropriate, especially as a 
rigorous approach to system description. He has also shown how in some 
cases the uncertainties involved in quantification are too large, and therefore 
problematic leading to misleading results. The response of the system 
dynamics community to Warren’s assertion would be that the way to 
determine policy and strategic intervention is by simulation modelling, which 
means moving to a quantitative model first. Warren tends to dismiss this as 
well, for the following reasons. He suggests that if this was the case then there 
would be a higher uptake of the methodology by executives and managers. 
He shows that this is not the case. He acknowledges that there is no 
systematic evidence to as to why system dynamics does not have the desired 
uptake. He suggests that this may be because the outcomes of system 
dynamics modelling are unreliable or the benefits are insignificant. 
Alternatively if they are reliable, then the benefits do not outweigh the costs. 
He then refers to the underlying flaws of qualitative mapping, and suggests 
that if they contained errors, then any quantitative model based on these will 
also be flawed. 
Warren’s prescription is that system dynamics can only be beneficial if it is 
based on the stock-flow notation, together with quantitative time-paths of 
both stocks and flows. 
In a subsequent paper, Warren (2005) considers how strategic management 
may be improved by drawing on the fundamental principles of system 
dynamics. It is an elaboration of his earlier arguments, except that he now 
gives more credence to how system dynamics may be beneficial.  
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The principles that he highlights include: 
• Focus on performance over time 
• Resources drive performance 
• Resources fill and drain 
• Resource building depends on existing resource levels 
An analysis of these principles indicates how they are entirely consistent with 
system dynamics and the basic nature of asset-stock accumulations discussed 
earlier in this chapter. The principle that resources drive performance and a 
focus on performance over time relate directly to the cardinal principles in 
system dynamics that structure drives behaviour and a focus on reference 
modes. The latter two of Warren’s principles are directly related to the 
behaviour of stock variables in system dynamics as mechanism of asset-stock 
accumulations. 
Warren himself indicates how system dynamics has always been interested in 
the behaviour of important variables over time. These are usually termed 
behaviour over time (BOT) graphs in popular systems thinking or reference 
modes in quantitative system dynamics work. System dynamics usually tries to 
explain the reference mode by understanding the feedback loops that 
represent the hypothesised feedback structure that drives them. It is expected 
that this is surfaced by eliciting the collective mental models of the team.  By 
contrast, the approach presented by Warren is what he terms a “rigorous, 
coherent, and evidence-based explanation for how the organisation’s 
performance has arrived at its present state” (p.345). The approach traces 
backward along a chain of causality that explains the time-charts, which 
ultimately leads back to asset-stock accumulations. The time-charts of these 
reflect the historical accumulations. Further causal tracing reaches the flow 
variables, and their underlying policy variables and other asset-stocks. Once 
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again the time-charts of the variables are explicated.  The focus on the 
building and retention of stocks do not necessarily place emphasis on the 
feedback loops, as in many cases these are not the primary drivers of the asset 
accumulation. 
There is another divergence with conventional system dynamics approaches 
and Warren’s approach. He suggests that often exogenous variables are 
important and have significant influences on the behaviour and system 
performance of the system whereas an important principle in system 
dynamics is that behaviour is as a result of endogenous variables and their 
related feedback loops. Warren cautions that undue attention to feedback 
loops may result in missing important exogenous influences. He cites the 
example of car sales in Indonesia that appeared to be explained by positive 
feedback effects typical of tipping points, while the actual driver was changing 
income levels that were exogenous.  
Finally, Warren highlights how this approach diverges from the resource 
based view. He notes that in the latter, the focus is on inimitability of 
resources that comply with the VRIN attributes, while in his approach the 
focus is not really on VRIN, and includes many “mundane” variables that 
explain the performance of the firm. A counter to his argument is that if that 
is the case, then his framework is merely about explaining performance arising 
out of a complex set of relationships between asset-stocks in the form of 
resources and capabilities, but says nothing about sustaining competitive 
advantage. 
Warren  presents the complete competitive strategy dynamics approach in his 
book with the same title (Warren, 2002), and in a more recent book, entitled 
Strategic Management Dynamics (Warren, 2008).  In essence, it represents a 
strategic architecture based on asset-stock accumulation of resources, together 
with the associated timescales and time-paths of the flows that cause the 
stocks to accumulate or deplete over time. While his emphasis is still on 
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understanding these time-paths, he does now rely more heavily on a system 
dynamics approach, in the sense that he acknowledges the importance of 
positive and negative feedback loops that impact the asset-stocks. In Part 1 of 
the book (Warren, 2002), he devotes a chapter to each of these types of 
feedback loops.  In Part 2 of the book, he enriches the framework by 
considering other strategy concepts and tools including dynamics of rivalry, 
the experience curve, generic positioning strategy, environmental and industry 
analysis and so on.   
There are two other important elements that he considers in the latter part of 
his work. The first is soft factors. We notice that this has always been a 
consideration in system dynamics where these have been termed “soft 
variables”. This is important as it enables the consideration of intangible 
resources such as quality, morale, perceptions, confidence, and knowledge. 
The second is the notion of capabilities. He defines this as follows: 
“A resource-building capability is the relative rate at 
which the organization is able to build a specific strategic 
resource, for any given availability of other resources 
needed for that task.” 
(Warren, 2002, p. 208) 
 
Capabilities in his formulation, are themselves asset-stocks, and hence may 
also be treated in a similar way to resources. It is therefore a natural extension 
to the basic resource stock architecture.  
Another interesting avenue is the links with learning whether at individual or 
organisational level. Warren defines learning as “the current rate at which a 
given capability is being increased” (Warren, 2002, p. 212). 
It is important to note that this use of capabilities in the competitive strategy 
dynamics is a way of incorporating ideas from the dynamic capabilities 
approach. Warren explicitly refers to Amit and Schoemaker (1993) in his 
discussion of capabilities.  
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Discussion 
In this chapter, we explored the resource based view, the dynamic capabilities 
approach and Amit and Schoemaker’s strategic assets framework. The key 
insight of the resource based view is that sustainable competitive advantage 
may be achieved through resource positions that meet the VRIN attributes. 
Firms are considered as heterogeneous bundles of resources. While the RBV 
has merit and provides an alternate to the positioning and industry analysis 
approaches, it is still firmly a strategic choice approach. One of the valuable 
contributions is that even though the literature does not explicitly use systems 
terminology, it is inherently a systemic approach. Thus, the systemic 
relationships play an important role in giving rise to the VRIN attributes. 
Given that the basis of RBV is the resources, it is the nature of resources that 
has to be understood. Resources are asset-stock accumulations which have 
peculiar characteristics as indicated by Dierickx and Cool. These 
characteristics include time scale diseconomies, asset-mass efficiencies, 
interconnectedness of asset-stocks, causal ambiguity and asset erosion. By 
drawing on these, the RBV offers a richness to strategy that was not available 
in the industry analysis view. It helps explain differences in firm performance 
and positions that are just not possible from an industry analysis point of 
view. Furthermore, the RBV highlights the importance of context and the 
firm specific nature of assets and attributes. While the strategy literature has 
long identified process and content as important concepts, less attention was 
paid to context prior to the RBV. The RBV has been criticised as being too 
static. The dynamic capabilities approach attempted to deal with this criticism. 
Here the focus is broadened to the “teams of resources”, and the ability to 
reconfigure resources in a dynamic way.  As opposed to merely considering 
resource positions, the dynamic capabilities approach considers how 
resources change over time. Furthermore, it points to the benefits in high 
velocity and fast changing environments which some claim that the RBV is 
unsuitable for. The strategic assets framework of Amit and Schoemaker 
attempts to bridge the industry analysis approach and the RBV.  It may be 
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seen as an elaboration of the resource based view. While the RBV is relatively 
silent on the specific resources that a firm has to develop, the strategic assets 
framework makes the assumption that specific resources and capabilities need 
to match with strategic industry factors. In other words, for a firm to be able 
to achieve sustainable competitive advantage, the resources and capabilities 
and the strategic industry factors must overlap. This seems to be a regression 
to the old idea of “fit” between organisation and environment that has been 
so prevalent in the strategy literature. The strategic assets framework therefore 
circumscribes the universe of possible resources and capabilities that underpin 
competitive advantage, which by contrast, the RBV and the dynamic 
capabilities approaches leave much more open. Thus, we may state that the 
strategic assets framework restricts the degrees of freedom that a firm has in 
the development of its resources and capabilities, relative to the RBV and the 
dynamic capabilities approach. Although not exactly the same, this has similar 
connotations to the design and planning schools relative to the positioning 
schools. In the design and planning schools, there are, in principle, an infinite 
number of strategies. What the positioning school did was to circumscribe 
these to a limited number of generic industry positions. The contribution of 
the strategic assets framework was that it acknowledged the complexity under 
which decisions about resources and capabilities are made, and it highlighted 
the cognitive biases and bounded rationality of strategic actors. The RBV and 
the dynamic capabilities approach did not deal explicitly with these. As a 
result, the strategic assets framework recognises the difficulty in deriving 
normative approaches that will yield optimal results. It therefore admits the 
need for a heuristic based approach to work with the complexity in the 
development of resources and capabilities. In relation to a theory of strategic 
enactment, what we need to pay attention to is that in the strategic assets 
framework, there is a recognition that competitive interactions are not entirely 
based on a fixed environment, but rather on the interpretations of that 
environment by different actors.  
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We discussed Warren’s competitive strategy dynamics in the chapter. It was 
shown that this has elements of the RBV and system dynamic approaches. It 
was also pointed out that Warren has highlighted how it differs with the RBV 
and his critique of system dynamics. Nevertheless, it was shown that there are 
still very strong relationships with both the RBV and system dynamics 
especially when he uses the feedback relationships in developing his dynamic 
strategic architecture. Competitive strategy dynamics is a way of 
operationalising the asset-stock accumulations and their characteristics as 
highlighted by Dierickx and Cool. It also incorporates dynamic capabilities, in 
Warren’s formulation of capabilities as asset-stock accumulations. While this 
strategic approach may be useful as a methodology for practice that embodies 
some elements of the RBV, dynamic capabilities, and asset-stock 
accumulations, a problem with this approach is that it is overly rationalistic 
and functionalist in its orientation. This functionalism, based on an ontology 
of objectivism, is revealed in Warren’s claim that his approach is a “rigorous, 
coherent, and evidence-based explanation for how the organisation’s 
performance has arrived at its present state” (p.345). We notice that this does 
not admit any plurality, there is no tolerance of multiple perspectives, but 
even more serious is that it assumes reified worlds of asset-stocks that 
relentlessly change over time through objective means. Where is the human 
actor? Where are the interpretations of the human actors, and what of the 
human foibles and frailty that animate organisational life? We may draw some 
relationships with the competitive strategy dynamics and the technologies of 
quantification of number systems discussed earlier. Claims like the one made 
by Warren above, are what present a façade of “facts speak for themselves” 
which is a form of reductive and instrumental rationality that strips away the 
richness of what strategising-organising is, and then takes the high moral 
ground that nothing else is of value because they are not evidence-based. 
Unfortunately they do not scrutinise assumptions of what constitutes 
evidence, and how values inform what is admitted as evidence and what is 
not. Evidence, like all of social reality, is a human and social construction. 
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C h a p t e r  4 - S c e n a r i o  P l a n n i n g  
Scenario-based strategy 
Strategic management is confronted with a complex and turbulent world. 
This poses the dilemma of how managers and practitioners are to cope with 
such complexity. We require appropriate methodologies and tools to 
understand and operate in complex and uncertain environments. Scenario 
planning with roots in post World War II military planning, and later 
spreading to business and other sectors is one such approach. It has evolved 
into a set of well-established practices over the last 30 years and is applicable 
in all types of organisational settings. It is particularly appropriate for large 
scale change. It is related to understanding how the future may evolve and 
hence it is an important element of strategy and strategic change.   
Scenario based strategy may be considered a process based approach that 
simultaneously ensures that strategy content is adequately given attention. It is a 
set of tools and approaches that brings significant organisational participants 
together to consider important factors of strategy content including industry 
factors, competition, and other important factors in the organisation’s 
environment in order to determine how it should respond in the case of 
uncertainty of those factors. This strategic response is related to internal 
organisational factors including resources and capabilities, organisational 
culture, processes and systems.  
Scenario planning is versatile in relation to its applicability across different 
schools (paradigms) of strategy. It may be applied from an Industry Analysis 
perspective of strategy. For example, it may be embedded in a positioning 
approach, where there is little emphasis on resources and capabilities. Rather, 
competitive advantage is seen to stem entirely from the organisation’s 
position in the industry. In this way it is an extension of the positioning 
approach, by taking into account uncertainty in the industry. The objective of 
scenario based strategy in this case is to identify those generic positions that 
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will be robust against any of the futures that will emerge. By contrast, it may 
equally be applied as a strategy approach that disregards industry positioning 
as the basis of competitive advantage but one that is based on inimitable 
resources and capabilities. In such an application, the preoccupation will be 
identifying and developing a set of resources and capabilities that are robust 
against the uncertainties embedded in each of the scenarios. Thus, it then 
becomes an extension of the resources and dynamic capabilities approach.  
It may also be considered as a practical approach that bridges the industry 
analysis approach to strategy with one that focuses on internal organisational 
factors. Although scenario planning does not dictate the application of a 
resource based perspective, as indicated in the preceding paragraph it does 
not preclude it. It is entirely consistent with the respective frameworks of 
Grant (1991, p. 115) and that of Amit & Schoemaker (1993, p. 37) covered in 
Chapter 3, and may be considered as one method of operationalising them. As 
opposed to a single set of Strategic Industry Factors, each scenario may 
embed different sets of them, given the uncertainty in the contextual 
environment.  Consequently, this will require a response to identify those 
Strategic Assets that have the optimal overlap with these sets of Strategic 
Industry Factors, such that the organisation will be robust against any of the 
scenarios or futures that may occur.  
Similarly, scenario planning may be combined with the competitive strategy 
dynamics approach (Warren, 2002). Each of the major asset-stocks and flows 
in the latter will now have multiple sets of time-paths reflecting the changes in 
these variables under different sets of uncertainty as embodied in each of the 
scenarios. 
There is much potential for synergistic application of scenario planning and 
system dynamics modelling. There are four important ways in which this may 
be achieved. Firstly, a system dynamics model is constructed for the key focus 
question that frames the scenario planning. The model may then be used as a 
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tool for identifying and understanding the key uncertainties that become part 
of the scenario analysis. This is the approach followed by Maani & Cavana 
(2002, p. 85). Secondly, given that each of the scenarios have sufficient 
divergence, it is likely that the underlying systemic structure of the scenarios 
will differ markedly. In order to enrich the scenarios, a system dynamics 
model may be developed for each scenario that embeds the different 
underlying structure and hence uncertainty. Thirdly, system dynamics 
modelling may be used to explore different approaches to responding to the 
future uncertainty, in order to generate robust strategies. Fourthly, system 
dynamics modelling may be used to stimulating strategic conversation. This 
may be achieved by developing microworlds or management flight simulators 
(Bakken, Gould, & Kim, 1994, p. 245; Senge, 2006, p. 325; Senge, Kleiner, 
Roberts, Ross, & Smith, 1994, pp. 529-531) based on an underlying system 
dynamics model to extend the results of the scenario process to the whole 
organisation.  
Futurescope 
Although it was originally devised for long term planning, I shall use the terms 
scenario work, scenario practice, or simply scenarios as opposed to the term 
scenario planning. The reason is that planning has limited connotations 
whereas the significance of the approach goes beyond planning to incorporate 
scenario thinking, learning, strategic development and modelling of futures. 
Scenario practice has been applied to all kinds of systems with the resultant 
outcomes covering global, regional, country, government, institutional and 
departmental scenarios. Moreover, since scenarios focus on driving forces in 
the contextual environment, and considers the roles of various stakeholders in 
the transactional environment, it also takes into account how organisations 
and other forms of institutional actors in themselves shape large scale change. 
Scenario practice is therefore very relevant to strategy under uncertainty, and 
may be considered as complementary to other strategy approaches. 
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Although some approaches to scenarios do not take systems thinking into 
account and it is possible to construct scenario narratives without it, the 
position taken here is that it is fundamental to an effective scenario process. 
This is by conceptualising scenarios as plausible futures, each describing the 
future world as a system. It is supported by deploying systems tools in the 
process of scenario practice. In relation to complexity, scenario practice is 
designed specifically to work with causal ambiguity and uncertainty.  
Scenario work has emerged from the world of practice, and has been 
criticised for lacking theoretical support and justification. In this part of the 
chapter, I attempt to make a modest contribution to address this concern. 
The discussion is framed around a proposed scenario approach that I have 
termed Futurescope2, to conduct scenario work.  The name is a metaphor for 
making the future perceptible. The dictionary defines scope as “the state of 
the environment in which a situation exists” (Wordweb 1.63). Since scenario 
work is ultimately about understanding the state of the environment, the 
name seems relevant. The metaphor of Futurescope is also drawn from 
instruments like the microscope, telescope and oscilloscope. We use such 
instruments to understand and study phenomena that are usually 
imperceptible to us. A telescope makes distant objects perceptible. A 
microscope makes very small objects perceptible. An oscilloscope makes 
various electrical quantities perceptible. Futurescope is intended to make the 
future perceptible.  
Theoretical considerations 
It is somewhat paradoxical that although much has been written about 
scenario planning, and there are many articles published in the academic 
literature, scenario planning is under-theorised. Despite this extensive 
literature the lament of several authors is that it is not adequately justified, and 
                                                 
2 The Futurescope process together with a critical discussion of how it compares to other approaches to 
scenario work is presented in Appendix 1. 
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that it has tenuous theoretical underpinnings. This is surprising given that it 
has been applied for at least three decades in all kinds of organisational 
contexts spanning both time and geography. It has been applied in 
commercial, government, and non-governmental sectors globally (Verity, 
2003). The range of scenarios is broad in that it has been applied to global 
macro scenarios, at regional level such as the European Union, at country 
level, industry, firm and individual department level. It has also been applied 
in large and small organisations, as well as in multi-stakeholder settings. It is 
therefore very versatile. As an approach and methodology it has emerged 
from practice, and continues to grow by way of innovations in practice. 
Given the success of scenario planning in practice, what is the theoretical 
basis for it? O'Brien, Meadows, & Murtland (2007, p. 243) cite Hodgkinson 
and Wright (2002) as stating that scenario planning is a 
 “practitioner-derived method with very little supporting 
evidence, other than basic anecdotal evidence, for its 
efficacy.” 
  
Bradfield (2007, p. 260) notes that  
“ …unlike other long-range forecasting methods, there is 
yet no solid theoretical-based foundation underpinning 
scenario techniques.” 
 
In what follows, I make some suggestions on how to address the paucity of 
theoretical and philosophical underpinning of scenario work. Although the 
scenario approach has emerged from practice, it is a well established one that 
works and continues to offer benefit across all kinds of organisations. The 
critique of insufficient theoretical justification, while valid, does not mean that 
the method should be discredited. Since it works in practice, there ought to be 
a stimulus for seeking out the theory that makes it work. This is consistent 
with the learning cycle, where we reflect on practice to improve our theory. 
The learning cycle is not prescriptive, and accordingly, we can start anywhere 
in the cycle. By considering some of what the practice entails, we may be able 
to induce certain theoretical principles. In this section, I intend to explore this 
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a little further by investigating what scenario practice is in contradistinction 
with other methods. 
Decision making, planning and risk analysis 
Theoretical distinctions are made between scenario planning, contingency 
planning and sensitivity analysis. These distinctions revolve primarily around 
how each of them deals with uncertainty. This is well covered in Schoemaker 
(1993, pp. 186-188) and summarised below. He cites Habermas’ (1985) 
concept of “epistemic risks” that do not fit in with people’s conceptual 
frameworks. These are not easily handled with traditional frameworks such as 
forecasting or decision analysis.  
“Whereas forecasting techniques try to abandon any 
uncertainty by providing managers with only one forecast, 
multiple scenario analysis deliberately confronts decision 
makers with environmental uncertainties by presenting 
them with several, fundamentally different outlooks on 
the future.  Scenarios are generally built upon a dynamic 
sequence of interacting events, conditions, and changes 
that are necessary to reach a particular outcome. Thus, 
scenarios focus attention on causal processes and crucial 
decision points.” 
(Cornelius, Van de Putte, & Romani, 2005, p. 95) 
 
Scenarios are an effective way for working with such epistemic risks. Most 
conventional methods for working with uncertainty embed it in a single 
model, whereas scenario work builds uncertainty across models. Contingency 
planning prepares an alternate plan based on a single uncertainty whereas 
scenarios work with multiple uncertainties all at the same time. Sensitivity 
analysis identifies major variables that are uncertain and looks at the impact by 
changing a single variable at a time. Scenarios consider the change in many 
interacting variables all at once, without keeping others constant. Scenarios 
therefore enable a more powerful approach to working with uncertainty than 
conventional approaches to decision making (Schoemaker, 1993, pp. 186-
188). 
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Scenarios as interpretive systems methodologies 
The System of Systems Methodology (SOSM) (Jackson, 2003) considers two 
dimensions. The first dimension is whether the context is simple or complex, 
and the second dimension relates to the nature of relationships between 
participants or stakeholders in a given context.  
This is shown in the diagram below. 
Participants
Increasing divergence of values / interests 
 
  Unitary Pluralist Coercive 































Figure 4.1: System of systems methodologies 
Adapted from (Jackson, 2000) and (Jackson, 2003, p. 24) 
 
By considering the practice of scenario work we may be able to infer how it 
may be related to the SOSM.  Before “placing” scenario work on the ideal 
typology of the SOSM, one has to first make the argument that it may be 
considered as a systems methodology. It may appear unusual to classify it as a 
systems methodology, given that it did not emerge from a systems tradition, 
and many approaches to scenarios do not incorporate systems ideas. 
However, it has been common to use some systems tools such as influence 
diagrams and cause-effect relationships as methods in some stages of scenario 
process. Futurescope does this in a conscious, deliberate and explicit way. There 
is more to the story of why it is a systems approach than just the application 
of systems tools. This is by conceptualising scenarios as systems. This is done 
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first, by identifying the ‘system under scrutiny” (Curry, 2007) and second, by 
conceptualising each scenario as a “system as mental construct” describing a 
possible future. We explore the systemic relationships that will impel a given 
outcome. Furthermore, as we shall see later, boundary considerations are an 
important component of scenario work. This is in relation to both spatial and 
temporal boundaries. The relationship between the “system under scrutiny” 
and the environment is an important aspect of scenario work. Viewed this 
way, scenario work becomes inherently a systemic approach. The concept of 
methodology as implied in the SOSM is that there is some form of 
intervention. Although scenario work sometimes stops at the stage of creating 
scenarios, in most cases there is some form of implementation by considering 
strategies, decisions or options against each of the scenarios. Therefore 
scenario work ultimately leads to intervention, and is a critical component of 
the approach. In summary, we can offer some theoretical justification for 
scenario work as a form of systemic intervention. 
Scenario planning is designed to work with ambiguity and uncertainty that 
result from complex underlying relationships. In terms of the vertical 
dimension of ideal typology of the SOSM, scenario work applies at the 
complex end of the continuum. This indicates complex contexts or problem 
situations with large numbers of interacting elements, and high levels of 
interdependence amongst elements. Scenario approaches are applicable across 
all three contexts of unitary, pluralist and coercive in the horizontal dimension 
of the SOSM, but seem to align best under pluralist ones. The early days of 
scenarios may be classified as unitary in the sense that the approach tended to 
be rational and objective, where the scenarios were meant to be descriptions 
of the future in an objective way. I mean this in the sense that the assumption 
was that scenarios were descriptions of an objective reality in the world. This 
is akin to hard systems approaches and functionalism, relevant to unitary 
contexts in the SOSM. Although such application is not widespread it is 
conceivable that scenario work may also be applicable in coercive contexts, 
where the goal is to overcome dominance. There may be opportunities for 
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this especially when working in multi-stakeholder contexts such as when a 
municipality, citizens, business and NGOs come together in a scenarios 
exercise. In this chapter, the focus will be on showing how scenarios have the 
highest critical mass when considered as an approach for pluralist contexts. 
Here we assume that there is divergence in worldviews, goals, values and 
interests of the participants and the stakeholders, but there is room for 
accommodation of differences and there are elements that bind stakeholders 
together in some way and the possibility that through engagement and 
dialogue there may be some move towards “common ground.” In this case, 
scenario work may be seen as an interpretive systems approach (Jackson, 
2000). This is supported by the following features of scenario work.  
• It is always participatory. 
• It relies heavily on inter-disciplinary participation.  
• The methods and techniques applied are designed to accommodate 
divergent viewpoints. 
• It recognises multiple perspectives and eschews the idea of a single 
truth. 
• Plausible futures are constructed from the many inputs of 
participants. 
• Uncertainty is embedded as a fundamental concept. 
• It can accommodate low levels of conflict and in some cases may be 
able to handle higher levels of conflict. 
• Scenarios are constructed by the participants. The construction is 
based on interpretation of facts, events, trends, and forces. 
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• Scenarios are written as narrative constructions. Every narrative is an 
ethnographic account open to multiple readings and interpretations. 
• Scenarios are mental conceptions. They do not describe an objective 
reality, but rather they describe the plausible, future reality as 
perceived by the participants. 
• Every stage in the scenario process is based on the exchange of 
perceptions, values, and views of participants and some level of 
accommodation amongst these to achieve the outputs of each stage. 
We may identify further support for scenarios as an interpretive approach by 
going back to the work of Pierre Wack (Wack, 1985a, 1985b). He was one of 
the leading scenario practitioners whose work spawned, and whose original 
insights still permeate many of the scenario approaches and methodologies 
applied today (Selin, 2007). Through experience, Wack and his team 
discovered that scenarios were most effective when they were able to assist 
decision makers in “re-perceiving reality.” We can infer from this that 
scenarios act as “perceptual devices”. It is commonly accepted that scenarios 
do not represent forecasts, but rather possible pathways into the future. 
Nevertheless, even if we accept this, it may appear that scenarios still describe 
objective reality in some way, but does it by circumscribing all possibilities 
because the future cannot be predicted. If it is merely a perceptual device then 
we mean that scenarios eschew positivism and objective rationality. The 
implications of this at a philosophical level are that by accepting scenarios and 
scenario practice, in effect we are referring to an ontology of social 
constructionism and enacted reality. Many practitioners of scenarios do not 
realise this. 
The very nature of scenarios and the attention that it pays to uncertainties 
shows how they automatically take into account competing worldviews. This 
is most explicit in the intuitive-logics approach to scenarios where the 
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different logics are in themselves different worldviews. An example is the 
logics of globalisation-fragmentation. These implicitly refer to different 
worldviews in the globalisation logic and the fragmentation logic respectively. 
Based on the forgoing we conclude that scenario work may be classified as a 
form of interpretive systems methodology. When we evaluate scenario work 
as described in this chapter, with Jackson’s constitutive rules for a generic 
interpretive systems methodology, we may indeed classify it as an interpretive 
systems methodology (Jackson, 2000, p. 282, Table 7.5).  This may come as a 
surprise to both scenario practitioners as well as academics.  
Scenarios as a form of modelling 
In our attempt to induce theoretical justification for scenario work, we may 
follow another line of argument, where we propose that scenarios are a form 
of modelling. If this is done then it may be evaluated alongside other 
approaches to modelling such as mathematical modelling, formal modelling, 
and system dynamics modelling. We need to explore what is meant by a 
model. A model is an abstraction of reality. Any good model distils the 
essence of reality relative to some purpose. It is common wisdom that a 
model cannot represent reality in its entirety otherwise the model will be as 
complex as reality itself. This common wisdom is embodied in the phrase, “a 
map is not the reality.” However this does not mean that a map is not useful. 
It abstracts out those features that are important to the purpose, in this case 
orienting one spatially and offering the ability for navigation between two 
points. Scenarios are models of the future. They are not meant to represent all 
aspects of the future, but rather those elements of the future that are 
important to some purpose. Another important aspect of scenario practice is 
that as a model it may be considered as a soft model. It does not model the 
future per se but rather the conceptions of the future of the scenario team. In 
this sense, the nature of scenarios is fundamentally an interpretive one. 
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The role of narratives in scenarios 
In the same way that a set of econometric models may represent an economy 
at a high level, or other real world systems may be represented by formal 
models, we may conceptualise scenarios as models of the future. These 
models are based on the knowledge drawn from the mental models of the 
decision makers, supported by information and research related to the future. 
Scenarios are therefore models of uncertainty. The same justification that is 
used to develop system dynamics models or operations research models such 
as Bayesian uncertainty in dealing with stochastic systems, or queuing models 
in the case of deterministic systems, may be used for the development of 
scenarios. From this point of view, scenarios may be classed as a form of soft 
OR modelling (Pidd, 2004, p. 10) when it is based on a systematic and 
rigorous process of data collection, analysis, synthesis, testing and validation.  
Scenarios are sensemaking devices. They help us make sense of large amounts 
of conflicting and complementary data. Since scenarios are perceptual and 
sensemaking devices the narrative form is an appropriate form. It is a kind of 
paradigmatic internal validation. Why use narratives? Later in this chapter, I 
shall describe the benefits of using narrative, but here it is also suggested that 
theoretically we are bound to use narrative. We are constructing futures not 
merely describing them, and in addition they are jointly constructed through 
facilitated meaning making and sensemaking processes.  As the saying goes 
“words create worlds”.  
This is perhaps also an underlying reason why those that get the most benefit 
from scenarios are the participants and not necessarily the executives and 
decision makers who did not participate in constructing them. This offers a 
number of challenges and opportunities in scenario practice and how far we 
can go in using them in a way that is theoretically justifiable. 
When the scenarios are underpinned by cause-effect structure diagrams as it is 
in Futurescope then there is automatically an underlying systems model for each 
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scenario. I wish to extend the argument that the narrative form ought also to 
be considered as a form of modelling. When the narrative is considered a 
model of uncertainty, it is extremely powerful. Narrative offers a framework 
for drawing together disparate data and types of data into a coherent whole, 
and it offers a framework for judgment (Schwartz, 1998, pp. 37-39). It 
captures complex relationships as well as non-linear relationships between 
variables. This is not easily achievable with some kinds of formal modelling. 
For example, if we wished to represent the same relationships in the form of 
equations, the first difficulty is how to go about formulating them. The 
second difficulty is that even if we are able to formulate them, they are likely 
to be intractable. I am not suggesting that narrative as a form of modelling is 
superior to formal models but I am highlighting narrative as “fit-for-purpose” 
when dealing with highly complex systems and high levels of uncertainty and 
ambiguity. I wish to conclude this section by re-iterating that scenarios are 1) 
models of the future and 2) models of uncertainty. 
Scenarios and self-organisation 
One of the important features that we draw from complexity theory is that of 
self-organisation. I shall not dwell too much on this here, except to raise one 
important point. Although the scenario process is a facilitated one, it does rely 
heavily on self-organising processes, which are subject to emergence 
(Anderson, 1999, pp. 217-218). Much of the raw material in scenario 
construction is the various data that are generated during each of the stages. 
These are large amounts of data. Since the process is a transparent one, all of 
this information is represented as a form of “group memory” in flipcharts and 
whiteboards. Wheatley (1992, p. 106) notes how information serves as a 
structuring dynamic. Although this is not unique to scenario work, and is 
applicable to other forms of participatory work, and small and large group 
facilitation there is room to draw theoretical support from complex systems 
theory in relation to emergence and self organisation. In scenario work there 
has to be novel elements and surprises as important components (van der 
Heijden, 2005). Without these, scenarios are unlikely to engage the decision 
 Page 108 
makers sufficiently, nor are they likely to challenge their mental models in any 
fundamental way. This highlights the need for scenario work to be a creative 
act and a form of artistry. Complexity theory offers the “science” behind the 
art, by way of self organising processes leading to emergent outcomes that 
may not be specified in advance. The “information as a structuring dynamic” 
serves as the mechanism to effect the self organisation. This is by way of 
amplification of some inputs, and attenuation of others.  
Epistemological issues 
Good scenarios are created when there is a judicious mix of facts based on 
intensive research, data collection and analysis, and the “subjective” knowing 
of the scenario team as embedded in their mental models and schemata.  
Every scenarios exercise is a form of knowledge construction. The SECI 
model of Nonaka and Takeuchi  (1995, p. 71) offers a theoretical framework 




Figure 4.2: SECI model 
Adapted from Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995. p.71) 
 
The SECI model is based on the idea that new knowledge is created when 
there is dynamic interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge. The 
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the process. Van der Heijden (1996, p. 120) draws on the “zone of proximal 
development” as defined by Vygotsky (1986) to demonstrate how scenarios 
act as a form of scaffolding to enrich one’s knowledge base. The zone of 
proximal development lies around a person’s existing cognitive structures. By 
a process of scaffolding, people are able to make meaning out of their 
empirically rich tacit knowledge, and unconnected bits of insight. This is a 
kind of pre-analytic knowledge. When we engage in conversation and social 
interaction then this pre-analytic knowledge in the zone of proximal 
development is connected to the logic of reasoning in the outer conversation 
of the group, and we thereby create new knowledge (van der Heijden, 1997). 
The underlying message here is that sensemaking can only occur in the zone 
of proximal development. Each of the steps in the scenario process is 
designed such that the tacit knowledge embedded in the scenario team 
becomes codified and articulated in the final outcomes, and there is collective 
learning as new bits of insight and hunches start to form in the minds of 
participants thereby extending their tacit knowledge and the zones of 
proximal development. The SECI model and the zone of proximal 
development therefore offer epistemological support for scenario work.  
Cognitive psychology and scenario work 
The scenario literature (Heathfield, 2007; Schwartz, 1998; van der Heijden, 
1996) makes reference to the work of neurobiologist, David Ingvar, who 
discovered that there is the propensity for the human brain to weave stories 
about anticipated sequences of events, and creates alternate sets of action 
plans and alternate timepaths about the future. These are termed “memories 
of the future”. We are constantly creating such memories of the future in an 
unconscious way and look for correspondence between new streams of 
information and one of these memories of the future. We, thus, use them to 
filter new information and respond to new situations based on them. 
Scenarios are akin to a memory of the future at the group level, which enables 
an organisation to rehearse the future before it happens. 
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The literature has also considered the relationship between cognitive 
psychology and scenarios. The focus here has been on cognitive biases and 
traps, a number of which have been identified. By drawing on cognitive 
psychology, Bradfield (2007, p. 263) notes that there is some consensus that 
knowledge and memory are stored in the form of mental schema and 
associative networks. When new information is received then different 
schema or parts of the associative network are activated. Hence new 
information is dealt with on the basis of past experience embodied in the 
schemata and the associative network. The activation of one node in the 
network results in identifying other nodes based on the associative logic that 
ties the parts together. This means that dependent on which node is activated, 
different knowledge from the network is elicited. This leads to a number of 
cognitive biases that will be treated shortly. For now we can see how 
scenarios may actually be applying this in a beneficial way. Because each of 
the scenarios is different, it means that different parts of the associative 
network are brought to bear. Therefore, a more comprehensive and holistic 
picture may be achieved, than if relying on a more limited set of the network 
and schemata. 
The following is a summary of the cognitive biases and mental traps drawn 
from Bradfield (2007, pp. 264-270). The representative heuristic results in 
individuals assigning more weight to events or samples that are closer to how 
they represent their current mental models. The availability heuristic results in 
events that have occurred recently, are more concrete or vivid, and those 
which an individual is familiar with, given more weight.  Anchoring and 
adjustment mean that individuals form their judgments of an estimate based 
on the starting position or anchors with which the information around an 
event is presented. Belief perseverance indicates that once individuals have 
formed a mental model or theories about situations, people, and relationships 
between variables, they tend to adhere to those beliefs even when presented 
with conflicting data. This means that once the theories and beliefs are 
formed they become independent and disconnected from the data on which 
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they were formed. The confirmation bias implies that once a belief is formed, 
individuals give more credence to supporting evidence and less to 
disconfirming evidence. The latter are considered erroneous or unreliable. 
The experience bias indicates that the past experience and knowledge of 
individuals bias how they interpret and work with new information. They will 
focus more on things that they understand and “fit” with their past 
experience and how they frame or conceptualise a problem, thereby limiting 
the solution space. The overconfidence bias indicates that individuals are 
over-confident in their predictions, because they seem unaware of the 
fallibility of the assumptions on which they base their predictions. The single 
outcome bias shows that as opposed to what conventional decision models 
imply that we seek out many alternatives or options and evaluate them based 
on a set of objective criteria, individuals tend to settle on one outcome based 
on a single interpretation, and one alternative to achieve that outcome. This is 
done by magnifying the attractiveness of the preferred outcome against that 
of alternative outcomes, and hence the spread between them.  
Bradfield acknowledges that most of the mental traps and heuristics referred 
to above are from cognitive psychology studies conducted a long time ago, 
that the findings are not unanimous, and that research is based on 
probabilistic forecasts.  He further adds that 
“as scenario practitioners will be quick to point out, 
scenarios have nothing to do with either probabilities or 
forecasts.” 
(Bradfield, 2007, pp. 272-273) 
 
His contention however is that scenario work will be affected by such 
cognitive processes, and that while experienced scenario practitioners may be 
aware of this through experience, most scenario practitioners are unaware of 
them. This leads to his argument that scenario work is not as deceptively 
simple as made out to be in much of the literature. This is certainly important 
to bear in mind especially by those who may be new to scenario work. 
Bradfield has unfortunately not considered how scenario work may actually 
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contribute to overcoming some of these cognitive biases and traps, and even 
using them as points of leverage that other approaches to planning and 
decision making are unable to. For example, Schoemaker (1993, pp. 208-209) 
has shown how scenarios rely on one set of biases to overcome another. In 
his research, indications were that scenarios exploited the conjunction fallacy 
to overcome the overconfidence trap. This is a fertile area for further 
research. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, but there is merit in 
interrogating each of the cognitive biases individually and in relation to each 
other, to formulate design principles to include in a scenario process. They are 
off course all invaluable for those that facilitate scenarios processes to bear in 
mind as they conduct their work. 
Discussion  
One of the key research questions in this study was related to strategy under 
conditions of high ambiguity and uncertainty. In this chapter we investigated 
scenario planning as one such methodology. It was shown that it is a very 
versatile approach that is applicable from the perspective of different schools 
of strategy, for example industry analysis and positioning, as well as from the 
resource based view. Since scenario planning emerged from the world of 
practice it has been critiqued as under-theorised. Therefore an attempt was 
made in the chapter to induce theoretical principles for scenario planning. 
There are a number of promising avenues to achieve this. Firstly, it was 
shown how scenario planning deals with uncertainty by comparing it with 
contingency planning and sensitivity analysis. Secondly, a case was made that 
scenario work may actually be classified as a form of systems methodology. 
This was done with the aid of Jackson’s SOSM. More importantly, it was 
shown that scenario planning may be considered as an interpretive systems 
approach. This is akin to soft OR or a soft systems approach.  Therefore, it is 
likely that we may draw contributions from scenario planning towards a 
theory of strategic enactment. Thirdly, an argument was presented that 
scenarios are a form of modelling, and may be evaluated alongside other 
kinds of modelling such as mathematical modelling, formal modelling and 
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system dynamics modelling. Scenarios, therefore, represent models of the 
future and models of uncertainty. Another important point that was 
highlighted was that scenarios require rich narratives, and these narratives may 
be considered as models of uncertainty. Fourthly, it was shown how an 
effective scenario process relies heavily on processes of self-organisation and 
emergence, by relying on “information as a structuring dynamic”. Fifthly, the 
SECI model was applied to indicate the relationship between tacit knowledge 
and “zones of proximal development” and how new knowledge is generated 
during a scenario process. Finally, relationships between scenario practice and 
cognitive psychology were explored.  
Managers and practitioners require appropriate methodologies and tools 
when confronted with a complex and turbulent world. Scenario planning is 
one such approach that has evolved into a set of well-established practices 
over the last 30 years. It is relevant to large scale change, because it refers to 
future uncertainty and focuses primarily on the driving forces for change in 
the external environment. Scenario practice has been applied to all kinds of 
systems with the resultant outcomes covering global, regional, country, 
government, institutional and departmental scenarios. It considers the roles of 
various stakeholders in large scale systems and also takes into account how 
organisations and other forms of institutional actors in themselves shape large 
scale change.  
Despite its success, various authors lament its lack of theoretical support and 
justification. I have offered some suggestions to begin to address this criticism 
by considering various theoretical approaches as well as epistemological issues 
in relation to scenario work. These include decision making, planning and risk 
analysis, cognitive psychology, modelling and soft OR, and the SECI model. 
Furthermore, I have presented a case that systems thinking is fundamental to 
effective scenario practice, and that scenario practice is most appropriately 
considered as a soft systems intervention or interpretive methodology in 
terms of the SOSM. As Curry (2007, p. 371) has noted, scenario planning is a 
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form of “systems thinking without systems specialists”, or in other words 
scenario planning is “systems in disguise”.  
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C h a p t e r  5 - C o m p l e x i t y  T h e o r y  a n d  
O r g a n i s a t i o n s  
Introduction 
One of the aims of this study is to determine the extent to which complexity 
theory may help in understanding organisations and strategy. This chapter 
therefore explores complexity theory in some detail, and thereafter defines 
and identifies important characteristics of complex adaptive systems. A case is 
made that social systems including organisations are complex adaptive 
systems and will therefore exhibit their properties. I also explore complexity 
theory in the context of the social sciences in a broader way as this endeavour 
signifies an ontological shift in our understanding social reality. Given that a 
substantial portion of the literature on complexity theory in relation to the 
social realm is based on metaphorical application, I cover the concept of 
metaphors and their relation to scientific knowing quite substantially. This 
chapter also sets the framework for the subsequent chapter on leadership.  
Complexity Theory and Complex Adaptive Systems 
Complexity theory (Anderson, 1999; Chiles, Meyer, & Hench, 2004; Cilliers, 
1998; Kurtz & Snowden, 2003; D. L. Levy, 2000; Stacey, 2007) is an emerging 
worldview and approach for understanding and working with complex 
systems. Technically, these systems are referred to as non-linear dynamical 
systems. This focus on non-linear dynamical systems is significant in itself. 
Most real-world systems whether physical or social systems, are non-linear 
dynamic systems. Mathematical analysis of non-linear systems was intractable 
until about thirty years ago. They only became amenable to mathematical 
treatment as non-linear dynamic systems as a result of more powerful 
computing tools. Prior to that, they had to be approximated as linear systems. 
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“Whenever nonlinear equations appeared, they were 
replaced by linear approximations. Instead of describing 
the phenomena in their full complexity, the equations of 
classical science deal with small oscillations, shallow waves, 
small change of temperature and so on.” 
(Capra, 2002, p. 35, emphasis in original) 
 
The study of such complex, non-linear systems, was given much impetus with 
the application of powerful computer based simulations. Simulations of 
complex adaptive systems vary from cellular automata, Boolean networks, 
and genetic algorithms to other forms of agent based simulations. It may be 
argued that such simulations offered researchers and scientists a new method 
for undertaking science.  
Complexity theory has been described as a “kind of qualitative holistic 
mathematics” (Waldrop 1992, cited in Agar, 1999, p. 99). 
Complexity theory, though having its roots in natural and physical systems, 
has evolved into an interdisciplinary field of study that draws on inter alia 
biology, economics, sociology, information systems and communications. 
The central concern of complexity theory or complexity science, as it is 
sometimes termed, is to understand the underlying characteristics of complex 
systems, their resulting behaviour and how the two are related. There are a 
number of important concepts that is associated with complexity theory. 
Some of these are: emergence, self-organisation, self-organised criticality, 
chaos, edge of chaos, dissipative structures, autopoiesis, strange attractors, 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and fitness landscapes (Cilliers, 
2000; Coleman Jr., 2000; Escobar, 2003; Lissack, 1999). 
Complexity theorists are not drawn from a single discipline. Many different 
scientists and scholars including biologists, physicists, chemists, philosophers, 
mathematicians, psychologists, economists, and other social scientists have 
contributed to the development of complexity theory. The genesis and 
development of complexity theory has been a transdisciplinary one. 
Moreover, the concerns of complexity theory are with all types of natural and 
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social complex systems, their properties and behaviour. This includes the 
issues of interdependence, turbulence, messiness, unpredictability, 
fluctuations, value laden-ness, multiple perspectives and context (Klein, 2004, 
p. 4).  
Delgado Diaz (2004, p. 50) identifies several complexities. The first is 
complexity as science, which is the study of non-linear dynamical systems and 
their properties. This is what is usually referred to as complexity theory or 
complexity science. The second is complexity as method, that is, the ways of 
thinking and application that we draw on from complexity as science. The 
third is complexity as worldview which is related to our perspective of the 
world and our relations with it.  
Complex systems are open systems because they exchange energy, resources 
and information with the environment. Anderson (1999, pp. 217-218) 
identifies six insights that he regards as scientifically established. He provides 
significant support for this point by highlighting a significant literature that 
covers this extensively.  Furthermore, these insights are corroborated by 
much of the literature on complexity theory referred to elsewhere in this 
thesis. 
First, many non-linear dynamic systems do not reach point or cyclical 
equilibrium. Point equilibrium is when a system stabilises around a single 
point. A common example is a pendulum subject to friction. If a pendulum is 
released, at say 90o to the vertical, it will traverse a path that eventually comes 
to rest at the origin (00), at point equilibrium. If we release a marble at the side 
of a concave container like a bowl, it will eventually settle at the bottom of the 
container, at its point equilibrium. The absence of point equilibrium is a key 
difference between complexity theory and some branches of systems 
thinking, such as cybernetics. Cybernetics considers systems as homeostatic 
and hence systems that reach point equilibrium. Cyclical equilibrium is when a 
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system never comes to rest but follows a trajectory that is repeated cyclically, 
such as a pendulum that is not subject to friction.  
Second, many processes that are apparently random are actually chaotic. 
Chaos implies that system states are unpredictable yet bounded. They revolve 
around a strange attractor.  
Thirdly, chaotic systems are subject to sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions. This is popularly framed by the metaphor of the “butterfly 
effect.” A way to understand the mathematical operation that leads to 
sensitive dependence is to consider the stretching and folding of baker’s 
dough. Suppose we mark baker’s dough with two droplets of blue and red ink 
right next to each other. As the typical kneading action of folding and 
stretching is done, the red and blue spots begin to successively move further 
and further away from each other. Another example is two droplets of rain 
close to each other falling at the top of a cliff. One raindrop falls to the left 
and the other to the right, consequently ending up in two very different 
oceans. Both examples demonstrate that an imperceptible difference in 
starting conditions gets amplified leading to radically divergent outcomes. 
This phenomenon of sensitive dependence on initial conditions enables 
chance events or historical accidents to tip a system into a particular 
trajectory. It leads to lock-in and path dependence.  This is one of the 
underlying reasons for the “arrow of time” or irreversibility of time, that 
characterises complex systems. In such systems, “history matters.” Brian 
Arthur shows how positive feedback in the economy magnifies such small 
differences in starting conditions. An example is that of the VCR, which was 
introduced in two competing standards, VHS and Betamax, at roughly the 
same time, selling at roughly the same price. Due to chance events, and 
external circumstances, the VHS format was able to get a small lead over the 
Betamax format, ultimately leading to VHS capturing the whole market 
(Arthur, 1990, p. 92). A second example from Arthur shows how some 
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regions attract industry as a result of chance and not necessarily geographic 
superiority based on factor endowments, natural resources, or skills. He 
indicates that in the 1940s and 1950s, key individuals in the electronics 
industry set up operations in Sara Clara County near Stanford University. As a 
result this attracted many other related firms into the area, which today has 
become Silicon Valley. Arthur asserts that if they chose to locate elsewhere 
(many other university towns would have sufficed) the concentration of the 
electronics industry would have been elsewhere.  
Fourth, complex systems are not amenable to reductionist analysis, because of 
the myriad inter-relationships and feedback loops characterised by mutual and 
circular causality, to the extent that the feedback relationships are not 
discernable (Stacey, 2007).  
Fifth, complex patterns of behaviour emerge from the relationships between 
the parts of the system.  
Sixth, complex systems have the propensity for self-organisation. Given a 
random starting condition, they will evolve to a state of order poised between 
chaos and disorder, or what is termed the “edge of chaos”. 
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Cilliers (2000, p. 24) provides what he terms a qualitative description of 
complex systems, and identifies the following features: 
• Consists of large numbers of elements which in themselves may be 
simple. 
• The elements interact dynamically, in a non-linear way, and the 
interactions are rich. The effect of local interactions may be 
propagated globally. 
• The interactions are comprised of many direct and indirect feedback 
loops. 
• These are open systems, operating far-from-equilibrium, exchanging 
energy and resources with the environment. 
• Such systems have memory that is distributed throughout the system. 
The behaviour of the system is dependent on the history. This point 
is significant as it indicates that two systems that appear to be very 
similar, have different embedded histories, and hence are very 
different. This relates back to the discussion in Chapter 3 where 
system states are embodied in the cumulative history of all its asset-
stocks. This embedded history underlines the importance of path 
dependence in complex systems. Another point that is important is 
that the memory is distributed throughout the system, and not in any 
one agent. Therefore no agent has global understanding of the system 
and how it came to be where it is. 
• Since the system behaviour is based on interactions between 
components, and less on what is contained within the components 
themselves, and such interactions are feedback-laden with many, 
multiple interacting feedback loops, the behaviour of the system may 
 Page 121 
not be predicted. Cilliers emphasises that this is not an argument 
against causality but rather against deterministic forms of prediction. 
• Complex systems are adaptive, meaning that they can (re)organise 
their internal structure without the intervention of an external agent. 
This means that system changes may be endogenous and not 
necessarily as a result of shocks from the environment. 
Levy (2000, p. 68) considers  complexity theory as an umbrella term that 
covers both chaos theory and network theory.  Chaos theory is based on 
recursive application of non-linear, deterministic equations. A common 
example is that of the logistics equation. The state of the system at time tn+1 is 
dependent on the state of the system at time tn.  
Complexity theory is not a single theory but rather an ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, frameworks, propositions and metaphors. It draws largely from 
physical, biological, physiological and other natural systems but has 
application in social systems. The following is a definition of a complex 
adaptive system (Bodhanya, 2008, p. 12): 
A complex adaptive system (CAS) is a system comprised 
of many heterogeneous agents that interact locally with 
each other based on local schema, such that the 
behaviour of the system arises as a result of feedback 
relationships between the agents, and the system evolves 
as the schemata of the agents adapt based on the 
feedback. 
 
By applying this definition, the application of CAS is not restricted to physical 
and natural systems, but includes social systems. The notion of an agent is a 
generic one, and applies at different levels of abstraction. In the case of a 
physical substance, we may consider molecules as the agents. If it is an 
ecological system then the agents may be species. Neurons are the agents in 
the physical brain, while artificial neurons are the agents in an artificial neural 
network. In the case of an organisation, individuals, groups, and departments 
may be identified as the agents. In an economy, the population of firms 
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represents collections of agents. There are alternate conceptions of agents in 
social systems. For example, in the complex responsive process approach, the 
agents are narrative themes (Stacey, 2007).  Others have considered Dawkin’s 
memes as agents (Price, 2004, p. 42).  
Characteristics of complex adaptive systems. 
Agents with schemata (Anderson, 1999, p. 219). A complex system is made 
up of a large number of interacting agents. These agents have cognitive 
structures termed, schemata. As the agents interact with each other, the 
schemata change. Anderson notes the distinction between system dynamics 
where feedback loops are between system variables, whereas in complex 
systems the feedback loops are considered to be between agents. 
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions. This is one of the major 
lessons from chaos theory and has assumed the popular connotation of the 
“butterfly effect” (Gleick, 1998, pp. 8,20-23; D. Levy, 1994, p. 170). The 
implications of this are that it is not possible to forecast a future state of a 
system with any precision because minor changes in initial conditions may 
lead to vastly different outcomes. A corollary to this, as discussed earlier, is 
that complex systems exhibit path dependence (Arthur, 1990). 
Fitness landscapes. Agents in complex adaptive systems traverse a 
metaphorical fitness landscape (Anderson, 1999, p. 220; Kauffman, 1995b, p. 
121; Levinthal & Wraglien, 1999, pp. 344-345; D. L. Levy, 2000, pp. 72-73). A 
climb up the landscape represents an increase in fitness. Conversely, a 
traversal down the landscape represents a decrease in fitness. As agents 
interact with each other, each agent strives to increase its fitness based on the 
payoff functions for each of the steps of the traversal (Anderson, 1999, p. 
220). As an agent changes it changes the environment of the other agents, and 
hence the agents traverse an adaptive landscape. The fitness landscape 
represents the environment. This results in achieving dynamic, as opposed to, 
static equilibrium. The fitness landscape is not static as the actions of other 
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agents affect it, thus, the agents traverse a constantly deforming landscape. 
This leads to co-evolution between the agents and the environment. Agents 
do not merely react or adapt to changes to the environment but they co-
evolve with it. This may be considered as co-evolution at a micro-level. 
Co-evolution. At a higher level, the system as a whole is also co-evolving 
with the macro-environment. In this case, the interpretation is that a 
population of organisations or systems are traversing this shifting, heaving 
landscape. This represents co-evolution at a macro level. 
Co-evolution to the edge of chaos. CAS have the tendency to gravitate to a 
state of self-organised criticality (Anderson, 1999, p. 223; Morel & 
Ramanujam, 1999, pp. 281-282). This is a state poised at the edge of chaos 
between static order and chaos. It is a region that is paradoxical in that it has 
characteristics of stability and instability simultaneously. It is a state where the 
system is in dynamic equilibrium, or what Stacey (2003, pp. 228-230) refers to 
as bounded instability. Slight changes can lead to small or large outcomes that 
follow a power-law distribution.  Such power law equilibria occur at the edge 
of chaos.  The power law distribution implies that large system changes occur 
exponentially less frequently than small system changes, and large fluctuations 
occur more often than when characterised by the normal (Gaussian) 
distribution (Anderson, 1999, p. 223; D. L. Levy, 2000, p. 80). 
Dissipative structures. Complex adaptive systems are a form of dissipative 
structure, operating far-from-equilibrium, by importing energy, information 
and resources from the environment. As agents are connected to other 
agents, their behaviour is determined by the subset of agents that they interact 
with. This leads to system level outcomes that are ordered, but that was not 
determined by any one or small groups of agents. This is a form of negentropy, 
and may appear to violate the second law of thermodynamics. This is not so, 
because the system has to import energy from the environment in order to 
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maintain the self-organised state. At the level of the system, entropy is 
reduced, but at the level of the environment the overall entropy increases.  
Self-organisation. Complex adaptive systems exhibit the property of self-
organisation (Morel & Ramanujam, 1999, p. 282; Pascale, 1999, p. 89). Order 
emerges from the interactions between agents in the system and is not 
imposed from outside of the system. This indicates that there is a level of 
control, but the control is an emergent property that is not imposed on the 
system. The system therefore displays bounded behaviour. It traverses the 
state space and is bounded by an attractor, a confined region in state space 
that constantly displays novelty, as it never repeats a state. It is also possible 
for the system to shift to an entirely new attractor that is a different pattern 
and bounding of the state space. There is the potential for entirely new forms 
of order to spontaneously emerge. 
Recombination and system evolution. There is the possibility of the 
network of agents changing in a CAS as new agents enter, or existing agents 
leave the network (Anderson, 1999, p. 225). The relationships between agents 
may also change. There may be new sets of connections between agents that 
did not exist before. Alternatively, the strength, direction, or intensity of the 
relationships may change. Agents may also be transformed as existing entities 
may recombine or split. An agent may itself be a complex adaptive system. 
Emergence. Complex adaptive systems display the properties of emergence 
(“effects do not equal causes”). This may be interpreted in a number of ways. 
Firstly, as in systems thinking, the system displays emergent properties. These 
are properties of the system as a whole that are not properties of the parts. 
Secondly, we have emergence in the form of different system states. The state 
of the system emerges as a result of self-organisation. In this sense, we do not 
have only emergent properties but emergent order. Finally, and perhaps this is 
the most radical interpretation, we have emergence in that the system itself 
emerges. 
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Egalitarianism. Complex adaptive systems have the paradoxical property 
that although agents are heterogeneous, and some agents have more influence 
than others in a number of ways, there is one aspect in which there is egality 
in that no agent can stand outside the system and understand the whole 
(Cilliers, 2000, p. 24; Stacey, 2007). As agents interact at a local level with the 
environment and they co-evolve at a micro level, no agent can understand the 
whole environment. Similarly no single agent can understand the system as a 
whole. 
Artifacts as (a kind of) agents. In the case of higher level CAS when we 
consider social systems, we may include artifacts (Maxfield, 1998) as (a kind 
of) agents. Our artifacts may include all kinds of human creations such as 
physical infrastructure, machines, technology, measuring instruments, as well 
as ideational constructions such as knowledge, blueprints, policies and 
information. They are agents in the sense that the human agents co-evolve 
with artifacts. As we create new artifacts it opens up new possibilities for 
action, and that in turn enables us to create new artifacts. The artifacts 
therefore also liberate and constrain the evolution of human agents. This has 
resonance with structuration theory as well as with actor-network theory. 
Complexity and the social sciences 
Urry (2005) refers to the ‘the complexity turn” in the social and cultural 
sciences. This complexity turn is as a result of developments in a variety of 
disciplines including physics, biology, mathematics, ecology, economics, and 
computer simulations. He shows that complexity has permeated in a variety 
of social and intellectual discourses and practices besides science. He makes a 
key point that complexity sciences focuses on phenomena characterised by 
large numbers, and that when it comes to the social worlds then it is dealing 
with large numbers  with “over 6 billion people, 700 million cars, 1 billion 
Internet users, 44 000 multinational corporations” (p.3). Urry cites key 
developments in 20th century sciences focusing on relativity theory, space-
time, quantum theory, chaos theory, and thermodynamics that set the stage 
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for the complexity turn. The complexity turn is preoccupied with non-linear 
dynamic systems that operate far-from-equilibrium, fuelled by fluctuations 
and positive feedback. The impetus for the complexity turn is further 
elaborated by Thrift (1999). Since complexity theory has yielded a rich set of 
metaphors, and such metaphors have the propensity to travel, the theory has 
permeated out of science into many of the disciplines, business and the public 
discourse. Using actor-network theory, Thrift demonstrates how this has 
occurred because the metaphors have “circulated in “heavily mediatized” 
networks of science, “cultural circuit of capitalism” (including academia, 
management consultancy and management gurus, and New Age practices. In 
some cases, complexity theory has travelled back into and is shaping (the 
acceptance of) the science.  
Byrne (2005, p. 97) defines complexity theory as  
“the interdisciplinary understanding of reality as 
composed of complex open systems with emergent 
properties and transformational potential.” 
  
He states that complexity science is inherently dynamic, and that it implies 
that knowledge has of necessity to be local and not universal. It introduced 
the idea of trajectory, representing the actual pattern of change, which is 
important for the social sciences. 
“Complexity theory is not a matter of importing ideas 
from the ‘hard sciences’ into the consideration of the 
social, although some of the terminology of non-linear 
dynamic theory can be rather useful to us. Rather it 
involves thinking about the social world and its 
intersections with the natural world as involving dynamic 
open systems with emergent properties that have the 
potential for qualitative transformation, and examining 
our tools of social research with this perspective 
informing that examination.” 
Byrne (2005, p. 98) 
 
This point by Byrne is very significant philosophically, as it indicates that the 
demarcations between physical reality and social reality are much more diffuse 
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and permeable than was hitherto thought. Put another way, it means that the 
distinction between the hard sciences and the social sciences are not as fast 
and fixed. While much of the literature around complexity theory emphasises 
that its roots are in the physical sciences but has applicability in the social 
sciences, we now have an emerging argument that this is not necessarily the 
case. This points to an ontology where physical and social reality 
interpenetrate and is intertwined. So it is not just a matter of taking learning 
from the physical sciences and incorporating into the social sciences. The 
knowledge that we supposedly gained from the physical sciences is actually 
from this intertwined single reality, which in itself is open, emergent, mediated 
contextually and has the potential for radical and qualitative transformation. 
This is an argument for transdisciplinarity. When considering real world 
problems from the perspective of this single, undivided reality (Bohm, 1980, 
p. xi), we note that they do not present themselves in neat packages that are 
susceptible to treatment from individual disciplines. The real world is messy 
and wicked (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 160). In order to understand the 
underlying complexity of real world problems, there will be a need to bring 
multiple perspectives to bear in transcending disciplinary boundaries. Let us 
make a number of distinctions between disciplinary, interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary approaches. Disciplinary research brings the theoretical tools 
of a particular discipline to bear on some problem. For example, if the 
phenomenon of interest is poverty, then we may draw on the discipline of 
economics to understand it. Given the nature of the discipline there are a 
number of implicit assumptions that are brought to bear. These may include 
instrumental rationality, perfect markets, general equilibrium, and specific 
relationships between supply and demand. Here, poverty is seen as an 
economic problem. The focus may be on the distribution and allocation of 
resources. Concepts such as human agency are probably quite restricted. 
There will be a tendency for the units of analysis to be somewhat large, 
thereby relying on the “law of large numbers” and employing certain 
probability distributions. It will rely on economic measures such as output, 
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productivity and elasticity. By doing this we reduce the real world problem to 
fit out axioms and our constructs of the world. We discount any intentionality 
of human agents. It is unlikely that we shall consider issues such as trust and 
social capital (Beinhocker, 2006, p. 435) that may exist in the community. Let 
us now move to the idea of interdisciplinarity. Here we acknowledge the 
shortcomings of considering problems from the perspective of a single 
discipline. We shall therefore attempt to draw in a wider set of perspectives by 
bringing a variety of disciplines to bear on our problem. We may therefore 
attempt to understand poverty from the viewpoints of several disciplines 
including, for example, economics, sociology, psychology, and urban 
planning. This enables a richer perspective of the issues under consideration. 
By contrast, Klein (2004, p. 6) argues that interdisciplinary studies are still 
rooted in concepts of modernisation and development, focusing on “narrow 
indicators of economic efficiency” and has discounted “indigenous 
knowledges and traditional technology” (p.6). Transdisciplinarity embraces 
broader concepts such as social and environmental justice, draws on ways of 
knowing of indigenous and local communities, and incorporates a plurality of 
languages, knowledge and participatory methods at different levels of inquiry. 
“Gaps between Western and non-Western traditions 
must be bridged as well as esoteric and organic 
knowledges, colonial and indigenous traditions, official 
and peoples knowledges. One of the transgressive 
purposes of the new discourse of transdisciplinarity is to 
renounce the logic of instrumental reason by creating a 
more democratic discourse involving participation.”  
(Klein, 2004, p. 7)  
 
The quest for universality is not possible in terms of complex systems. 
Phenomena are not independent of the context in which they occur. The 
feedback loops that contribute to manifestation of phenomena that are 
perceptible to us are integrally part of the context.  
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“[C]omplexity theory challenges the nomothetic 
programme of universally acceptable knowledge at its 
very heart – it asserts that knowledge must be contextual. 
Moreover, it breaks down the boundaries between natural 
and social as objects of knowledge and action, and 
necessarily places social agency as of crucial historical and 
potential significance for the constitution of planetary 
reality as a whole, precisely because human agency can 
change system trajectory.”  
(Byrne, 2005, p. 97)  
 
Suteanu (2005) brings another perspective to the arguments made above. He 
notes that scientists do not generally change their interpretive frameworks in 
order to expand their horizons. Rather they do so when they are compelled. 
He identifies the three pillars for a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, 
namely, it must be measurable, reproducible and predictable, and proceeds to 
show how complexity studies have changed all three of these pillars. He 
provides an excellent example in the work of Mandelbrot to illustrate how the 
pillar of measurability has been transformed. Natural scientists had incredible 
difficulty in describing complicated objects such as trees, clouds, rivers and 
coastlines quantitatively. Mandelbrot’s fundamental insight was that different 
points of view produce different results, and a way of getting fuller insight 
into these objects was to extract the relations that connect these multiple views. 
He developed a mathematical approach to describe these relations. What he 
did was to understand the phenomena at different scales and linked those 
together in his fractal geometry. This was an approach that cast qualitative 
features into a quantitative schema, and one that is able to characterise 
patterns. The result of Mandelbrot’s method was not numbers of units, but 
rather a measurement in relation to a dimension, and therefore instead of 
“measuring objects, it tells us how the object is” (Suteanu, 2005, p. 117, emphasis 
in original). 
Suteanu argues that the way that complexity has answered the measurability 
requirement of science is that these irregular, immeasurable entities have been 
transformed into objects and entered into the quantitative realm. If we 
examine this a bit closer, it indicates that nothing in reality has actually 
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changed – there is no transformation per se. All of the features of reality have 
stayed the same, but our understanding now indicates the intertwined natural 
and social reality of a coastline that may now be measured in fractal 
dimensions and have become objectified. 
“Beyond the practical application of multi-scale methods, 
the principle discovered by Mandelbrot proved relevant 
for the understanding of complex systems and complex 
situations: it revealed the importance of promoting not 
just one – the arguable “best – point of view, but of 
considering the same problem from multiple 
perspectives.” 
(Suteanu, 2005, p. 117) 
 
The focus on multiple perspectives is a longstanding one in systems theories 
and is here accentuated again through complexity theory. 
Goodwin (2000) argues for a science of qualities that are complementary to 
the dominant science of quantities that we are well acquainted with. Modern 
science is only interested in “primary qualities” of phenomena that are 
amenable to counting and measurement, and disregards “secondary qualities” 
such as colour, texture, taste, beauty and form, which are referred to as qualia. 
He suggests that one of the main constraints in science is the restriction of 
data to that which is measurable and quantifiable, and that there is no intrinsic 
reason for why this constraint should be accepted. He argues that what is 
needed is a methodology where subjects come to some agreement on their 
observations and experiences, which is the same basis for quantitative 
measurement, except there it is an agreement on method. This is already 
practiced, for example, in the medical professions. A diagnosis is not made 
just on measurements such as blood pressure, heart rate etc. but medical 
professionals take into account other patient qualities such as colour and 
texture of skin, colour of eyes, posture and so on.  
While the above is appealing, skeptics will raise the question as to what the 
theoretical justification for accepting a “science of qualities”, as proposed by 
Goodwin, is. I would argue that it is theoretically defensible if we draw on the 
 Page 131 
concept of emergence. While recent as a key idea from both systems thinking 
and complexity theory, emergence, has been long established as a 
philosophical perspective. Hodgson (2000) shows how the concepts 
“emergent property” and “emergence” and the general idea underlying them 
is more than two centuries old, by noting that it is reminiscent of Hegel who 
stated that “the law of transformation of quantity into quality” (p.65), and 
Auguste Comte, “society is no more decomposable into individuals than a 
geometrical surface is into lines, or a line into points” (p.65). Therefore 
secondary qualities or qualia are seen as emergent properties of a 
phenomenon. If we wish to understand complex systems, we have no choice 
but to pay attention to these emergent properties, and therefore any science 
of organisation has to include a science of qualities.  
Hodgson further cites Veblan’s “treatment of institutions as phenomena that 
are dependent on individuals but not reducible to them” (p.66). The 
implication of this is that human society can evolve beyond, and more rapidly 
than that of individuals on their own. This is very important philosophically, 
as it decouples biological evolution from societal and human evolution. The 
arguments from this discussion resonate with that of holism and reductionism 
covered in systems theories. It sharpens that difference by explaining that it is 
emergence that argues against reductionism.  
Hodgson (2000) further cites Polanyi (1967, p.36) as stating “you cannot 
derive a vocabulary from phonetics, you cannot derive the grammar of  
language from its vocabulary; a correct use of grammar does not account for 
good style; and a good style does not provide the content in a piece of 
prose… it is impossible to represent the organizing principles of a higher level 
by the laws governing its isolated particulars.”  
Given that we seem to have legitimacy for emergence from a philosophical 
standpoint, we need to extend this. Emergent properties imply that higher 
level macrostates have an independent ontological status that is not reducible 
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to constituent individuals. This raises a number of issues that do not feature 
prominently in the literature on organisations and strategy, and questions 
some of the prescriptions that are common in this literature. The most 
problematic is the largely unquestioned assumption that desired features of 
organisations may be designed, by manipulating and configuring the constituent 
parts. Such an assumption is only valid if the macrostates are reducible to the 
individual components. They are not. This gives weight to the position taken 
by Goodwin that the science of quantities, are insufficient, and a science of 
qualities is equally necessary. One example from the organisation theory will 
suffice. Organisational culture is considered as an organisational feature that 
may be designed. Culture is a macro-level outcome based on relations of 
individual components of organisation. Hence, culture, may not be designed. 
“Furthermore, reductionism is still conspicuous in social 
science today and typically appears as methodological 
individualism. This tends to be defined as ‘the doctrine 
that all social phenomena (their structure and their 
change) are in principle explicable only in terms of 
individuals – their properties, goals and beliefs’ ... It is 
thus alleged that explanations of socioeconomic 
phenomena must be reduced to properties of constituent 
individuals and relations between them.” 
(G. M. Hodgson, 2000, p. 72) 
Complexity theory and theoretical metaphors 
Since many applications of complexity theory in various domains, especially in 
the social sciences, are based on metaphor it is important to consider 
metaphor more closely. There are two basic types of metaphor which are 
fundamentally different, namely literary and theoretical metaphors 
(Chettiparamb, 2006).  
I have developed the following basic model of theoretical metaphors by my 
interpretation of the key points presented by Chettiparamb, and by drawing on 
the work of Knudsen (2003). 
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Figure 5.1: A model of theoretical metaphors 
 
A theoretical or scientific metaphor involves the transfer of ideas, concepts, 
models and notions from a source domain to a target domain. The transfer 
may include elements of isomorphism, that is, direct structural mapping 
between the target and source, but will usually involve the non-isomorphic 
mapping of features. The source domain will also denote features that are not 
present in the target domain, but these connote features that give rise to 
meanings that have resonance with the features in the source domain. The 
metaphor is “denotatively false and connotatively true” (Chettiparamb, 2006, 
p. 75, citing Hunt and Menon). The mapping involves the carrying over of a 
system of relations, which gives the metaphor its richness and appeal.  
When transmitted for the first time into a target domain, theoretical 
metaphors are marked as “strangers within the discourse” (Soyland 1994, 
cited in Knudsen, 2003, p. 1254). They are accepted as tentative, fuzzy and 
ambiguous, and need to be clarified and explained. Over time, as the 
metaphor is used for theory construction in the target domain it gets a life of 
its own, it evolves and assumes new meaning in the target domain which 
interactively influences the source domain. As such it is based on a unique 
evolutionary history and is highly context dependent (Knudsen, 2003, p. 





Transfer of concepts, ideas and notions 
Metaphor
Denotative features Do not exist here 
Connotative meanings that have 
resonance 
Knowledge is mapped by holding 
together systems of relations 
Interactively informs the source 
domain 
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subsumed into the vocabulary of target domain and lose their metaphorical 
qualities, as they get embedded in literal usage. 
The function of theoretical metaphors is to serve as a form of theory 
construction including generation of hypotheses, theories and concepts. As 
with hypotheses generated in other ways they are subject to testing, challenge 
and extension for them to become acceptable within the scientific discourse. 
Knudsen asserts that as a result of the development of the metaphor over 
time it is subject to transformation until experienced scientists no longer 
consider the metaphor to be metaphorical, but it becomes an accepted 
concept like any other scientific one. This may be termed as a closed 
metaphor. It is notable that when dealing with theoretical metaphors the 
process of development often relies on a whole conceptual network of other 
metaphors.  
Knudsen cites Boyd (1993) who made a distinction between theory-
constructive metaphors and pedagogical or exegetical metaphors. The former 
are indispensable to any scientific theory, as they form an important 
component of scientific reasoning and conceptualisation.  According to Boyd 
(cited in Knudsen, 2003, p. 1249), theory-constructive metaphors are 
impossible to paraphrase while pedagogical metaphors may be paraphrased. 
Pedagogical metaphors are relied upon for teaching of concepts or for 
explanation.  
Knudsen illustrates the powerful impact of theory-constructive metaphors by 
an example of the contribution of the physicist, Edwin Schrödinger, who first 
introduced the metaphor of the genetic code in biology. 
“[S]chrödinger had in fact produced what no biochemist, 
molecular biologist, or geneticist had been able to 
produce so far: a metaphorically expressed, constructive 
hypothesis about the workings of the genetic material.” 
(Knudsen, 2003, p. 1252) 
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It is important to highlight, that the metaphor as presented by Schrödinger 
was not entirely accurate, as he had associated it with the wrong chemical 
entity and thus theory-constructive metaphors ought not to be considered as 
representing scientific truths in the target domain. This is an example of the 
“denotatively false and connotatively true” as indicated earlier in this 
discussion. The idea of the genetic code as presented by Schrödinger had 
connotative meanings that resonated with ideas from the source domain. 
We can now turn our attention to the application of metaphors in 
organisations. A distinction may be made between primary metaphors and 
complex metaphors (Cornelissen & Kafouros, 2008, p. 957). This is in 
opposition to earlier work that distinguished between surface and root 
metaphors. The latter are based on static images, whereas the former is akin 
to a more dynamic, evolving sense of how complex metaphors are related to 
primary metaphors. A primary metaphor has an experiential basis, and 
involves a single point of correspondence between the target and the source 
domain. It is “the most basic metaphorical description of a target domain and 
has minimal structure” (p.961). Complex metaphors are a  
“self consistent metaphorical complex composed of more 
than one primary metaphor and hence implies more 
source domains and more points of correspondence and 
entailment in relation to a target domain.”  
(Cornelissen & Kafouros, 2008, pp. 961-962) 
   
They lead to a complex metaphorical image that may be very detailed, but one 
that is easily assimilated, worked with and manipulated by scholars.  
Metaphorical thought drawing on complex metaphors is a “creative and 
dynamic process that allows scholars to combine primary metaphors in a 
novel ways” (p.963) and therefore opens up many new avenues for theoretical 
development and extension. This relationship between primary and complex 
metaphors is particularly salient when considering how complexity theory is 
applied metaphorically to social systems, and especially to organisations. 
Cornelissen & Kafouros (2008) use the metaphor of “organization as a 
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complex adaptive system” to illustrate their position of the relationship 
between primary and complex metaphors! Complex metaphors enable 
scholars to mentally simulate an entire scene about events, actions and 
interests, in a way that they tend to obey constraints of reality.  
“[W]hen scholars run through such metaphorical scenes 
in their minds and imagine them in a concrete and 
specific form, it often makes those events and the related 
inferences seem real.” 
(Cornelissen & Kafouros, 2008, p. 964) 
 
There is an acceptance that complexity theory has travelled widely to 
numerous different target domains based on the complex metaphors. An 
interesting question is what was the underlying momentum? One of the 
vehicles was the ubiquity of models and images of strange attractors as 
exemplified by the Lorentz attractor (Mackenzie, 2005). In relation to primary 
and complex metaphors we may consider the Lorenz attractor as a 
visualisation of a complex metaphor. Although it relates more to chaos theory 
than complexity theory per se, it embodies within in it a number of complex 
concepts and mathematical notions that are pertinent to complexity theory. 
Some of these include phase space (a mathematical abstraction), basins of 
attraction, patterned outcomes that are unpredictable yet bounded, sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions, periodicity, and bifurcations. It is quite 
surprising that as a visualisation in two dimensions, the Lorenz attractor is 
successful in exhibiting features of three dimensional abstract space and 
evoking multidimensional mathematical relationships. 
 
 Page 137 
“This is both more modest than a paradigm shift, or a 
shift between modern and postmodern science (Cilliers, 
1998), and yet more troubling because it starts to break 
the ways in which the positions of knower and known are 
constituted. Rather than a shift in worldviews, from a 
world of mechanical causes and effects to a world of 
complex instabilities, events and bifurcations, what counts 
as the right question to ask, as the most relevant way of 
posing problems, changes.”  
(Mackenzie, 2005, p. 48) 
 
An observation by De Landa cited in Mackenzie (2005, p. 53) drawn from 
phase space is that “a change in mathematical practice can change the very 
object of knowledge in surprising ways, and in ways that are not easily 
understood as metaphor change.” This is another example of transforming 
objects of the world by transforming our tools of apprehension (See earlier 
discussion regarding Mandelbrot and the transformation of objects). 
Counterpoint – The pitfalls of metaphor 
“The dangers of metaphorical reasoning are well known. 
They provide tools for explanation, giving us insights 
rather than understanding, and insights can prove illusory. 
They must be considered points of departure for the 
reasoning process rather than points of arrival.”  
(Boisot & Cohen, 2000, p. 123) 
 
The use of metaphors as a form of reasoning is inextricably linked with 
reasoning by analogy and abstractions, and the distinctions between them 
need to be clarified. Reasoning by metaphor treats phenomena that are 
different as if they are the same in one significant respect which is left 
implicit. Reasoning by analogy treats them as if they are the same in many 
significant respects. This is done in a much more rigorous way than 
metaphor. Reasoning by abstraction treats them as if they are the same in all 
significant respects. Metaphors connote, analogies denote and reasoning by 
abstraction changes to propositional (Boisot & Cohen, 2000).  
Complexity theory and chaos theory in particular are not without their 
criticism, especially in the field of organisation science. There are several 
authors who criticise the loose application of chaos theory and complexity 
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theory to organisations (Cilliers, 2000; Galbraith, 2004; D. L. Levy, 2000). 
Some writers make it seem that chaos is ubiquitous in organisations, and 
others have been criticised for their “evangelical zeal” when applying it to 
organisations (D. L. Levy, 2000, p. 68). There has been very loose application 
of metaphors from chaos theory especially that of strange attractors, and the 
butterfly effect. Much of this type of critique has merit. A common example 
is that chaos is equated to disorder or to crisis in organisations. This quickly 
leads to prescriptions for top management to manufacture crises in their 
organisations. Apart from the very idea being questionable, there are also 
ethical issues around such prescriptions. In a similar way, the concept of 
attractors is loosely applied. Some authors equate concepts such as leadership, 
vision, and spirituality to attractors. What is the warrant for mapping such 
abstract concepts to attractors? There is little justification for it. In terms of 
chaos theory, a strange attractor has a very special meaning, which has to do 
with the trajectory that the system traverses through state space and in the 
case of strange attractors, one that never repeats yet is bounded. There is no 
reason to equate a strange attractor in the loose fashion as mentioned above. 
Similarly there is no warrant to equate crises with chaos. Chaos in chaos 
theory also has a very specific meaning which relates to aperiodic 
deterministic behaviour in a mathematical sense. There is no reason to equate 
that with the everyday, common-sense use of chaos, meaning haphazard, 
disorganized, and filled with crises. Such loose application of metaphor to 
new target domains has serious pitfalls especially when they lead to normative 
claims and to prescriptions for practice. This is illustrated by the critique of 
several papers applying chaos theory to educational administration and 
leadership (Galbraith, 2004, pp. 10-18). This work shows how these 
applications are based on misunderstanding the nature of non- linear dynamic 
systems, feedback characteristics, and other important characteristics of 
complex systems. This raises the distinction between metaphor, archetype and 
model.  Galbraith concedes that one level or type of representation is not 
necessarily superior to the others and that it depends on the purpose. He 
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cautions, though, that the nature of the claims made, and the evaluation 
criteria are markedly different. 
Sheard (2006) explores complexity theory in the light of continental 
philosophy. He tries, based on an extensive discussion of metaphor from a 
philosophical point of view, to resolve the tension between whether 
complexity theory is universalistic or locally contingent on context. This is an 
interesting avenue of exploration, because unlike other forms of metaphor in 
scientific contexts, when it comes to complexity metaphors, they are not 
restricted to very specific phenomena in restricted contexts in a specialised 
domain. Rather, they have the potential for mobility from multiple source 
domains to multiple target domains, because complexity is all pervasive and 
may be said to be everywhere. As they move across these domains they in 
turn get mediated in complex ways that are self-referential and recursive. The 
whole notion of theoretical metaphors in the scientific endeavour thereby gets 
“complexified”. Complexity theory indicates the fluid, indeterminate and 
unpredictability of phenomena which means that knowledge is contextual and 
locally contingent. On the other hand, complexity theorists argue that it 
applies generally across many domains to the extent that it may be interpreted 
as universalistic. How do we resolve this inherent tension? 
This brings us back to the crucial question about the application of 
complexity theory as metaphor, as model or as literal. This is a much deeper 
philosophical question that relates to transdisciplinarity. What is the extent to 
which a concept or idea that is applicable in one domain may be carried over 
into another domain? When will such transfer be valid and when will it not?  
From a philosophical point of view, all science is a form of mapping concepts 
to some real world referent. There is no absolute validity for the mapping. 
When we use symbol processing (as in the case of logic or mathematics) and 
language in the social sciences we are establishing a mapping between a 
symbol or word and the real world referent. When we apply mathematical 
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procedures we are applying a set of rules to transform the symbols into 
different forms. Why is this then not valid when using words and language as 
an alternate symbol processing system or an application of rules? The point 
that I am highlighting is that we should not be imprisoned by positivist 
notions when trying to establish validity of representation and mapping to 
real world referents. A case may therefore be made that under certain 
circumstances the use of metaphor and analogy offer similar benefits to more 
formal symbol processing systems and sets of rules. The question that then 
becomes important is how loose or how tight must the metaphor be?  
We also need to look at the similarities and differences between literal, 
analogy, metaphor, model and formalism. What is meant by each of these?   
This raises questions around deduction and induction, and when are they 
valid or not? If we want absolute truth then only deductive reasoning is 
appropriate. But again this is from the point of view of positivism. One may 
argue that it is never possible to generate theory by way of deduction. Both 
deduction and induction are crucial to theory building. As Weick (1989, p. 
516), refers to theory building as “disciplined imagination”, we can see the 
importance of inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning in the true sense may 
only be applicable in a closed system. The real world is an open system, and 
hence we may not rely on deductive reasoning alone. In any closed system 
there are always a set of axioms that are considered to be self-evident. What is 
the warrant for that? Can we then not have other concepts in other 
philosophical systems that are not axioms but something else that gives us 
warrant as the starting point?  
The issue then is the difference between theory and truth. As we have more 
confidence in a theory we tend to think that it is closer to the truth. Again this 
is a relic of positivism. Given the discussion of axioms covered earlier, it is 
not possible to achieve absolute truth even in the positivist sense. Our axioms 
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only hold in the world that we have constructed. For example, the axioms of 
Euclidian geometry only hold in a “flat world”, so to speak. 
In assessing the position taken by Boisot and Cohen as indicated in the 
quotation at the head of this section and the ensuing discussion above, I 
adopt the stance that metaphor is a valid approach and actually indispensable 
for theory construction. This was covered in the earlier discussion on 
theoretical, theory-constructive, primary and complex metaphors. 
Nevertheless, the counterpoint presented by Boisot and Cohen serves as 
useful caution in relation to uncritical acceptance of the promise of 
metaphors.  
Lissack (1999, p. 111) calls on social construction of reality, where 
organisations may be viewed as “systems of interpretation”, in order to justify 
the application of complexity metaphors within organisation science. He 
further states that metaphors are world constituting for those who use them, 
and that it is inappropriate to discard the contribution of metaphors and 
models from complexity theory to organisation science. He indicates that 
both complexity theory and organisation are interested in uncertainty and 
there should therefore be a fruitful relationship between the two. 
“At the overlapping boundaries of complexity science and 
organization science is where the importance of 
vocabulary, language, metaphors and models come into 
play.” 
(Lissack, 1999, p. 121) 
 
 Page 142 
Discussion 
One of the important aspects of this study is the extent to which complexity 
theory helps us understand organisations and strategy. While the instruments 
of classical science like the telescope enable us to understand macro aspects 
and the microscope to understand the micro aspects of the universe, the tools 
and instruments of complexity science are simulation models of complex 
systems. Without the instruments of classical science there were important 
constituents of the universe that we were not able to perceive, and it may be 
said that those constituents did not exist. In the same way the instruments of 
complexity science makes constituents of the world that have been hitherto 
imperceptible available to our understanding. From another angle, the tools 
of logic and the language of mathematics made other “hidden” aspects of the 
world perceptible. So too do the instruments of complexity science make 
them perceptible. Here we are referring to abstract aspects of understanding. 
For example, mathematics enables us to perceive and visualize imaginary 
numbers or complex numbers. Complexity theory enables us to visualise 
complex relationships, emergence, bifurcations and so forth, which were 
hitherto “hidden” from us. If we follow this argument further then 
mathematics and formal systems of representation are ontological tools. They 
make us understand reality in multidimensional ways. In this way, complexity 
theory is a kind of ontological tool that widens our understanding of reality 
even further. 
We may now make the assertion that complexity theory is also a tool for 
organisational ontology. It renders aspects of organisation that were 
previously imperceptible to us, available for us to understand. If social 
systems are conceptualised as complex adaptive systems, then the concepts 
from complexity theory and the general properties of complex adaptive 
systems, would also apply. Hence, organisations which are a specific type of 
social system, also exhibit such properties. This means that any inquiry about 
organisations and strategy making will be partial if it neglects a study of 
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complexity theory. This has far-reaching implications. It means that much of 
our theorising about organisations in the past were lacking in a fundamental 
way. It calls into question many of the prescriptive approaches to strategy, as 
the underlying assumptions are based on a traditional worldview as opposed 
to the emerging worldview (Dent, 1999).  
Complexity theory is an approach to understanding non-linear dynamical 
systems. Complex adaptive systems consist of large numbers of 
heterogeneous agents with schemata. They are subject to sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions. This means that minor changes to a system 
can lead to radically divergent outcomes. Therefore, long term prediction and 
forecasting is not possible in complex systems. Previously it was thought that 
prediction and forecasting, even though difficult in practice, is theoretically 
possible in principle, given sufficient time, resources and information. 
Sensitive dependence indicates that it is not possible even in principle. 
Therefore some of the dominant approaches to strategy that rely implicitly on 
the assumption of prediction, in principle, are flawed. What is more 
significant however is that any approach to strategy that is predicated on a 
plan, position, posture, vision, or detailed goals and objectives are 
fundamentally flawed. The myriad little actions that are involved in 
implementation of these are susceptible to minor changes and fluctuations, 
and hence subject to sensitive dependence. System order cannot be achieved 
by design. What this amounts to is that deliberate strategy is simply 
unachievable. This ought to be quite disconcerting, because the major part of 
the strategy literature and most of the 10 schools of strategy rely on this to a 
greater or lesser extent. 
Complex adaptive systems traverse a fitness landscape that is constantly 
changing and deforming. This means that there is co-evolution at a micro 
level between agents in the system. In addition, there is co-evolution at 
macro-level, where the system as a whole is co-evolving with the 
environment. This calls into question the entire notion of “fit” between the 
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organisation and the environment. A cardinal principle in many of the 
dominant approaches to strategy is that the strategy must ensure that the 
organisation is able to have a good “fit” with some future environment, be it 
in the form of designs, plans, positions, or postures.  
Complex adaptive systems are understood as dissipative structures that 
operate far from equilibrium. This is a significant departure even from many 
systems approaches, such as cybernetics, which rely on equilibrium in the 
form of homeostasis.  They exhibit the property of self-organisation, where 
the system displays bounded behaviour. This is as a result of emergence and is 
not imposed from outside the system, not internally by any of the actors in 
isolation. While system behaviour is bounded it displays novelty because no 
single state is repeated as the system traverses state space bounded by an 
attractor. Since the system can shift radically to a different attractor, there is 
potential for new forms of order to emerge. This is another disconcerting 
finding for strategists. It means that although there is order in the system, it is 
emergent order and not designed order.  
The property of egalitarianism in CAS sounds the death-knell for any 
pretensions to deliberate strategy. This property indicates that no single agent 
(CEO, planner, designer, leader) or small group of agents (top management 
team, management board, strategists) can stand outside the system and 
understand the system and the environment as a whole, and design a strategy 
that can be implemented to achieve deliberate strategy. Therefore the basic 
premises of the design, planning, positioning, entrepreneurial, and cultural 
schools are called in to question. The entire notion of intended strategies is 
discredited. The property of emergence indicates that organisational macro-
states emerge from the interactions between agents. Macro-states may not be 
designed in advance. At a simplistic level, since the evolutionary school is 
based on an ecosystem metaphor, one would assume the evolutionary school 
is one that is entirely consistent with a complex adaptive systems view. 
However, when we are dealing with human activity systems such as 
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organisations, each of the agents does have power, volition and agency. 
Therefore, agency and identity is much more complex in strategic enactment. 
We have agency at a micro-level, but this agency does not extend to macro-
level. This means that population ecology is insufficient to explain strategy.  
In the context of the model of strategic choice, chance and inevitability (De 
Rond & Thietart, 2007) discussed in Chapter 2, we may now state that 
strategic choice is applicable at the level of agency of the individual actor, but 
does not translate to choice at the level of organisational macro-states. We 
may now elaborate their model further. They refer to causal background as 
necessary for both chance and choice. We can understand the causal 
background as the context in which the agent is embedded. This context also 
includes all other agents, their schemata and their actions.  Therefore we may 
re-interpret their model in a recursive way. The causal background is made up 
of interacting models of choice and chance of all other agents. We may also 
investigate the relationship between chance and the causal background. To 
the extent that actors can perceive and trace out cause-effect relationships, 
they are classified as part of the causal background. To the extent that these 
relationships are too complex, and the cause-effect relationships are 
indiscernible, they may be classified as chance events. Therefore chance is not 
an absolute that is independent of the set of observers. What we discover 
here is that chance is relative to the observers and the bounded rationality of 
such observers. While critical systems thinking has raised the importance of 
boundaries at the level of a system, what we notice here is that boundary 
judgments are also important at the local level.  It means that rationality is 
dependent on the boundary judgment of the local actor. Each of the actors 
acts on the basis of the boundaries that he or she has constructed. To the 
extent that these boundaries are congruent or commensurable, there will be 
agreement on the rationality of actions. To the extent that these boundaries 
are significantly different, what is perceived as rational from the point of view 
of one actor is not from the point of view of other actors. 
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Thus the following propositions follow: 
Proposition 1: Chance and causal backgrounds are inter-related.  
Proposition 2: Chance is not absolute, but is observer dependent. 
Proposition 3: Rationality is dependent on local boundary judgments. 
Proposition 4: Agency is related to both chance and boundary judgments. 
Let us now explore the relationship between chance and agency. The more 
that an actor can understand and discern causal relationships, the higher the 
mass that resides in the causal network, and the lower is that, which resides in 
chance. Therefore the higher the local agency the lower the chance elements 
that come into play. 
I presented an argument earlier that artifacts may be considered as kinds of 
agents in complex adaptive systems and that human agents co-evolve with 
such artifacts. These artifacts may include physical infrastructure, machines, 
technology, blueprints, policies and information. This provides us with a clue 
to what strategy in the schools that subscribe to deliberate strategy may 
actually do. The strategy as design, plan, position or posture is actually an 
artifact. This shows that they do have an influence on the strategy as they 
constrain and influence other agents in the form of co-evolution. They do not 
result in deliberate strategy. These specific artifacts are but one small set of 
agents, together with a whole gamut of other artifacts and agents that interact 
to give rise to system behaviour. Therefore, there is no warrant to claim that 
these artifacts can have any over-arching influence to yield deliberate strategy. 
It was also shown from the property of agent recombination and system 
evolution, that the system is constantly changing as the entire network of 
agents evolve. New agents enter, existing agents leave and the nature of the 
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relationships between agents changes. Thus the boundary of the system is not 
fixed but is constantly changing.  
Complexity theory has a number of implications for the social sciences, and 
presents new tools for understanding social reality. As highlighted by Byrne, 
complexity theory involves considering the intersections between the social 
and natural worlds as dynamic and emergent, offering the potential for 
qualitative transformation. Goodwin argued that the science of quantities that 
is so pervasive in the sciences needs to be supplemented with the science of 
qualities. These lead us to the understanding that the demarcations between 
physical and social reality are much more diffuse and permeable than we had 
previously thought. We may then refer to an ontology where physical and 
social reality interpenetrate and are intertwined. This is an argument for trans-
disciplinarity. In the case of strategy research, it implies that strategy must 
break free from the “strait-jacket” of the dominance of economic theory and 
positivist approaches with large statistical databases and large sample sizes. 
There is merit in richer studies that are contextual, with deep engagement 
with the unit of analysis. This will include qualitative studies, ethnographic 
accounts, action research, and multi-methodological approaches.  
The point made by Suteanu about Mandelbrot’s work needs further 
consideration. To recap some of the arguments on this, we note that by 
taking a different point of view, Mandelbrot was able to extract the relations 
connecting multiple points of view. The result in the form of fractal 
dimensions was a transformation of qualitative features into a quantitative 
dimension that was able to characterise patterns. The point was made that the 
features of interpenetrating social and natural reality had not changed but our 
understanding of it changed through the insight of Mandelbrot. Furthermore, 
the social understanding of rugged natural features became objectified in the 
transformation. 
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Given that a substantial portion of the literature on complexity theory in 
relation to the social sciences is based on its metaphorical applications, 
metaphor was covered quite substantially in this chapter. The discussion 
explored the justification of such application of metaphor, and therefore of 
necessity, was extended to the philosophical considerations around how 
metaphor contributes to the construction of knowledge and the extent to 
which metaphor contributes to the scientific endeavour. Lissack (1999) in 
drawing on the theory of social constructionism, indicates how using 
complexity-related metaphors, opens up a new language in organisation 
science, and points to language as tool for managers in understanding and 
opening up new possibilities for action. This is significant in a number of 
ways. Firstly, implicit in his discussion, is how complexity metaphors become 
a tool for organisational practitioners. Secondly, there is now another link 
between complexity theory and sensemaking which is not given sufficient 
attention in the literature. Thirdly, he shows how the possibilities for action 
lead to the potential for a new identity for an organisation. All of these are 
important in constructing a theory of a strategic enactment, which is one of 
the central objectives of this study. This is picked up again in Chapter 7. 
Fourthly, the arguments made by Lissack reinforce the lessons that we were 
able to draw from strategy as “serious play” discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, he    
boldly declares the strengths of complexity as both a “management tool and – 
the conceptual underpinnings” of the inaugural edition of the Emergence 
academic journal (p.123). 
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C h a p t e r  6 - L e a d e r s h i p  a n d  C o m p l e x i t y  
Introduction 
Since complex adaptive systems are subject to emergence and self 
organisation, it begs the question as to what the role of leadership is, in 
organisations conceptualised as complex adaptive systems. This poses a 
number of challenges to conventional leadership. Furthermore, the field of 
strategy is closely related to that of leadership because the strategy literature 
assumes that the key actors in strategy-making are those in leadership 
positions. This chapter, therefore, begins by exploring the evolution of 
leadership theory and considers the various conventional theories of 
leadership. This is followed by considering the implications of complexity 
theory on leadership and discussing leadership in complex adaptive systems. 
The chapter offers a critique on writers who ostensibly draw on complexity 
theory in understanding leadership, but who do not fully rise to the challenge 
as they revert to conventional prescriptions that do not address the key issues 
adequately. Finally, the chapter raises the important aspects of sensemaking 
and interpretation in the context of complex foresight horizons.  
Evolution of leadership theory 
Leadership has been studied formally since the early 20th century. The 
evolution of leadership theory has been conceptualised into 10 distinct eras 
(Van Seters & Field, 1990). This is depicted in Figure 6.1 and discussed 
below. 
Personality Era 
During this era the focus was on great men (not women). Leadership was 
equated with their personalities. If others could adopt similar personality traits 
of specific individual “hero” leaders then they too could be effective leaders. 
The traits theory approach was similar to that of personality, but as opposed 
to the personality linked to a specific individual, researchers tried to identify 
general traits of great leaders, that would enable others to achieve leadership 
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greatness. One of the problems was that different studies identified different 
lists of traits and characteristics, and these were not necessarily good 
predictors across a variety of situations. They then regress to being no better 
than a laundry list of characteristics that were of little use in practice (Van 
Wart, 2003, p. 217). Furthermore most of the early trait studies consisted of 
groups made up of adolescents, low level managers and supervisors. They did 
not cover individuals with significant leadership responsibilities for 
organisations as a whole (House & Aditya, 1997, p. 411). 
Influence Era 
Here leadership is extended beyond the individual leader to the dyadic 
relationship between the leader and the follower. This looked at the power 
and influence that the leader had over the follower. The role of the leader was 
dominant. 
Behaviour Era 
In this era, the focus shifted away from personality traits and power to what 
leaders do. It was a kind of extension of the traits approach. Two of the 
important variables were the leader’s behaviour in initiating task structure, and 
in the leader’s consideration for relationships. Initiating structure had to do 
with behaviours related to the definition of roles, coordination, task allocation 
and control mechanisms.  Consideration is related to behaviours that involve 
development, inclusion and the positive feelings of followers. Behavioural 
theories were found to be useful in that they offered simple conceptual 
constructs that could easily be understood, taught and implemented by 
practicing leaders. Their shortcomings, however, were that they relied on too 
few variables to explain a complex phenomenon (Van Wart, 2003, p. 217). 
Research that contributed to behavioural theories, like the earlier trait 
theories, were limited to “laboratory studies” using students or lower level 
managers and supervisors (House & Aditya, 1997, pp. 420-421). 
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Situation Era 
This era recognised that leadership occurs in a context that extends beyond 
the leader and the follower. It therefore took into account other contextual 
factors such as the nature of the task, the social status and the position of the 
leader and the follower, and the broader organisational and environmental 
context. The context and situational factors will determine the traits, 
behaviours and influence that give rise to effective leadership. 
Contingency Era 
In the contingency era it was recognised that leadership is multi-dimensional, 
transcending traits, behaviours, power and influence, in that all of them 
together with other factors impacted leadership effectiveness. Leadership was 
therefore contingent both on the situation and on all of these other factors. 
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Figure 6.1: The evolution of leadership theory 
Source: Van Seters, D. A., & Field, R. H. G. (1990, p.33). 
 
Transactional Era 
The transactional era, like the earlier influence era, looks at the relationship 
between the leader and follower, but here more credence is given to the 
reciprocal relationships between them and it assumes that there is an implicit 
process of exchange. Therefore, leadership can be seen as a transactional 
process. The nature of the exchange may differ in the different approaches to 
transactional leadership. For example, the leader gives rewards in exchange 
for the follower undertaking what the leader wants. Alternatively, the 
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followers ascribe status and esteem to the leader in exchange for the leader 
assisting in meeting the group objectives.  
Anti-Leadership Era 
The key argument in the anti-leadership era is that there may not be an 
“articulable concept called leadership” (Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 36). The 
previous eras had identified so many variables and factors that ostensibly 
explained leadership, to the extent that they were so confusing and muddled 
that they do not explain anything. Leadership was an overarching term that 
described organisational changes that are beyond our framing, so leadership 
frames these for us and gives us a useful ordering mechanism. In this case 
“leadership is only a perceptual phenomenon in the mind of the observer” 
(p.36). 
Cultural Era 
There was an acknowledgement in the cultural era that leadership was not just 
a phenomenon of the individual, dyad, or group, but rather of the whole 
organisation. It was embedded in the culture of the organisation. The role for 
leadership becomes prominent only when the culture of the organisation 
requires significant change.  
Transformational Era 
The transformational era places much more emphasis on the intrinsic 
motivation of followers rather than extrinsic rewards. Transformational 
leadership relies on a charismatic leader. The leader articulates a vision around 
which followers are energised. The vision gives followers meaning and 
purpose, and shifts their attention from rewards, status, needs for affiliation 
to recognition, achievement and self-actualisation. One of the central 
concepts of transformational leadership is that of charisma which has been 
traced back to Max Weber (Canella Jr. & Monroe, 1997, p. 228). Charisma 
according to Weber was as a result of endowment of divine grace on 
particular individuals that gave them extraordinary gifts. These enabled the 
leader to exude confidence, a sense of purpose and meaning and appeal to 
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followers. As Canella Jr. & Monroe (1997) point out, while charisma is no 
longer associated with divine grace, it is still considered as an important 
quality of transformational leaders, that creates intense emotional and 
affective appeal. 
Transformational leadership was also important because it conceived of 
leadership in the context of a changing environment. It emphasises another 
thread that is inherent in the evolution of leadership, that of a successive 
broadening of the scope of leadership. While some of the earlier eras such as 
the traits and behavioural ones were limited to the individual or dyads, the 
situational and contingency ones embraced the team or workgroup. The 
cultural, transactional and transformational era extended to the whole 
organisation.  
“Leadership theory began as a very one-dimensional, 
internal and individualistic process in which only a 
leader’s personality, traits, or behaviour were considered. 
Then dyadic relationships evolved as leader’s interactions 
with others were considered. Situational elements external 
to the leader-member dyad were subsequently added to 
the leadership equation, as well as an acknowledgement 
of group processes.” 
(Van Seters & Field, 1990, p. 39) 
 
An alternate, but similar classification of leadership eras is given by (Van 
Wart, 2003) as shown in Table 6.1 below. He separates out great man and 
trait theories, and dates great man theories as prior to the 20th century. He also 
includes Servant Leadership as a separate classification.  Finally, he highlights 
an attempt at integrating previous work in what he terms the multifaceted era 
beginning in the 1990s, which underlines the need for a more holistic 
approach to leadership than in previous eras, especially given the current 
globalised context. 
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Table 6.1: Different eras in leadership theory 
Source: Van Wart, M. (2003, p. 218) 
 
Academic theories and their evolution as presented above in terms of the 
major classifications, schools or eras tends to be somewhat ahistorical and is 
isolated from the social, political and cultural context and the economic 
realities which were pivotal in their birth. As such what we have is a sanitised 
picture. By contrast the “history of leadership – like history itself – is rife with 
ruptures, discontinuities, multiple interpretations, and competing narratives 
engaged in hegemonic struggles”(Trethewey & Goodall JR, 2007, p. 459). In 
order to highlight this, Trethewey & Goodall JR  (2007) offer a reframing of 
leadership as situated in a grand narrative of post-World War II history and 
culture. They identify three hidden storylines in leadership, each related to a 
dominant historical era. These are the Cold War, Post-Cold War and Post-
9/11 eras respectively. 
The Cold War era of leadership is traced back to how the traits and leadership 
styles theories were rooted first in the human relations and then human 
resources approaches to human motivation. This has strong links to Maslow's 
theory of motivation, which in turn was a direct response to the Cold War. It 
is a story of human freedom achieving utopia by keeping the forces of fascism 
and totalitarianism at bay. Leadership was meant to ensure that organisational 
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goals are achieved, and both leaders and follower would strive for self-
actualisation. The method to achieve this was to take on the characteristics of 
“brightside” leaders against that of “darkside” leaders (p.462). Brightside 
leaders are those that may be associated with Theory Y, self-actualisation, 
contingency, and team-based leadership. Darkside leaders are associated with 
Theory X, rigid, control-oriented and repressive regime masters. 
 “If there ever was a clearer symbolic depiction of 
Capitalism versus Communism, of the US and our allies 
against the Soviets and their satellites, we cannot name 
it.” 
(Trethewey & Goodall JR, 2007, p. 462) (p.462) 
 
Despite these brightside theories there was still a perversion in this era, 
because all of the higher ideals and utopian visions ultimately became 
associated with the material world of markets and commodities and the 
central role of accumulation of wealth and material possessions. 
Given the demise of the Soviet Union and the victory of capitalism over 
communism we had the move to unfettered markets in the Post Cold War 
Era. Globalisation became a dominant force in influencing organisation and 
business practices. This was the transition to the hyper-competitive world 
underpinned by technological advancements and the notion of “business at 
the speed of thought”. This became an era of unlimited opportunity for the 
entrepreneurs and those who were enterprising and who could sail the 
superhighway of the digital and cultural worlds. A result of this, there was the 
need for an  
“iconic, media savvy leader capable of igniting and 
inspiring audiences worldwide through scripted, focus 
room, and poll-tested messages...”  
(Trethewey & Goodall JR, 2007, p. 463) 
 
The brightside aspect of leadership was transformational. Here we had a 
leader who could inspire and unleash personal capacities of followers for 
growth and change.  The rhetoric was about how personal commitment could 
enable positive changes in the world, as embodied in notions of 
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empowerment and team-based learning.  What about the “darkside” to the 
transformational approach to leadership? It became subsumed in a market-
based entrepreneurial ideology. Leaders tended to shift from one 
management fad to the next, without fully taking into account the impacts of 
their actions. Since charisma is one of the key facets of transformational 
leadership, combined with the hyper-competition of a globalised world, 
leadership often resorted to “spin”. There was the blurring of reality and truth 
to the extent that it became difficult even for those who wove the spin to 
make the distinctions.  
“Furthermore, in a consumer-rich culture where charisma 
trumps character for awe-inspired manager and citizens 
and spin replaces truth for shareholders and voters, short-
term economic and political gains rather than long term 
ecological investments and decision making begin to 
make perfect, if totally corrupt, global sense.” 
(Trethewey & Goodall JR, 2007, p. 465) 
 
As a result of the 9/11 attacks, a key organisational problem became how to 
be prepared for and defend against attack by non-state actors. One of the 
consequences has been that businesses and other organisation now resort to 
intelligence gathering of their employees and customers using similar tactics 
to that of government. There is somewhat of a reversion to characteristics of 
the Theory X style of leadership with a focus on authority and controlling of 
power  leading to a culture of fear and an expectation of blind loyalty on the 
part of followers. As a result, Western leadership has resorted to a kind of 
fundamentalism where there are single truths that maintain sharp divisions 
between those who agree with us and those who do not.  The post 9/11 
leadership has manifested the darkside of leadership.  
“We elect and are led by leaders who know their own 
truth, do not tolerate disloyalty, do not bother with 
argument or evidence, and who make decisions guided 
only by their self-interest and their faith.”  
(Trethewey & Goodall JR, 2007, p. 468) 
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Trethewey & Goodall JR (2007) propose that if we wish to reclaim the 
brightside of leadership it requires that we embrace what they term, pragmatic 
complexity. This is a model of communication that is more embracing of 
plurality. It is a shift from dominion narratives to engagement narratives 
(p.471). It requires openness to multiple meanings, participation and inclusion 
on a wide scale. This means that leadership has to be open to “ontological 
insecurity”, embracing uncertainty and complexity.  Meanings are “never 
fixed, but they are provisional, pragmatic, experimental, and fundamentally 
open to change” (p.471). 
They argue that it requires the following three leadership principles: 
1. Provisional meanings are constructed in local situations and through 
participatory dialogue. 
2. Provisional meanings are tested in ongoing social practice, so 
leadership is experimental as opposed to recipe driven or treated as 
doctrine. This is a reflexive approach to leadership. Meanings are 
based on multiple interpretations and are co-constructed. 
3. Leaders must embrace an ironic stance which is the “tension of 
holding incompatible things together because both or all are necessary 
and true” (citing Haraway, 1990, p.190). 
Mumford et al (2000) state that traditional leadership is considered as an inter-
personal phenomenon based on leader-follower interactions. They propose a 
theory wherein effective leadership behaviour is presupposed on complex 
problem solving skills to deal with the messy, complex, unpredictable and 
ambiguous issues and problems that arise in organisations. Leadership is thus 
exhibited as a form of complex social problem solving. Given the complex 
nature of organisational contexts, leaders do not have the luxury of 
analytically generating options and solutions in a rationalistic fashion. Rather, 
they have to rely on shortcuts, heuristics, and general models to deal with 
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complex problems. Problems are not isolated, but are rather, multiple and 
overlapping, and unfolding over time in a dynamic system. Their solutions 
must therefore be extemporaneous (p.14). Moreover, solutions may not be 
found independently, but is reliant on interactions with a range of different 
people including followers, peers, and other stakeholders. Leadership is 
therefore viewed as a complex phenomenon involving multiple forms of 
cognition including social cognition. This highlights the importance of 
leadership skills including creative problem solving, social judgment skills and 
broader organisational knowledge. Effective performance in dealing with ill-
defined problems requires a creative and flexible problem-solving orientation 
that formulates procedures during problem construction, seeks out key facts 
and observations that are anomalous while gathering information and using 
appropriate metaphors and analogies to generate new understandings (p.18).  
None of this is done in an isolated context, but has to work in a social 
context. Social judgment skills of the leader require an understanding of the 
social dynamics in which he or she is operating. Some of the skills that are 
important include communication and persuasion, negotiation, conflict 
management and coaching (p.20). Finally complex problem-solving in 
dynamic social contexts also require leaders to have knowledge of the 
situation and the domain. The knowledge will be based on formal, conscious 
knowledge structures together with experiential knowledge from previous 
experience, and in addition knowledge structured in associational networks.  
“These experience-based representational networks 
influence how leaders define problems, evaluate 
restrictions, and implement plans.”  
(Mumford, et al., 2000, p. 21) 
 
These authors suggest that their skills-based approach to leadership takes into 
account the “dynamic interaction between the person and the environment” 
(Mumford, et al., 2000, p. 27).  
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Leadership as a process of simplification 
Harter (2006) adopts a philosophical approach to the topic of leadership in 
the context of complexity. He notes that complexity can have both objective 
and subjective assessments. Where complexity is considered as an objective 
attribute of a system, it implies that when systems achieve a certain level or 
stage, they are inherently more complex in and of themselves, irrespective of 
our human experiences of such systems. By contrast, a subjective assessment 
of complexity implies that it is our experience of systems that are labelled 
simple or complex. In this perspective, as we become more familiar with a 
system, and our understanding of it increases then we can say that the system 
is less complex. Harter suggests that we have to take into account both 
attributions of complexity.  Further, he highlights that simplicity and 
complexity are not opposites of each other, but following Plato he refers to 
them as a metaxy. This is a bi-polar, static model of complexity where 
complexity and simplicity are two directions between which we operate in a 
form of a tension. As we are pulled towards one pole we move further away 
from the other pole. However, this static model has to be complemented with 
a more dynamic model. Following the philosopher Vogel, Harter states that 
such a dynamic model “depicts a process from compactness through 
differentiation toward order” (p.78). Compactness is a state of fusion that is 
an undifferentiated mass, which has features that have not yet become 
distinguishable. Differentiation is a state of consciousness where the mind 
apprehends the distinguishing features, and thus the undivided form may be 
broken into parts that the mind perceives as differentiated. Subjective 
complexity arises when this differentiation reaches a critical point such that it 
is overwhelming, where we cannot make sense of all of the number of parts 
that have proliferated. It is thus confusing and difficult for us to fully 
comprehend all of this detail from the previous undifferentiated mass that 
was blended together. To prevent the separate parts merging together into 
compactness, we have to order the system in some way, by creating a schema 
based on their relations with each other. There is a progression from 
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compactness through differentiation to order. In this process there is an 
increasing of complexity during differentiation by adding elements. This 
increases the pressure to simplify. We may be tempted to revert to the 
previous state of compactness, but this cannot be done indefinitely.   
“We shall have lost our innocence. The bell cannot be 
unrung.” 
(Harter, 2006, p. 78) 
 
The simplification that comes from ordering is “a simplicity on the other side 
of complexity”. Harter contends that leadership can be seen as the promise of 
simplification. The question is which kind of simplification. Is this 
simplification by compactness or simplification by achieving a new order? His 
answer is that it can go in either direction and that no single way is the right 
answer. There are five ways in which leadership enables simplification.  
Leader as a unifying symbol.  
When there are tensions and conflicts, the leader can serve as a symbol that 
unifies a group. He becomes the focal point around which there is cohesion. 
Without this unifying cohesion the group or system fragments and 
disintegrates. The leader embodies in his person the identity of the whole. 
This is one explanation of the leadership theories that give prominence to 
great leaders. However, as Harter indicates this type of unifying actions of the 
leader actually presents a surface simplicity that obscures the complexity 
underneath. He cites the example of Saddam Hussein as an example of this. 
While he was in power he was able to maintain cohesion of differing and 
contesting groups such as Kurds, Sunnis and Shias, despite their underlying 
conflicts and tensions, and was able to contain the conflicts between Western 
and Muslim values, without Iraq breaking out into civil war.  “[I]t was a 
simplicity bought with corruption and violence to preserve the charade that 
probably fooled outsiders more than it did the people of Iraq” (p.82).  
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Reverting to compactness 
A second way for a leader to simplify is to revert to compactness. Harter cites 
Gardner (1990) who referred to the rhetoric in the US about unity and it 
being the melting pot of cultures. This masks all the different problems and 
factions in American society. Reversion to compactness by leaders is a 
promise to a more traditional community that is homogenous and 
unchanging. However, an attempt at reversion is perhaps not sustainable and 
leads to a distortion of reality.  
“In our quest to revert, we might neglect fresh, contrary 
evidence or stop listening to critics or in some other way 
cling to our beliefs beyond reason.” 
(Harter, 2006, p. 82) 
 
Achieving a new order 
Harter refers to leadership as adaptive work as a third form of simplification. 
Adaptive work is based on the work of Heifitz (1994), and is a method for 
responding to conflict through clarification of values and aligning them with 
reality. 
Shattering order and releasing its energies 
This is about freeing oneself from the dominating order itself. What this 
amounts to is dismantling of the prevailing order in the system, and allowing a 
new order to prevail.  
Pragmatic rhythms as we tolerate our deformations 
This is about enabling the system to tolerate deformations. Systems usually 
have an overarching purpose without which they will disintegrate. There will, 
however, always be contradictions, contentions and disagreements in 
collective life.  Furthermore, “no system exists in isolation from a network of 
interlocking forces and institutions” (p. 84). Therefore every system is in 
reality a form of deformation in some way or another. So leadership as 
simplification, here, is that of improvisation and minor adjustments and 
makeshifts to deal with the myriad contingencies, disturbances and 
deformations that the system faces.  
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Leadership in complex adaptive systems 
Since complex adaptive systems are subject to emergence and self-
organisation, it begs the question as to what is the role of leadership in 
organisations conceptualised as complex adaptive systems. This actually poses 
a challenge to conventional theories of leadership discussed above. Much of 
the literature on leadership focuses primarily on the traits, attributes, skills, 
knowledge or behaviour of the leader and the influence that these have on the 
actions and behaviour of followers. While some contingency approaches do 
take the context into account, it is a rather restricted and parochial view of the 
context. Context is limited to one or two key dimensions of the context of the 
dyadic leader-follower relationship. For example, situational leadership 
considers the emotional and task maturity of the follower, and then provides 
normative behaviours that the leader must apply. Transactional leadership 
considers the rewards or sanctions that the leader promises in exchange for 
follower compliance with the leader’s desires or instructions. This is a 
perspective that is locked into instrumental rationality. Transformational 
leadership, by contrast, seeks to activate higher order needs and aspirations of 
followers, and is therefore considered to be more receptive to the human 
potentials that are latent in followers. However, both transactional and 
transformational leadership still privileges the leaders and give primacy to his 
or her goals, desires and objectives, with the follower in a subordinate role. 
Much of conventional leadership theory therefore discounts the varied and 
myriad degrees of freedom that are inherent in followers. It is also surprising 
that given the changing environmental context, and the rise of the network 
society, these theories are relatively silent on how leadership roles are not 
fixed or static, but actually travel according to time, place, task, and project at 
hand. We may even refer to shifting leadership in the sense that the leadership 
role shifts many times during even a single meeting or conversation. 
When we apply complexity theory to organisations as complex adaptive 
systems, the natural question that has to be addressed is what are the 
implications for leadership? We may contrast this with traditional views of 
 Page 164 
leadership. One of the most important differences is that traditional views of 
leadership consider organisations as equilibrium-seeking systems. In such 
systems, futures are knowable and may be controlled by planning and 
intervention, primarily by leaders. As seen in the discussion of the work of 
Harter (2006), one of the roles of leadership is to reduce complexity. 
However, under processes of self-organisation where organisations are far 
from equilibrium, it is not possible for leaders to establish control. What then 
are the roles of leaders? Plowman et al. (2007) suggest that the role is to enable 
rather than control desirable futures as articulated by Marion & Uhl-Bien 
(2001). Based on a case study they suggest that leaders enable emergent self-
organisation by three types of mechanisms. Firstly, leaders disrupt patterns by 
increasing uncertainty and conflict. Secondly, they encourage novelty through 
the establishment of simple rules for “swarm like” behaviours and they 
promote non-linear interactions. Thirdly, they act as sense makers by creating 
correlations through language, and taking on the role of tags.  
Marion & Uhl-Bien (2001) ask how complexity theory informs leadership.  
They draw on Kauffman’s idea of autocatalysis. This is a process whereby 
certain events lead to a variety of other events that in turn trigger the 
production of events that keep the entire process operating by itself. For 
example, an event A leads to B which in turns leads to C and D. Now 
suppose that B and C collectively lead to A, which keeps the process self-
generating. Autocatalysis does not require any coordinating behaviour from 
outside the system, the order in the system arises naturally out of the 
interactions occurring at a micro-level within the system. The idea, though, is 
that certain events act as catalysts for the autocatalysis to occur. Marion and 
Uhl-Bien cite Holland (1995) who was able to distinguish such catalysts and 
labelled them as tags.  
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They define  
“a social tag as any structure or information that catalyses 
(enables or speeds up) certain social behaviours.” 
(Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001, p. 398) 
 
This means that tags can be ideas, technology, symbols or symbolic acts, 
myths or beliefs, or as they argue, even a leader can be a tag. Tags are what 
enable certain behaviours to be correlated, and they lead to aggregates, which 
may in turn combine into higher level meta-aggregates. Therefore, they 
suggest that complex leadership implies that leaders have different roles than 
defined in traditional leadership theory. These include the following: 
Foster network construction 
Leaders must actively engage in constructing new networks, and encourage 
inter-dependencies between various agents. This includes internal participants 
as well as those external to the organisation. The argument is that the 
networks are of value themselves. They provide a structure for innovation 
and for new value to be created by the interactions between participants. 
Catalyse bottom-up network construction 
In addition to building networks, leaders must actively catalyse network 
construction by enabling followers to create and build networks, and 
providing opportunities for network construction.  
Become leadership tags 
Here leaders assume the role of tags where they rally people around a 
concept, idea or attitude. However, they acknowledge that leaders cannot 
control the movement and outcomes.  They state, for example, that “they 
(leaders) are simply along for an inevitable ride” (p.405).  
Drop seeds of emergence 
Leaders are meant to stimulate emergence by identifying knowledge centres, 
encouraging creativity, increasing communication of these ideas, sending 
workers to conferences and other activities to spawn new ideas. They “create 
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organized disorder in which dynamic things happen at multiple locales within 
the system” (p.406). 
Think systemically 
They suggest that complex leaders must think systemically, in the way defined 
by Senge from the point of view of systems thinking.  
“In sum, complex leadership should be viewed as creating 
conditions that enable interactions through which the 
behaviours and direction of organizational systems 
emerge. Leaders provide control by influencing 
organizational behaviour through managing networks and 
interactions.  They do not delude themselves with the 
notion that they can determine or direct exactly what will 
happen within the organization. The dynamics of 
interaction, guided by complex leaders, help the 
organization develop appropriate structure, innovation 
and fitness.”  
(Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001, p. 406). 
 
Hazy (2006) aspires to the ability to measure leadership effectiveness in 
organisations as complex systems. He asserts that in order to achieve this, 
leadership is conceptualised as an organisational meta-capability which 
processes information on the organisation and the environment, and then 
reconfigures existing capabilities and builds new ones. He presents the 
Leadership and Capabilities Model in which he identifies 5 points of leverage 
in complex systems where leaders may intervene. This is shown in the 
diagram below: 
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Figure 6.2: Leadership under complexity 
Source: Hazy, J. K. (2006, p.66) 
 
 
These points of leverage relate to 1) promoting convergence in the 
organisation towards building capabilities, 2) ensuring that extra capacity is 
used to build up slack resources for future capability building as opposed to 
being appropriated by individuals, 3) increasing variety in order to be able to 
appropriate revenue and other resources from the environment into the 
organisation, 4) increasing variety to convert slack resources into new 
capabilities and 5) balance points of tension and risks in the other points of 
leverage towards some convergence by taking a systems perspective (p.67).  
Although Hazy has raised very interesting points, a fundamental error, is that 
while he identifies leadership as a meta-capability driven by bottom up 
interactions and emergence, he reverts to a traditional view of leadership as 
specific individuals who have agency that can transcend emergence.  He 
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He states that: 
 “[t]he organizing activities that occur are interpreted by 
organization’s members as leadership.”  
(Hazy, 2006, p. 61, emphasis in original) 
 
He also acknowledge that if one is to act in order to influence the outcomes 
of a complex system one has to first understand the system. However, as 
shown by complexity theory this is not possible.  
Hazy has missed an important opportunity for extending the notion that 
leadership is distributed. 
“Throughout the organization, many individuals in 
various leader roles, by word and action, continually send 
an array of signals to the organization’s members.”  
(Hazy, 2006, p. 71) 
 
Much of his paper reverts to normative prescriptions about leadership that is 
no different to that from traditional leadership approaches. Some of these are 
in contradiction with what complexity theory indicates, and yet his basis is 
that of complexity theory.  As an example he refers to the cultural 
cornerstones for effective leadership. These include clear vision, strategy and 
road map, and engaged and committed employees. In a self-organising 
emergent system that is far-from-equilibrium it is not possible to achieve 
these by leadership decree or action. 
Boal & Schultz (2007) attempt to address the same question, that is, what is 
the role of leadership if organisations are complex adaptive systems? They 
argue that leadership indeed has a role, in that they create the context, and 
structure in which interactions between agents occur. They make a distinction 
between supervisory theories of leadership and theories of strategic 
leadership. The former focuses on the task and behaviours of leaders and 
followers, while the latter is concerned with the evolution of an organisation 
as a whole which includes its capabilities. Strategic leadership makes sense of 
the environment and gives meaning to ambiguity and turbulence as 
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experienced by organisational participants. One way of achieving this is 
through processes of story-telling. 
“It is through the telling of stories, principally about the 
organisation's past history, that strategic leaders provide a 
rationale for past actions and a legitimate perspective that 
guides future potential behaviours.”  
(Boal & Schultz, 2007, p. 412) 
 
Similar to Plowman et al. they resort to the notion of tags as one way of 
coordinating behaviour of agents. They suggest that there are many examples 
of tags including uniforms, brands, trademarks and a variety of other symbols. 
In addition, strategic leaders may embody tags in themselves. Here they are 
able to transform or change agent interactions, where they are “acting as a 
sort of traffic cop” (p.415).  They also link this to the process of sensemaking. 
“Because strategic leaders are central in cognitive 
networks of organizations and thus the tagging processes 
that control contacts between organizational agents, they 
will have a strong influence on the exchange of 
information and advice and its interpretation.”  
(Boal & Schultz, 2007, p. 417) 
 
By drawing on the concept of a lifestory schema of individuals they posit the 
importance of an organisational lifestory schema, which “exists as a widely 
shared mental representation which draws attention to, elaborates, and 
arranges the many tales and legends told among members into a consistently 
patterned, autobiographical account of the organization over time” (p.420). 
This is done through an interactive process between leaders and followers. 
Different agents bring their own lifestories into the process and this 
contributes to a socially constructed organisational lifestory. The importance 
of this is that it works with the individual identities of agents and integrates 
the various identities. The role of strategic leaders is to help the construction 
of the autobiographical pattern on historical accounts to create a coherent 
picture of the organisational identity. The way that it achieves this is via 
temporal coherence, thematic coherence, causal coherence and the cultural 
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concept of biography. The cultural concept of biography ties in the various 
stages and events in an organisation’s life to cultural norms. 
They further link the organisational lifestory to the organisational vision. 
“Although all individual members are ‘coauthors’ of an 
organization’s life story (Czarniawska, 1997, p.14), 
powerful individuals, such as strategic leaders, can 
produce narratives for which the rest of the organization 
is more of a passive audience. That is the special role of 
strategic leaders as agents within an aggregate of agents in 
a complex adaptive system; they promote the 
proliferation of life story narratives as a tagging 
process.”(Boal & Schultz, 2007, p. 422) 
 
They assert that strategic leaders can have control over the vision formation 
process by control over storytelling and how members interpret the 
organisation’s path over time.  Despite the apparent control that strategic 
leaders have over organisational narratives, the authors concede that the 
development of stories may be subject to mutation and distortion, and that 
counter-narratives may arise that could lead to alternate identities and visions. 
These are very significant disclaimers in the context of organisations as 
complex adaptive systems. 
Generative leadership (Surie & Hazy, 2006, p. 13) identifies leadership as that 
which creates the context for innovation and adaptation to occur in 
organisations as complex systems. The key argument is that the task of 
leadership is to foster connectivity and interactions between organisational 
participants, but in a structured way. It also has the underlying notion of 
problem-solving in complex organisational contexts. Given that the focus is 
system wide, leadership is not limited to a few people at the top of the 
hierarchy. Furthermore, in the generative leadership framework, innovation 
may become an embedded organisational capability. Generative leaders have a 
number of processes at their disposal to nurture interactions while at the same 
time managing complexity. They may apply symbolic language to enable 
participants to understand experiences as personalised. They specify system 
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level goals so that knowledge that is gained may be selected and applied to 
problem solving in a way that ensures alignment. They facilitate the speed of 
interactions through judicious use of group and ICT technology. Interactions 
are partitioned though application of resource allocation and modular 
organisational systems. This is a way of restricting interactions in a structured 
way. Interactions are leveraged by identifying opportunities for reuse of 
learning and knowledge across organisational systems. This may include 
codifying knowledge gained from interactions and embodying them in tools 
and methodologies for others to use.  
“In contrast to traditional perspectives that conceive of 
leaders as the gatherers, interpreters, and synthesizers of 
feedback and as those who heroically convert the 
information into a strategy or vision, generative leadership 
channels feedback through the organization’s members 
who are in the best position to interpret and synthesize 
the information into more useable models of the 
environment.” 
(Surie & Hazy, 2006, p. 19) 
 
There is an argument that leadership is not based on a leader’s use of 
symbolism, motivation and the application of charisma. In the context of 
complexity, traditional and hierarchical approaches to leadership are 
inappropriate. An alternate conception of leadership is possible in what has 
been termed complexity leadership theory. Lichtenstein et al. (2006) state that 
leadership does not reside in individuals, but as a complex, dynamic process 
that arises in the interactive “spaces between” people.  Leadership in this view 
is an emergent phenomenon, and an outcome of the relational interactions 
that people engage in.  
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This has the following implications: 
• A shift to a whole-system view across an entire social system 
• A focus on micro-strategic leadership actions at different levels within 
the organisation and across organisational boundaries 
• Less emphasis on variables and more emphasis on complex 
interactions 
• Leadership that gets enacted in complex environments 
One notes that this is referring to leadership as something that is distributed 
within a social system, and that “it does not lie in a person but rather in an 
interactive dynamic” (p.3).   
“Instead, ‘leadership’ becomes a term that is descriptive 
of certain social forces at play amongst actors, which may 
include a formal leader.” 
(Lichtenstein, et al., 2006, p. 7) 
Computational modelling in leadership 
Given the complexity of the world, some argue for new methods for 
understanding leadership. Computational modelling is one such new method 
for understanding leadership processes. Hazy (2007) provides some coverage 
of this by identifying numerous such studies. These include system dynamics, 
discrete event simulation, NK modelling, agent based modelling and hybrid 
models. He provides a summary in the form of a typology (Hazy, 2007, p. 
397).  
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“A complexity science perspective would suggest that it is 
more likely that ‘leadership’ is a negotiated artifact of 
agent interactions, an artifact that is interpreted by the 
agents as ‘leadership’.” 
(Hazy, 2007, p. 397) 
  
Other authors (Schreiber & Carley, 2006) also support the notion of 
complexity leadership theory, discussed earlier, and have applied 
computational modelling to leadership. In their terms, the idea of leadership 
as an emergent outcome of interactions is adaptive leadership. They frame 
this as one of three aspects of entangled roles of leadership, the other two 
being managerial leadership and enabling leadership. Managerial leadership 
according to them is the conventional, position based formal leadership. 
Enabling leadership creates an enabling environment for adaptive leadership 
and for “channelling” productive outcomes (which arise as a result of 
emergence) back to managerial leadership for strategic planning and 
exploitation. This is depicted in Fig 6.2 below. 
 
Figure 6.2: Entangled roles of leadership 
Source: Schreiber, C., & Carley, K. M. (2006, p.64) 
 
They argue that enabling leadership is enacted by creating tensions that 
stimulates interactions and interdependence amongst agents.  This facilitates 
the flow of knowledge and learning. They then tie this back to the 
relationship between human and social capital. Their thesis is that effective 
leadership occurs by way of creating complex network functioning in 
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organisations. They then proceed to answer the question of whether 
leadership style affects such complex network functioning, by drawing on 
computational modelling techniques. This is achieved via multi-agent dynamic 
network analysis. Leadership style in the model may be either directive or 
participative. They used network characteristics as proxies for human capital, 
social capital and adaptive leadership. For example, social capital is indicated 
by graph density and clustering coefficients. Adaptive leaders are identified as 
agents that are “central to shaping the overall communication structure of the 
organization” (p.68). The proxy measure for this was the betweenness 
centrality of the simulated agents.  Their results indicate better performance 
with a participative style as well as higher levels of adaptive leadership. 
Furthermore, the agents that exhibited adaptive leadership differed across the 
two different leadership styles. 
“This suggests that agents in the informal network will 
serve different roles – such as leader, peer and sub-
ordinate – depending on the conditions. This includes 
formal leaders, as they are also embedded in the complex 
functioning of the informal network.”  
(Schreiber & Carley, 2006, p. 71) 
 
Another interesting observation was that even though the only difference in 
the initial conditions of the network was the leader and their connections, 
while the initial network structure of the members were the same, two 
different member networks emerged. They note that this indicates that 
leadership style has second-order effects in networks, and a change in leader 
can lead to unintended structural changes. 
Strategic leadership in the context of complexity 
In the context of uncertainty and complexity a distinction may be made 
between clear, complicated and complex foresight horizons. Lane & Maxfield 
(1996) show these distinctions by outlining the following scenarios: 
The first is that of an 18th century general overlooking the plain of a battle the 
next day. On a clear day he has a good view of the landscape, and the 
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positions of both party’s troops. During the battle there will be movement of 
the troops from the opposing camps, and battle engagement between them. 
This will be based on the orders that he and the opposing commander gives, 
together with the myriad contingencies that neither of them will have control 
over.  He can anticipate the possibilities that may occur, even though he 
cannot predict the outcomes with certainty. In addition, there is a clear 
terminal date, tomorrow. They refer to this scenario as characterising a clear 
foresight horizon.  
The second scenario that they outline is that of a US cavalry column 
marching though unchartered territory in the 1870s.  The commander does 
not know the full lay of the land, nor the location of the nearest river. Neither 
does he know whether there are any impassable areas ahead. In addition, he 
does not know the location of the Native American tribes, where they have 
established their camps, and whether they will want to engage in combat. 
Although he knows the general direction that he wishes to take, he is unable 
to make any detailed forecasts, as there are too many possibilities and 
unexpected occurrences to envision. At best he has to scout what lies just 
ahead as his column proceeds, and adjust his plans accordingly. The authors 
refer to his foresight horizon as a complicated one. Although he does not 
have a clear terminal date, his interest is to get his troops to an assigned 
destination in the next few days or weeks. 
The third situation is that of a Bosnian diplomat trying to bring an end to 
bloodshed in his country in 1995. This is a much more complex situation as 
he is not sure who his allies and who his enemies are. He has fought against 
the Croats and with them. He has engaged in battle with Bosnian Serbs, but 
his close relatives have aligned themselves with them. There are a plurality of 
political and security actors including the UN security forces, NATO troops, 
and politicians from Russia, Serbia, and Croatia. He is unclear about who is 
involved, and what to expect from whom. And even when he settles on this, 
it is likely to change the next day. In terms of a terminal date, there is no end 
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in view for him. This Bosnian diplomat faces, according to Lane and 
Maxfield, a complex foresight horizon.  
“The social landscape through which he moves constantly 
deforms in response to the actions he and the others take, 
and new features, not previously envisaged or even 
envisionable, emerge.” 
(Lane & Maxfield, 1996, p. 217) 
 
This differentiation of foresight horizons are of interest from the point of 
view of leadership. Each of the three key actors in the vignettes given above 
would usually be considered as leaders. The question becomes how should 
each of the three leaders, the General, the Commander and the Bosnian 
diplomat respond given their respective foresight horizons. 
What are the lessons for leadership in the case of complex foresight horizons? 
In order to answer this, it is important to understand their notion of 
agent/artifact space. The structure that a firm faces is made up of the plurality 
of agents (actors) involved and their relationships, as well as the artifacts with 
which they engage. Furthermore, it is also the interpretations of the agents of 
the agent/artifact space which is changing and which is important.  
Although the authors do not use the term sensemaking, this is at the heart of 
the issue. It has to do with the attributions that agents make in relation to 
other agents and artifacts. To the extent that there are shifts in such 
attributions, it means that their possibilities for action change, and result in 
how they act.  Moreover, it is these attributions that give rise to the agent’s 
own identity.  These changes in attributions give rise to new actions which in 
turn affects the agent/artifact space.  Attributional shifts are facilitated 
through generative relationships. Generative relationships are defined as those 
relationships that lead to changes in how people see the world and act in it.  
Not all relationships are generative. The preconditions are that there must be 
a level of heterogeneity between agents, and some level of shared directness. 
The heterogeneity may be in competence, in attributions, and access to other 
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agents or artifacts. Shared directness implies that there is the possibility to 
bridge the differences between participants in a generative relationship. 
This leads to the identification of two kinds of strategic practices. The first is 
referred to as “populating the world”. This is all about identifying agents and 
artifacts and considering the attributions made to them. It is a process that 
occurs through discourse that contributes to building and interpreting a 
representation of the external environment (Maxfield, 1998). This is in 
relation to the identity that has been attributed to the agents and artifacts. In 
order to do this the firm is not the appropriate unit of analysis.  
“To understand the structure of agent/artifact space, 
then, ‘firms’ cannot be taken as the primary agent unit. 
Instead the focus must be on relationships defined by 
recurring patterns of interaction, which happens inside 
firms, across their boundaries, and sometimes even 
beyond them, in places like university departments and 
government agencies.” 
(Lane & Maxfield, 1996, p. 227) 
 
This populating of the world is not restricted to a select group of leaders 
within an organisation, but rather all agents that face a complex foresight 
horizon engage in this practice in order to identify opportunities for action.  
The second strategic practice is that of fostering generative relationships. This 
is about agents monitoring their relationships with other agents, assessing the 
potential for generativeness, and assigning resources to unleash or nurture 
such potential. Much of this is about engaging in conversations and 
interactions.  While this is crucial, to fully realise the generative potential, at 
some point the participants must engage in joint action. These strategic 
practices of populating the world and fostering generative relationships do 
not work in isolation. Rather they contribute to a bootstrap dynamic. 
Structural change in artifact space leads to generative relationships that 
contribute to shifts in attributions. These attributional shifts lead to actions 
which open up possibilities for new generative relationships. Thus we have a 
classic positive feedback loop that is the engine of the bootstrap dynamic. 
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“These constructive positive feedbacks have an obvious 
cognitive counterpart: as the agent/artifact space 
undergoes ripples of change, new agents and artifacts 
come into being and old ones acquire new functionalities, 
so identities change…” 
(Lane & Maxfield, 1996, p. 224)  
Discussion 
The field of strategy is closely related to that of leadership, because much of 
the strategy literature assumes that the key actors in strategy-making are those 
that are in leadership positions. Although earlier leadership theories such as 
behavioural and traits approaches sometimes feature in the literature on 
strategic leadership, it is usually more aligned with transformational, 
charismatic, and visionary leadership. There is an unquestioned assumption 
that strategic leaders are or need to be brightside leaders. We have seen from 
the critique of Tretheway and Goodall that theories of leadership are not 
ahistorical, and have been heavily influenced by the social, historical and 
cultural context. They identify three hidden story-lines of leadership each 
covering a dominant historical era, namely Cold War, Post-Cold War and 
Post-9/11. In each of these eras there are also darkside characteristics of 
leadership. They argue that we need to embrace pragmatic complexity which 
is a model of communication that consciously draws in plurality. The focus is 
on the construction of provisional meaning in a local context, that are tested 
in ongoing social practice, and where meanings are based on multiple 
interpretations and are co-constructed, together with the ability to take an 
ironic stance, meaning holding incompatible positions.  We notice 1) 
resonance with the findings from complexity theory, 2) an alignment with 
strategising-organising through situated activity in social practice and 3) 
interpretations and meaning-making are accentuated. Thus, all of this ought 
to have some bearing towards a theory of strategic enactment. 
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Harter identified leadership as a process of simplification and identified the 
following five ways that this could be achieved: 
• Leader as unifying symbol 
• Reverting to compactness 
• Achieving a new order 
• Shattering order and releasing its energies 
• Pragmatic rhythms as we tolerate our deformations 
The first two ways are more related to leadership as an individual capability. 
The last three tend to be more systemic in nature, and leadership begins to 
take on a more provisional, tentative and improvisational stance. 
Complexity theory poses a number of challenges to conventional theories of 
leadership. Earlier theories of leadership focused mainly on the dyadic 
relationships between leader and follower, without taking into account the 
context. While contingency and situational leadership attempted to bring in 
contextual variables they were rather limited. Transactional and 
transformational leadership while focusing more on the whole organisation, 
privilege leaders and give primacy to the leader’s goals, objectives and desires. 
Conventional leadership discounts the many and varied degrees of freedom 
that are inherent in followers, and neglects the wider systemic relationships. 
Finally, conventional leadership theories, in the limited case, of when they do 
look at the organisation as a whole, view them as equilibrium-seeking systems, 
where futures are knowable, and may be controlled by planning and 
intervention on the part of leaders. These are not as helpful in the case of 
complex adaptive systems that are far-from-equilibrium, subject to emergence 
and the processes of self-organisation. We would therefore expect that 
authors who draw on complexity theory will address some of these 
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challenges. Unfortunately this promise has not been fully met. Plowman et al. 
state that leaders are unable to control desirable futures but are able to enable 
them. They suggest that leaders can enable emergent self-organisation by 1) 
increasing uncertainty and conflict by disrupting patterns, 2) encouraging 
novelty through rules for “swarm like behaviour” and 3) creating correlations 
by acting as tags. 
These prescriptions are firstly, not fully justified and secondly, assign agency 
to leaders in a similar way to conventional theories that they simply do not 
have. Thus, Plowman et al. have merely shifted the problem slightly, without 
necessarily addressing it. Let’s begin with their prescription for increasing 
uncertainty and conflict. While the underlying idea of disrupting patterns may 
have merit, the solution on how to go about doing it is not as straightforward. 
Increasing uncertainty and conflict within organisational contexts sounds very 
similar to “manufactured crises”. This is unethical because it increases anxiety 
and tension amongst organisational participants which may in turn lead to 
pathological organisational behaviour. Furthermore, there is no evidence to 
claim that this will lead to new patterns that are desirable. Their second 
prescription is that leadership needs to establish simple rules to promote 
swarm-like behaviour. This is another common prescription from authors 
who try to apply complexity theory to organisations. While there is nothing 
inherently wrong in establishing simple rules, it becomes quite problematic if 
we are relying on them to lead to desired futures. We need to interrogate the 
underlying rationale for simple rules. These are based on the simple rules in 
certain computational models that attempt to replicate swarming behaviour. 
Examples of these include simulations of flocks of birds, or shoals of fish, or 
in a slightly different format, simulation of ant colonies. These simulations 
illustrate how a few simple rules enable emergent outcomes that exhibit a 
level of coordinated behaviour and order. There are a number of problems of 
translating this directly to organisational contexts. Firstly, these simulations 
are based on homogenous agents whereas in social systems agents are 
heterogeneous (Stacey, 2003). Secondly, the agents in these simulations are 
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dumb agents in the sense that they do not have the capability for adaptive 
learning. Thirdly, in the real world, human agents can choose to disobey the 
rules, which is not possible in these simulations. Fourthly, the ordered 
behaviour of simple rules in this simulation is outside the control of any of 
the agents in the model. There is therefore no guarantee that even if there is 
ordered behaviour in organisational contexts from simple rules, that this will 
lead to desirable futures. The most important critique against the prescription 
of simple rules, however, is that there is simply no way of selecting and 
identifying the simple rules. How does one distinguish which rules to apply?   
Plowman et al. also refer to the suggestion of Marion and Uhl-Bien that 
leadership may assume the role of “tags”. This is based on the process of 
auto-catalysis, where certain events are catalysts that lead to a process 
operating by itself. Holland (1995) identified such catalysts in a computational 
model and labelled them as tags. Marion and Uhl-Bien used this as a 
metaphor for structure or information as social tags. These could refer to 
symbols, flags, ideas or technology that enable aggregate patterns to form 
through correlations. By extending this, leadership, apparently can assume the 
role of tags. Once again, there is a big leap between tags as catalysts in 
autocatalysis and leaders becoming tags. Some of the problems are identifying 
how leaders are tags and what types of behaviours are related to the processes 
of correlation. Four important points have been overlooked in suggesting that 
leaders can be social tags. First, tags may not be seen in isolation from the 
system in which they are embedded. It is a tag because of the specific 
feedback relationships in the auto-catalytic process. Therefore we cannot 
claim that because an individual is a formal leader in a system then he or she 
may automatically assume the role of tag by choice. Tags may not be imposed. 
Second, even if human agents may be tags, there are a myriad other agents 
who may catalyse the correlating behaviours. Third, there needs to be caution 
in singling out one concept from complex systems and developing theoretical 
propositions based on it, without noting all the other characteristics of 
complex adaptive systems such as self-organisation, co-evolution, and 
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sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Fifth, leader as tag invests far too 
much agency in the leader, to the extent that it assumes that the leader has 
agency over macro-states of the system. This has been shown to be 
impossible given the characteristics of complex adaptive systems.  While 
Marion and Uhl-Bien acknowledge the limited agency by stating “they 
(leaders) are simply along for an inevitable ride” (p.405), they nevertheless 
build a significant portion of their complex leadership theory on the idea of 
leader as tags. 
Hazy (2006) also draws on complexity theory to present his Leadership and 
Capabilities Model discussed earlier in this chapter. He raises two important 
points. The first is that leadership is a meta-capability driven by bottom-up 
interactions and emergence. The second is that certain organising activities are 
interpreted by organisational members as leadership. Despite, these very two 
significant insights, Hazy misses the opportunity as he reverts to normative 
prescriptions about leadership that is the same as that of traditional theories 
of leadership. He confuses leadership as a meta-capability with leadership 
invested in specific individuals that are able to transcend emergence. So here 
we have a model that is ostensibly built on complexity theory but ends up in 
direct conflict with it. 
Boal & Schultz (2007), also drawing on complexity theory, offer very 
significant insights by highlighting the role of storytelling and dialogue, and 
especially by introducing the concepts of the lifestory schema and 
organisational lifestory. Once again we have authors who draw on complexity 
theory, but do not follow through on their insights. They also fall back on the 
concept of tags, and assign leadership a relatively high level of control over 
organisational story-telling and even go to the extent of linking the 
organisational lifestory to the organisational vision via the tagging process. 
They, off course, offer disclaimers about distortion of narratives and the 
possibility of counter-narratives occurring but do not take into account how 
significant these are.  
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If we take the insights of some of these authors and follow through on them, 
we arrive at radically different conclusions from them. We begin to discern an 
emerging view that leadership has to be reframed not as the dyadic 
relationship between leader and follower, but rather a systemic meta-
capability. Furthermore, leaders do not have agency over macro-states of the 
system. Leadership thus becomes much more diffuse and is distributed 
throughout the system. We may thus refer to dispersed and distributed 
leadership. This is supported by Lichtenstein who identifies leadership as a 
complex, dynamic process that arises in the interactive spaces between 
people. Leadership is therefore an emergent phenomenon and an outcome of 
the relational processes that people are engaged in. Important aspects such as 
interpretation and sensemaking have been neglected in the leadership 
literature. If we wish to move towards a theory of strategic enactment, we 
need to draw out the full implications of a complexity theory view of 
leadership. 
Lane and Maxfield develop the construct of foresight horizons to show the 
distinctions between situations that are clear, complicated and complex. 
Under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty characterised by complex 
foresight horizons, traditional approaches to strategic leadership are therefore 
inadequate.  
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C h a p t e r  7 - S t r a t e g i c  E n a c t m e n t  
Introduction 
In this chapter, I draw on some of the theoretical insights from earlier 
chapters to sketch out the contours of a proposed theory of strategic 
enactment. This is supported by several propositions. In the context of 
complexity, the notions of grand narratives and grand theory are eschewed in 
favour of more tentative and provisional approaches to theorising and 
conceptualisation. In the light of this, a theory of strategic enactment may be 
viewed as “small” theory that may be able to provide a contesting set of 
explanations for strategy-making from that of strategic choice. 
Notwithstanding the provisional and tentative nature of this small theory 
development, the implications for the field are quite significant. This is not 
surprising from the lens of complexity theory which gives us the 
understanding that small perturbations can have large effects. A tentative 
theory of strategic enactment is constructed by drawing on important insights 
gained from the critical interrogation of the various theories in earlier chapters 
of this thesis. 
Strategic Enactment 
I use the term, strategic enactment, to signal that the framework is based on a 
constructionist ontology. Therefore, this is an interpretive approach to 
organisational strategy. In order to develop and build the theoretical 
framework, I shall offer a number of theoretical propositions. These are 
drawn on work covered in earlier chapters and developed in this chapter. 
We begin with a fundamental question of what constitutes reality. Is there a 
fixed, objective reality that exists that we can probe, understand and ultimately 
control? By applying the tools of positivist science, physical scientists are able 
to probe the material world, develop models of reality, and capture them in 
their formalisms. It enables us to optimise and control the mechanistic 
universe. What of the world that the social scientist observes? An objectivist 
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ontology in social science assumes that social reality is also objective. For the 
positivist, social scientists with the right tools can probe and understand the 
social world and discover the social laws that apply in an unchanging way and 
independent of context. The translation of this positivist idea into the 
organisational realm implies that organisations and environments are 
objective reality that exists out there. A second ontological position is that 
although there is an objective reality we cannot fully know and understand 
that reality. This is the notion of perceived reality. As a result of lack of 
knowledge or flawed perceptions, we shall never have full understanding. 
Strategists are subject to bounded rationality and all of the cognitive biases of 
human beings as discussed in Chapter 4. One of their tasks is to minimise the 
gap between their flawed perception of the environment and that of the real 
environment. A third ontological perspective, one that I adopt, is that of 
enacted environments. This embraces both constructivist and constructionist 
approaches. The implication of this is that there is no objective social reality. 
Reality is enacted by human actors who construct their worlds through their 
experiences and their interactions. All that exists are material and symbolic 
actions and interactions. 
An exploration and development of some of the key ideas and concepts 
covered in earlier chapters combined with an ontological perspective of 
enacted environments and constructed reality enables the development of a 
theoretical framework for strategic enactment in terms of a set of 
propositions as presented below. 
Proposition 1: Social reality is enacted by human actors who construct their worlds through 
their experiences and their interactions. All that exists are material and 
symbolic actions and interactions which become subject to interpretation by 
human actors. 
 
The term, enactment, implies that both thinking and action are involved in 
the process of constructing reality. It is through our interpretation of the 
world that we construct categories such as organisation and environment. We 
then react to these categories and therefore bring forth reality.  Smirchich & 
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Stubbart (1985) alerted us to these different ontologies in their presentation of 
objective, perceived and enacted environments in the context of strategy. 
Faulkner (2002) noted that this insight of Smirchich and Stubbart had 
“profound implications”. I concur with this, but argue that the strategy 
literature has not fully explored and developed it. This thesis attempts to do 
that. 
We may now proceed to incrementally build on components of strategic 
enactment such that we realise an overarching framework. We may begin with 
the individual agent. Each agent has a schema that represents his 
understanding of reality. This schema is based on his or her life history, and 
hence embodies his knowledge from his socialisation and experiences. It is 
through the process of interaction between individuals that schemata of 
agents change, and hence we have a complex adaptive system that is the 
organisation. It is crucial that since the schemata of agents are based on their 
life histories and their interactions over time, there is a close link with the 
identity of the agent. Thus, the agent has multiple evolving schemata and 
overlapping, multiple identities. The agent’s identity is therefore invested in 
the processes and outcomes of sensemaking. 
At one level, we may assert that the changing interpretations and changing 
conceptions means that there is a change in agent identity. This in turn leads 
to changing actions. Thus thinking and acting are intertwined and inter-
penetrating. Since an agent has the power to act in his local circumstances, it 
means that agency is also an important concept. Thus, we have a strong link 
between agency and identity of agents.  
Proposition 2: Thinking and acting are not separate activities but are intertwined and 
operate through the mechanism of sensemaking. 
 
Proposition 3: The identity of an agent is related to the changing agent schemata, and is 
therefore an emergent outcome of interactions between agents in the complex 
adaptive system of the organisation. 
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As changes in schemata happen through interactions between agents, we need 
to interrogate interactions in a deeper way. What are interactions? There are 
two kinds of interactions. First are interactions with other human agents, and 
second are interactions with other agents in the form of artifacts. The 
medium of interactions between human agents is discourse and conversation. 
This is not at the level of “speech acts” only. While it includes utterances, and 
languaging, it also includes gestures, emotions, change in body tenor, as well 
as the use of space. Thus, interactions are based on complex communication 
between agents. 
One of the important concepts in strategy is that of organisational routines. 
Routines are recipes of action that get enacted daily, and become part of the 
dynamic capabilities of organisation as discussed in Chapter 3. In the 
development and application of routines, artifacts play a prominent role. If 
organisations are systems of meaning and systems of interpretation, then 
routines and artifacts are embodied interpretations which constrain and 
liberate further interpretation and action. 
Proposition 4: Routines and artifacts are embodied interpretations which constrain and 
liberate further interpretation and action. 
 
At the level of organisation we may now link in with the idea of the 
organisational lifestory (Boal & Schultz, 2007). This is a shared dynamic 
narrative at an organisational level. We may equate this with the identity of the 
organisation. This leads us to three findings. Firstly, the organisational 
lifestory exists everywhere and exists nowhere. It exists nowhere because 
there does not exist any explicit text, as such, that contains the organisational 
lifestory. It exists everywhere in that it represents the organisation as a whole, 
and is a shared tacit understanding of the organisation and how it has come to 
be what it is – it exists in the spaces between. Secondly, the organisational 
lifestory is not fixed, it is changing every moment as interactions are occurring 
and hence it is fuzzy and vague and constantly changing. Therefore, 
organisational identity is not something that is fixed, but it is multiple, plural 
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and shifting.  Thirdly, a significant shift in organisational lifestory, represents a 
shift in identity, and hence strategy.  
Moreover, organisational lifestory is a boundary setting mechanism. It 
determines the construction of the organisation from non-organisation. The 
issue of boundaries has played an important role in systems work. What are 
the dimensions of these boundaries and what do they imply? The following 
lists some of the possible dimensions: 
• Spatial – This is the classic systems notion of boundaries as 
encapsulated in the systems holon. The system is embedded in an 
environment separated by the system boundary. 
• Time – How far we look back and how far into the future is also a 
form of boundary setting. 
• Observer – Who is assigning the boundary and what is their 
relationship to the system being inquired into? 
• Granularity – when we assign a boundary, it is a form of separation. 
For example, if we refer to a geographical boundary such as a river, is 
the level of granularity that of the flowing river or of the molecules? 
• Permeability – We know that things get exchanged across boundaries 
in open systems, if only conceptually, when we say that the 
environment influenced the system. But what about things that cross 
the boundary such as ideas or memes? Are they in the system or 
outside the system? 
• From a complexity perspective we may say that the boundary is 
inextricably linked with the system; as the system elements including 
agents change the boundary changes – the boundary is not fixed.  
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The organisational lifestory will therefore be an unarticulated narrative with 
multiple threads that also incorporates the various dimensions of boundaries 
listed above.  
Proposition 5: The organisational lifestory is a shared, dynamic but unarticulated narrative 
at an organisational level. It is not fixed, but it is multiple, plural and 
shifting.  A significant shift in organisational lifestory, represents a shift in 
organisational identity, and hence strategy.  
 
These arguments imply that change is ontologically prior. Thus, the 
organisation is a heaving, constant flux, and is not a stable entity. We may 
think of this as a “sea of change’ out of which we identify frozen moments, 
and when we think of organisations as stable entities then it is these frozen 
moments that we are thinking about. Therefore, whenever we reify things 
such as organisation, environment, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats, these represent frozen moments.  
Proposition 6: Change is ontologically prior to organisations. It is improvisational, not 
scripted in advance but the script is written as it is enacted. 
 
We now have two interesting perspectives that have been under-emphasised 
in the literature. Firstly, these organisational concepts such as strengths and 
weaknesses are not objective realities, but rather our interpretations of 
material and symbolic actions. Secondly, even these constructions are drawn 
from a constant, shifting sea of change, and stabilised as constructs that we 
can act on and react to. 
Strategy now becomes a series of enactments through interpretation and 
interactions between human agents and artifacts. It is linked with situated 
activity in practice. There is no such thing as a grand strategy. All we have are 
micro-processes and micro-actions mediated through interactions and 
discourse. The outcomes of these are decisions and patterns of actions over 
time to which we assign coherence, and we may sometimes label as strategy. 
Integral to this is the process of emergence and self-organisation. Strategy is 
therefore not episodic, but rather ongoing and may sometimes be manifested 
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as discontinuous change. This is the case when we have the emergence of a 
radically different organisational lifestory. We consider a lifestory that changes 
in an incremental fashion a result of continuous change. What we mean by 
discontinuous change is basically that we have a radical revision of the 
organisational lifestory. Having said this, even this revisionist version of the 
lifestory is not something that is designed, but rather emerges from changing 
identities of organisational participants who all contribute to the lifestory in 
some way. Furthermore, it is interesting that the lifestory is not something 
that merely changes in a linear way. Rather it is truly revisionist in that we 
completely rewrite the organisational lifestory because we re-interpret and 
reconstruct earlier events and milestones that are different from the previous 
lifestory. Strategy is not something that we do once a year in our strategic 
planning sessions, it something that is happening all the time. 
We now have to consider how organisational lifestory may be changed. Since 
the organisational lifestory represents the identity of the organisation, we may 
regard it as a composite of the identities of the agents. However, since it is an 
emergent phenomenon, the law of super-position does not apply. Therefore 
while it is a composite of the identities, it does not reduce to the individual 
identities. We may think of it as an agglomeration of identities. The changing 
of agent identities will therefore contribute to a changing of the organisational 
lifestory. We have already seen that agent identities are subject to the local 
interactions and changing of schemata, and since interactions are based largely 
on discourse, changing discourse implies ultimately changing the 
organisational lifestory. 
Previous chapters have shown that one of the most powerful ways to change 
organisational discourse is the use of analogies and metaphors. Therefore, we 
may conclude that if new metaphors and analogies are injected into collective 
organisational life, it represents a radical departure from ordinary discourse. 
Metaphors and analogies open up new possibility space, and new “adjacent 
possibles” (Lissack, 1999). From a dissipative structures point of view, the 
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injection of new discourse through introduction of metaphors and analogies 
may be seen as akin to injecting new energy and thus pushing the system far-
from-equilibrium, to the extent that a new level of order emerges.  
Proposition 7: Analogy and metaphor may be used as methods for changing organisational 
discourse and thereby the organisational lifestory, its identity and ultimately 
its strategy. 
 
It is important to note that this conception of strategy is very different from 
strategic choice approaches. Firstly, strategic choice is based on an objectivist 
ontology. Secondly, it invests agency in omniscient actors. The strategic 
enactment perspective proposed also grants agency to individuals but in a 
very different kind of way. Agency is restricted to a local level, in that agents 
have the power to act in their local interactions, but they have no agency in 
terms of system level outcomes. Strategic choice actually invests agents with 
agency over system level outcomes. This is clearly not possible in complex 
systems. Secondly, given that local actions can affect global outcomes, the 
strategic enactment perspective does not diminish the local agency, in the way 
that a population ecology view would. 
Proposition 8: Agents have the power to act in local interactions, but do not have agency over 
system macro-states. 
 
As shown in Chapter 5, drawing on complexity theory and actor-network 
theory, agency is not limited to human agents but also it is invested in the 
structural relations in networks of agents and in the artifacts that they create. 
Proposition 9: Agency is invested in human agents, structural relations in networks of 
agents and in artifacts. 
 
The strategic enactment framework is one that is consistent with 
sensemaking. There are similarities in that it deals with issues of identity in a 
similar way. The framework tends to also refer to agency that is less 
emphasised in sensemaking. If we bring in a sensemaking perspective then it 
accentuates the notion of working with equivocal inputs, and how order is 
imposed on the world through sensemaking. 
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Parry & Hansen (2007) consider how organisational stories actually constitute 
leadership. Although this is different to the idea of the organisational lifestory 
as used here, there is some relationship between them. We may consider that 
the organisational lifestory is an amalgam of the stories referred to by Parry 
and Hansen, who show how stories are used to make sense of events, and 
impact on the actions that people embark upon.  
“When we tell stories about ourselves to others, they 
know us not only by those stories, but ‘as’ those stories.” 
(Parry & Hansen, 2007, p. 287) 
 
What we discern from this work is that once again stories are a form of 
identity-construction. Since stories are not one-dimensional and do not 
depend on the individual alone, what we also note is that it is through 
communicative interactions between agents, in this case in the form of 
stories, that identities are shaped. Even more interesting is that we again have 
support for the relationship between agency and identity. Given that stories 
constrain what people can or cannot do, it also determines the degrees of 
freedom available to them in relation to agency. Another angle on this is that 
stories embody the constraints and freedoms available for thought and action, 
decision-making and implementation. Therefore, there is naturally a link with 
strategy-making. The schemata of agents are shaped by the story telling and 
re-telling that they are involved in. Parry and Hansen cite Ouchi (1981) who 
made the point that a management philosophy is like a general theory that 
organisational members may use in relation to their particulars. From this 
perspective, the organisational lifestory becomes such a general theory of 
action that determines what people do and not do. 
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“From the perspective of sensemaking, who we think we 
are (identity) as organizational actors shape what we enact 
and how we interpret, which affects what outsiders think 
we are (image) and how they treat us, which stabilizes or 
destabilizes our identity.” 
(Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005, p. 416). 
 
This quotation exemplifies the link between sensemaking and the strategic 
enactment framework. It highlights the role of sensemaking in identity 
construction. Thus, the nature of interactions between agents is central to the 
identity construction of those agents. This link between identity and agent 
schemata means that the emergence of organisational macrostates in the 
complex adaptive system is also linked to individual agent identities. What this 
amounts to is that every agent is not just potentially a strategist, but every 
agent is a strategist, if by strategy we mean the actual organisational 
macrostates that have emerged. 
Proposition 10: Every agent is implicated in the emergence of organisational macro-states 
and therefore every agent is a strategist. 
 
Now that we understand the importance of the relationship between agency 
and identity in strategic enactment, we can draw lessons from Maxfield and 
Lane, to incorporate as part of the framework. They identify the importance 
of agent-artifact space, populating the world, generative relationships and 
cognitive re-interpretations. The agent-artifact space is made up of two 
components. One is structural and the other is cognitive. The structural 
component relates to the agents and artifacts and the relationships and 
connections between them. The cognitive component is as a result of the 
attributions made by agents on who the other agents are, and what the 
artifacts do and do not do. Maxfield and Lane present the following 4 lessons: 
“Structural change in agent-artifact space is mediated by new attributions about the identity 
of agents and the meaning of artifacts” (p.222)  
 
This fits in very well with the discussion earlier. Here we see a direct link 
between sensemaking, identity construction and structural change. Under 
situations of complexity there are cascades of change. As a result, agents are 
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constantly faced with equivocal inputs from the environment. They engage in 
sensemaking to impose an order on those equivocal inputs.  As a result, the 
interpretations that they make of themselves, other agents and of artifacts, 
that is, the attributions that they make in turn impact the changes in agent-
artifact space. 
“Generative relationships are the locus of attribution shifts” (p.223). 
 
Generative relationships are those that cause agents to understand their world 
in a different way. This is as a result of changed attributions of the agent-
artifact space. We may also link this to one of the fundamental objectives of 
scenario planning, discussed in Chapter 5, which is of “re-perceiving reality” 
(Wack, 1985a). Certain relationships between agents can be the source of 
attributional shifts. Not all relationships have this potential. There are two 
important prerequisites. The first is that there must be some level of 
heterogeneity between agents. This could be in areas of competence, in 
attributions, and in their access to other agents and artifacts. If there is too 
much homogeneity between agents, then they tend to engage in recurrent 
patterns of interaction that becomes shared which does not lead to 
attributional shifts. The other prerequisite is that there has to be some shared 
directness. This is the converse of the distance given by agent heterogeneity. 
Here, it is a closeness that opens up the space for some level of shared 
meaning and understanding. 
“Structural change in agent/artifact space proceeds through a bootstrap dynamic” (p.224). 
 
This is related to the stimulation of positive feedback loops. Generative 
relationships give rise to new attributions and new artifacts. This shift in 
agent-artifact space opens up new possibilities for new relationships or new 
kinds of relationships which impact the agent-artifact space. Furthermore, 
new functionalities of artifacts give rise to changing identities. These lead to 
new interpretations, which in turn create dissonance between observed facts 
and reality, and increasing ambiguity. Agents respond to this ambiguity 
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through sensemaking, and once again we have attributional shifts in agent-
artifact space as well as increasing attributional heterogeneity. 
“The window of predictability for the attributional shifts and structural changes that 
characterise complex foresight horizons are very short – and virtually non-existent outside 
the particular generative relationship for which they emerge” (p.224). 
 
Prior to the emergence of a generative relationship it is not possible to predict 
what kinds of attributions will be possible and what these will mean for agent-
attribute space. Even though agents work to create and enhance generative 
relationships there is no guarantee that such generativeness will actually occur. 
Moreover, an understanding of the attributional shifts if at all possible, will 
only be detectable within the particular relationship itself. 
Earlier, we considered how the schemata of agents change through agent 
interactions. We can now link this in with attributional shifts in agent-attribute 
space. A change in attribution is also a result of changing agent schemata. We 
may now distinguish between interactions that lead to a change in schemata 
and those that do not. In some cases, agent interactions tend to reinforce 
existing schemata. This may be considered from the point of view of single-
loop and double-loop learning. In single-loop learning, learning occurs while 
existing schemata are reinforced, while double-loop learning means a change 
in schemata, and hence in attributional shifts.  
Attributional shifts and changes in agent-artifact space may be embodied in 
artifacts, routines, practices and discourses.  
Strategy tools in the context of strategic enactment 
It will be useful to consider the relationships between strategy tools and that 
of the strategic enactment framework. The strategy literature is replete with 
tools that are deployed in strategy making. However, there is also an area of 
fuzziness in defining what a strategy tool is. For example, SWOT, the BCG 
matrix, and some of the Porterian frameworks such as the five forces analysis 
and the generic positioning matrix are all considered to be strategy tools. 
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What about scenario planning? While some consider it as a strategy tool, 
others refer to it as an approach or methodology. Some of the steps in 
scenario planning may in themselves contain strategy tools such as a SWOT 
or a TOWS analysis. Thus, the boundaries between tools, models, 
methodologies, frameworks and theories are not sharply defined but are 
rather blurred. Some authors refer to core competencies or even dynamic 
capabilities as tools whereas in their broader sense they may also be 
considered as theories.  It has been shown by Spee & Jarzabkowski (2009) 
that strategy tools are not applied instrumentally in practice, but rather are 
shaped by the socio-political process in which they are applied.  Strategy tools 
are therefore used more as heuristic devices and quite often are applied in a 
way that is quite divergent from what their authors, inventors or originators 
may have intended. In addition, they are used for conversational purposes 
rather than purely for their analytic purposes (Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2009).  
When strategy-making is considered to be episodic, then it is during those 
episodic sessions during which the strategy tools are applied, that strategy 
formulation is considered to occur. However, in the context of a theory of 
strategic enactment, strategy tools are considered to be artifacts. These then 
co-evolve and impact on the interactions between agents. Spee & 
Jarzabkowski (2009, p. 225) state that  
“[S]trategy tools thus assume the status of an artefact, 
structuring information and providing grounds for 
interaction around a common tool that is easily 
recognizable by participants in a strategy task.” 
 
They draw on the literature of boundary objects to show how strategy tools 
may be considered as boundary objects. Boundary objects are defined as  
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“[f]lexible epistemic artifacts that inhabit intersecting 
social worlds and satisfy the information requirements of 
each of them.” 
(Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2009, p. 227 citing Star and 
Griesemer, 1989, p.393)) 
 
What this brings is that strategy tools are no longer seen in isolation, but are 
rather important for how they create meaning in their actual use. Precisely 
because they are boundary objects, it means that the meanings are not 
unambiguous across participants from the different social worlds, and that 
they are applied flexibly. Therefore meaning is not necessarily embedded in 
the tool itself, but rather meaning is created in the interactions as the strategy 
tool is applied. This fits in perfectly with a theory of strategic enactment 
which is preoccupied with sensemaking and interpretation. 
Strategic enactment and other theories of strategy 
We may now proceed to consider the theory of strategic enactment in relation 
to some of the theories covered earlier in this thesis. There are close 
relationships between strategy-as-practice, strategising-organising, “strategy as 
unfinished project” and a theory of strategic enactment (Jarzabkowski, 2005; 
McKiernan & Carter, 2004; Whittington, 2004). The focus in strategy-as-
practice is on the doing of strategy, with much attention paid to situated 
activity in practice. Strategic enactment helps indicate how practices are 
related to agency, identity and interactions.  
The focus has shifted from standard forms of theorising about strategy to 
that of the doing of strategy.  Strategic enactment, like strategy-as-practice is 
consistent with the strategising and organising perspective. The strategy-as-
practice approach favours the verb form as opposed to the noun form as in 
strategising as opposed to strategy, and organising as opposed to organisation 
(Whittington & Melin, 2003). It also notes that each of the dualities elides into 
each other, and hence we may refer to strategising-organising. This gives 
further weight to the idea that organising is strategising (Achtenhagen, et al., 
2003). 
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It is at the level of activities that relate to organising, especially when these 
activities lead to a consistent pattern of actions over time that we are referring 
to strategising. In addition, since activities are being conducted in every 
practice, it means that by definition we are referring to ongoing change, 
activity is doing, and doing is change. This suggests that organising is in a 
constant state of becoming. Furthermore, activities do not occur in isolation 
but are as a result of processes of interactions between agents as highlighted 
in strategic enactment. 
Strategic enactment theory is informed by actor-network theory to the extent 
that agency is not only vested in human agents but also in objects and 
technology in the form of artifacts, and its focus on micro-activities and 
interactions. While actor-network theory accentuates the disruption of 
centrality from the human actor to the network of actors and agents, in 
strategic enactment this is not as explicit, as the focus in the latter is on the 
interactions and less on the network. The network of agents is what gives rise 
to the possibility of interactions, and the nature of the network is constantly 
shifting. Here, strategic enactment takes its inspiration more from complex 
adaptive systems than it does from actor-network theory. 
What are the relationships between strategic enactment and the resource 
based view? The RBV is a strategic choice approach and based on a realist 
ontology. The implications of strategic enactment on the RBV are that the 
VRIN attributes that are central to it, may not be as clear-cut as originally 
conceived. Some of the VRIN attributes may be interpreted to be valuable, rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable.  Furthermore, the RBV tends to assign 
more agency to actors than that of strategic enactment.  Since the Amit and 
Shoemaker framework takes into account behavioural theory and cognitive 
biases it may be able to inform a theory of strategic enactment but this is 
outside the scope of this discussion. It would appear that there is more 
alignment between the dynamic capabilities approach and strategic enactment. 
This is because of the focus on capabilities and routines. Strategic enactment 
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explains how routines and capabilities emerge through the interactions 
between agents. 
From complexity theory we may conceptualise an organisation as a complex 
adaptive system, and identify that organisations have the various 
characteristics of CAS. Based on the premises of complexity theory no single 
agent or small group of agents can stand outside of the system. This is 
embodied in the property of egalitarianism discussed in Chapter 5. It is 
therefore not possible to design and implement strategy in advance. This is a 
radical perspective of strategy and the implications are far-reaching. A 
complex adaptive systems approach offers a good theoretical basis for 
evaluating and understanding emergent approaches to strategy. An emergent 
form of strategy implies that small actions by organisational actors may 
coalesce in time into a coherent pattern of actions that becomes its strategy. 
This coalescence happens without any central intelligence organising and 
directing it. Rather, it is a form of spontaneous self-organisation that emerges 
through interactions between agents, and through everyday situated action in 
practice. The same explanation addresses even that of organisations that are 
ostensibly operating on a premise of strategic choice or learning approaches 
to strategy. In strategic choice, the organisational elite engage in strategy- 
making by way of strategy bosberaads, indabas and lekhotlas3. Participants 
may indeed be engaging in environmental analysis, examining internal 
resources, skills, and capabilities, and applying a variety of strategy tools and 
techniques. The result is articulated in some form of strategy document 
designed by the “strategists”. These are then issued to the rest of the 
organisation to implement. No doubt this is conducted in hundreds of 
organisations throughout the world on an annual or perhaps more frequent 
basis. An emergent approach to strategy as explained by strategic enactment 
does not deny that this may be happening. However, its explanation is that 
                                                 
3 These terms refer to strategy breakaway sessions usually attended by senior management of both 
government and private sector organisations in South Africa. These sessions are often conducted in a 
place of retreat away from the office. 
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the strategic designs and plans are merely artifacts that agents co-evolve with. 
It is not that they do not play any role. They play a role like any other artifact. 
They inform and may constrain practice, but they do not determine strategy 
as designed. In short, strategy may not be designed and implemented. It 
emerges even if we operate from the premise of strategic choice. If we restate 
this in the terms that are used by Mintzberg, we can say that planned 
strategies are never realised, and that therefore there can be no deliberate 
strategy. The realised strategy is always emergent strategy. Thus, strategic 
enactment is a theory that indicates how strategies emerge bottom-up through 
micro-processes of interaction and situated activity in practice, as opposed to 
that of grand strategy designed from the top. 
A theory of strategic enactment also incorporates strategic leadership that is 
consistent with complexity theory and not in contradiction with it. It was 
shown in Chapter 6 that there are very significant implications for strategic 
leadership when organisations are conceptualised as CAS. It was also shown 
that several of the leadership theories that ostensibly draw on complexity 
theory, fail to fully account for it. A theory of strategic enactment attempts to 
overcome this failure. It accounts for strategy based on an ontology of social 
constructionism and interpretation of reality. It is consistent with the notion 
of change as ontologically prior to organisation and with the ideas of 
organisations as shifting conversations through first-order and second-order 
constructed realities. Thus, leadership in strategic enactment does not focus 
on the dyadic relationship between leader and follower, but rather considers 
leadership as a systemic meta-capability. Since leaders like any other agent in 
the system do not have agency over macro-states of the system, leadership is 
much more diffuse and is distributed throughout the system. We may thus 
refer to dispersed and distributed leadership. This view of leadership supports 
that of Lichtenstein who identifies it as a complex, dynamic process that 
arises in the interactive spaces between people. Leadership is therefore an 
emergent phenomenon and an outcome of the relational processes that 
people are engaged in. Strategic enactment places much emphasis on 
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interpretation and sensemaking that have been largely neglected in the 
leadership literature.  
A theory of strategic enactment offers a number of benefits. It may serve as a 
synthesising framework that draws together the various approaches to 
strategy including strategic choice, population ecology, learning and emergent 
approaches. 
Moreover, it resolves a number of the false dichotomies that are prevalent in 
the strategy literature. These include formulation-implementation, thinking-
acting, process-content and strategic-operational. These are not distinct 
phenomena but are rather intertwined; they may not be separated out. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, we need to understand strategy not as a noun but as a 
verb. This naturally raises the question of who does strategy. This means that 
we are also concerned with what strategists do in their everyday activities. The 
idea that strategy is largely episodic or something that is done once a year say, 
is inconsistent with strategic enactment. Strategists do strategy every day. 
Since they are not in strategy workshops every day, it means that there are a 
myriad other activities conducted by strategists that also constitute strategy. 
Strategic enactment also clarifies the relationships between strategy content 
and strategy process through its support of strategy-as-practice. Strategy-as-
practice offers an integrative view of process and content. The activities that 
strategists engage in are part of strategy process. The outcomes of the strategy 
process results in the strategy content. The practice approach offers a way of 
understanding the application of strategy tools, and therefore enables a bridge 
between different schools of strategy. For example if one takes an IO view, 
and applies Porter’s 5 forces, then a practice approach sees this as the activity 
of doing strategy where the 5 forces model is considered as a strategy tool to 
assist in that process. 
From a research point of view, strategic enactment is broad enough to 
embrace many different approaches. The focus, however, will, like in strategy-
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as-practice, tend to be on situated action in practice. We shall be interested in 
the micro details of what strategists engage in as they conduct their practice. 
This naturally lends itself to thick description and close interaction with the 
unit of analysis. However, we need to ask what exactly is the unit of analysis? 
In conventional approaches to strategy, the unit of analysis is the industry (IO 
view), firm (learning, culture etc.), resources (RBV), capabilities (dynamic 
capabilities), or the collection of firms (population ecology). In the case of 
CAS it is likely to be the actors (strategists and others). In the practice 
approach, the unit of analysis tends to be the activity.  
Is strategic enactment descriptive or normative? If we pay attention to micro 
activities of situated action in practice, on interactions between actors, and the 
relationship between actors (agents) and artifacts then we may say that is 
descriptive. However, we may ask whether such rich descriptions lend 
themselves to identifying common patterns of behaviour, activities, decision 
or actions that enable us to generalise, and if so, it could mean that strategic 
enactment may also under certain circumstances be normative. This would 
off course have to be the subject of further research. 
A theory of strategic enactment may serve to fulfil the purpose of a  “wild 
card” as defined by McGahan & Mitchell (2003). Wild cards in their 
conception are concepts and ideas that are ill-fitted to existing conceptual 
frames and that serve as a bridge amongst existing theories and offer potential 
for new theories. 
Practical implications 
I now proceed to draw out the practical implications of a theory of strategic 
enactment. Given that it is premised on a theory of social constructionism, it 
implies that actors need to be more circumspect about “evidence” based 
approaches to strategy, and need to be careful of what they define as facts. 
The idea that strategy may be designed in advance does not hold true. What 
can organisations do in furthering their strategy? It requires an understanding 
 Page 203 
that the unit of analyses is not singular but plural and will involve the situated 
activity in practice. It will involve the local, specific relationships that 
potentially could lead to generative relationships. Local conversations and 
discourse may need to be attended to. We can draw on two specific practices 
of Maxfield and Lane viz. “populating the world” and “fostering generative 
relationships”. There are a variety of ways of “populating the world”. 
Episodic encounters in the form of large scale group processes (Bryson & 
Anderson, 2000) such as Appreciative Inquiry, Future Search, and Open 
Space may all be valuable in achieving the end of populating the world. 
It also means that strategy tools may be used in much more flexible ways, and 
opportunities to do so should be encouraged. The expectation of strategy to 
be documented in a strategic plan needs to be reconsidered. A theory of 
strategic enactment shows that strategic plans are merely artifacts, like all 
other kinds of artifacts – so while there is nothing inherently wrong in 
producing strategic plan documents, there ought to be caution on what they 
are considered to be. Provided that strategic plans are considered as artifacts 
and not strategy as plans or designs in the sense of strategic choice, there is 
likely to be little harm. However, the amount of resources that is expended in 
compiling and maintaining such strategic planning documents would need to 
be explored, as it could be a form of wastage and hence value-destroying as 
opposed to having strategic benefit. Another important issue that arises is 
whether strategy workshops, away-days etc. applied in conventional episodic 
strategy-making are still necessary. Again there is little harm if they are 
conceived to be inputs into a strategy making process that is inherently 
ongoing and constantly in flux. These episodic interventions are a form of 
generating discourse and artifacts around which other agents may co-evolve. 
What this means is that there is nothing inherently wrong in engaging in these 
but understanding what and what they cannot do for strategy becomes 
important. Furthermore, there is a danger that organisational actors come to 
believe that strategy happens in these episodic encounters and therefore only 
those participants are the strategists without realising the impact of the 
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broader actors and agents that ultimately contribute to the strategy that will be 
realised though a process of emergence. 
“[A]ll of social practice, and all of the organization’s 
practitioners, are inherently implicated in the emergence 
of strategy.” 
(Campbell-Hunt, 2007, p. 817) 
 
One of the central elements of strategic enactment is that of interpretation by 
agents or strategic actors. This is about how they perceive reality. Thus from 
this view we may use scenario planning as a tool for interpretation, re-
perceiving reality (Wack, 1985a), and for changing agent attributions of agent-
artifact space. It may thus also be applied as one method for “populating the 
world” as advocated by Maxfield and Lane. 
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C h a p t e r  8 - C o n c l u s i o n s  
Addressing the key research questions 
This research attempted to answer the following key questions: 
1. What are the major theoretical frameworks and conceptual models 
that frame the field of strategy? 
2. How well do these frameworks and models contribute to strategy 
under conditions of high ambiguity and uncertainty? 
3. What contributions may be made by applying complexity theory to 
the field of strategy? 
4. What are the implications of adopting an interpretive approach to 
strategy? 
5. What are the implications of strategic enactment on strategic 
leadership? 
The following section discusses the extent to which the research questions 
were addressed in this study.  
Theoretical frameworks  
We have noted in this study that strategy is still a pre-paradigmatic field and 
hence is lacking integration and synthesis. There are a variety of theoretical 
frameworks and conceptual models. These were presented and discussed in 
Chapter 2. One of the common classifications is the ten schools of strategy 
(Mintzberg, et al., 1998). It must be noted that the schools in themselves do 
not necessarily constitute theoretical frameworks or conceptual models. 
Rather, each school considers numerous theoretical frameworks, models and 
approaches to strategy. The ten schools classification may be said to be 
encyclopaedic. Given that it has been 10 years since the Mintzberg et al 
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publication, it does not cover newer developments such as strategic 
organisation, strategising-organising and strategy-as-practice. These have been 
covered in Chapter 2 of the thesis.  
Strategy under uncertainty and ambiguity 
While there is general acceptance that organisations are faced with high levels 
of ambiguity and uncertainty, the field of strategy is, with a few exceptions, 
not explicit about how strategy is to be handled under such conditions. I 
offered an alternate classification of strategy in Chapter 2, that identified 
strategic choice, population ecology, learning and emergent approaches to 
strategy. Strategic choice is not well suited for conditions of ambiguity and 
uncertainty. This is especially pronounced because of the dichotomy between 
thinking and acting, and planning and implementation in strategic choice. In 
addition, given that the strategic actors are restricted to a limited number of 
people, it is difficult for such actors to handle the overwhelming complexity 
in which their organisations find themselves. The evaluation of population 
ecology against environmental uncertainty and turbulence is trickier. On the 
one hand, since the key driving force is considered to be the environment, 
one point of view is that it handles uncertainty extremely well. The 
organisation is subject to the vagaries of the environment, and as the rate of 
change increases the organisation has to adapt accordingly. However, the 
counterpoint to this is that strategic actors have no agency, and therefore are 
unable to deal with environmental turbulence.  A third approach to the issue 
is that since the unit of analysis is the entire population of organisations, those 
that are unable to adapt to the higher levels of complexity and uncertainty, 
will simply be selected out. From this point of view, the population ecology 
approach merely confirms the impact of ambiguity and uncertainty but offers 
us nothing on how to deal with it. The learning approach to strategy is well 
suited to uncertainty and ambiguity, as the major thrust of this approach is to 
specifically deal with it through learning, and hence enabling the organisation 
to be more responsive to environmental turbulence. A theory of strategic 
enactment is an explanation of an emergent approach to strategy which is 
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very appropriate under conditions of uncertainty and turbulence, as this is a 
bottom-up approach that co-evolves with the environment.  
Contributions from complexity theory 
Sensitive dependence on initial conditions indicates that it is not possible to 
engage in long term forecasting. The property of egalitarianism shows that 
neither a single powerful individual such as a CEO or strategic planner nor a 
small group such as a strategic management team is able to stand outside the 
system understand the environment and the organisation and thereafter 
formulate and implement strategic plans.  Organisational outcomes and 
macro-states of the system are not as a result of deliberate strategic planning 
and design by the organisational elite, but rather emerge from system and 
agent interactions as defined in complex adaptive systems. Order may not be 
imposed from outside the system in the form of deliberate strategy, but rather 
order is a consequence of self-organising processes. Furthermore, complexity 
theory shows us that the competitive environment is not fixed but is 
constantly shifting in the form of a fitness landscape. Complex adaptive 
systems are considered to be far-from-equilibrium systems, while much of the 
strategy field is based on an underlying assumption of equilibrium and 
homeostasis. It is therefore clear from the foregoing that the major 
contribution from complexity theory is that it calls into serious question the 
prescriptions from the dominant strategic choice approaches, and heralds the 
way for an alternative approach to engaging in strategy. 
It was shown earlier in this thesis how complexity theory may be able to 
enrich our understanding of strategy. This was further embodied in the 
strategic enactment approach by combining it with social constructionism. 
Strategic enactment is a perspective that dissolves some of the false 
dichotomies in the field of strategy as discussed below: 
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Organisation and Environments. 
If the world is socially constructed then there is no distinct organisation and 
environment with a fixed boundary. What is this thing called an organisation? 
Heil (2003) and Heil, Maxwell, & Whittaker (2003) ask a similar question, 
albeit it in a somewhat different context, and for a different purpose towards 
that which is intended here. An organisation is not single and distinct but 
rather multiple, fluid, temporal and transient, depending on our issue, context 
and point of view at a particular point in time. While there is material reality in 
the form of plant, technology, products, raw materials and people, we 
construct a social reality that draws relationships between them to identify 
managers, customers, the competition and strategies (Smirchich & Stubbart, 
1985). How we make meaning of the world and construct our social reality 
determines what the environment is. We actively make our environments and 
then react to that environment that we have reified. 
Formulation and implementation 
The separation of strategy formulation and implementation is one of the false 
dichotomies that continue to bind strategy into a straight-jacket that it is 
struggling to break free from. This is a remnant of strategic choice. It is based 
on omniscient actors who may stand outside of a system and objectively 
understand the environment. They then design and formulate strategy which 
has to be implemented. Off course, these all powerful, omniscient actors do 
not implement it themselves – but rather this becomes the responsibility of 
the “plebeians” in the organisation. This is a separation of thinking and doing, 
which translates to a separation between thinkers (strategists) and doers 
(implementers) (Mintzberg, et al., 1998). How often do we hear the refrain 
that the failure was not that of the strategy but that of implementation? 
Thinking and action may not be separated. Thinking is action (Bodhanya, 
2005). As human beings, we are engaging in sensemaking in every instant and 
hence actively constructing and reacting to the world that we create 
(Bodhanya, 2008). It is through sensemaking that we construct categories that 
we then work with. These are the categories such as industry, markets, 
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products, customers, strengths, weaknesses etc. These are precisely the same 
type of categories that the questions in Table 1 in Chapter 2 refer to.   
Strategy, Operations and Tactics 
When we make strict distinctions between categories and reify them then we 
separate out strategy, operations and tactics. In this way we deem that lower 
level workers and practitioners work with tactics, middle level managers focus 
on operations and higher professional and managerial elites must be pre-
occupied with strategy. This becomes part of the dominant organisational 
discourse and we treat these as if they are real, objective and fixed facts. When 
the professional elite or senior manager is engaging in situated action in 
practice we deem that as strategic, while a lower level person engaging in 
situated action in practice we deem as tactical. Firstly, sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions from chaos theory already shows why treating such a 
distinction between strategy, operations and tactics as fixed reality is 
problematic.  Secondly, we have seen how complex adaptive systems are 
subject to non-linear amplification and attenuation of fluctuations in the form 
of dissipative structures that result in self-organisation of macro-states. 
Therefore, the situated action of the lower level person is no different to that 
of the situated action of the professional elite. Thirdly, there are feedback 
loops between actions of agents that interact within the organisation, which 
coalesce into a coherent stream of actions over time that becomes the 
strategy. In that way, the lower level agent may contribute to the strategy that 
eventually emerges, in the same way that the professional elite does. 
A strategic enactment perspective also extends the notion of co-evolution that 
we draw from complexity theory. We know that there is co-evolution at a 
micro-level between agents, and at a macro-level with the environment. 
Given that reality is socially constructed, we may then speak of not just co-
evolution but rather co-creation both at the micro and the macro-level. 
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Strategic enactment – an interpretive approach to strategy 
It is of significance that the Mintzberg et al. classification pays very little 
attention to epistemological and ontological considerations. Indeed, strategy 
as a discipline tends to be philosophically unreflexive. In relation to the 
ontological aspects of strategy, most of the approaches to strategy, especially 
those that fall under strategic choice are based on an objectivist ontology. 
Therefore, despite the early signal by Smirchich and Stubbart (1985) of the 
profound implications of adopting an interpretive approach, there has been a 
dearth of work on it in the strategy literature. This study begins to remedy 
that. 
Strategic enactment is a theory of strategy based on an ontology of social 
constructionism, and draws on the lessons of complexity theory to indicate 
the dynamic nature of organising. Organisations are considered to be complex 
adaptive systems, and in contradistinction to other strategic approaches, it is 
not equilibrium-seeking. This theory indicates that change is ontologically 
prior to organisation. It draws on a number of strands of theory including 
strategy-as-practice, strategy as unfinished project, actor network theory and 
complexity theory. Strategic enactment places attention on concepts that are 
not normally given focus in the strategy literature. This includes identity and 
agency, and shows how agency and identity are linked, and how they give rise 
to organisational identity embodied in the organisational lifestory. If we tie 
this back to complexity theory, then we may state that the schemata of the 
agents are able to encode the environment, and the important features of the 
environment also become embedded in the organisational lifestory. 
It was shown in Chapter 6 that when organisations are understood as 
complex adaptive systems, the implications for leadership are very significant. 
Numerous authors that attempt to frame complexity leadership theories, do 
not address the full ramifications of the positions that have they taken. They 
end up resorting to leadership as tags. It was demonstrated in Chapter 6 that 
this is problematic as it leads to many contradictions and logical 
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inconsistencies. A theory of strategic enactment presents an alternate 
conception of leadership from that of conventional theories of leadership 
discussed, yet is still in consonance with complex adaptive systems. Instead of 
a preoccupation with dyadic relationships between leader and followers, 
strategic enactment considers leadership as a strategic meta-capability. 
Contributions of the study 
The thesis has made a variety of incremental contributions in each of the 
chapters. Chapter 2 provided diverse and broad coverage of the literature. In 
addition to the historical trajectory of the field and the classifications usually 
discussed in the literature, it extended the discussion to include strategy-as-
practice, strategising-organising, strategy as unfinished project, actor-network 
theory and strategy as serious play. While these topics and their underlying 
concepts have been explored elsewhere they have not been interrogated, 
combined and integrated before.  
The same applies to Chapter 3. While the relationships between resource 
based view and the dynamic capabilities approach is relatively well known, 
this thesis also presented a critical analysis of the relationships between 
strategy and system dynamics. With the exception of Kim Warren, the field of 
system dynamics is relatively unknown by strategy scholars. Again, while the 
nature of asset-stock accumulations (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) serves as a 
platform for the resource based view, its relationship with strategy remains 
unexplored, in the main, by strategy scholars. The same applies to the 
characteristics of the asset-stock formulation and the natural relationship of 
this approach with system dynamics.  
Given that scenario planning originated from practice, and the innovations in 
the approach continues to emerge from the world of practice it has been 
criticised for lacking theoretical support and justification. The contribution of 
Chapter 4 has been an attempt to address this shortcoming.  In addition to 
exploring the relationship of scenario planning with other approaches such as 
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decision-making, contingency planning and risk analysis, as well as cognitive 
psychology and behavioural theory, it was shown that scenario planning may 
be considered as an interpretive systems methodology that complies with 
Jackson’s constitutive rules for a generic interpretive systems methodology 
(Jackson, 2000). An argument was presented that scenarios are a form of 
modelling that may be evaluated alongside other kinds of modelling such as 
mathematical modelling, formal modelling and system dynamics modelling. 
All of these are novel contributions.  
A further contribution was the formulation of a proposed scenario approach 
termed Futurescope, as presented in detail in Appendix 1. It is meant to be 
readily applied by practitioners who wish to benefit from scenario work in 
engaging in strategy under complexity and uncertainty.  While I do not make 
any special claims for Futurescope, I engage in a detailed discussion of how it 
relates to other approaches to scenario work. 
Additional contributions were made in Chapter 5 in investigating complexity 
theory in the social sciences and organisations as complex adaptive systems. 
While some of the characteristics of CAS are well established in the literature, 
the property of egalitarianism was developed and accentuated, as this has 
significant implication on agency. Furthermore, I presented an argument that 
artifacts may be considered as agents. This is not generally covered in the 
complexity theory literature. I also showed that this has some resonance with 
actor-network theory.  The chapter discussed the philosophical underpinnings 
of emergence which are generally neglected in organisational theory. Since 
complexity theory is usually applied to social systems in a metaphorical way, I 
felt that it was necessary to interrogate the role of metaphor in theory 
construction and science. A model of metaphor in theory construction was 
presented based on existing literature.  
While the topics covered here have been discussed elsewhere, they have not 
been integrated as they have in this study, and it is rare to find this type of 
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discussion in the field of organisation theory and strategy.  Despite the more 
frequent application of CAS as metaphor, I developed the position that social 
systems are indeed CAS, and one does not have to resort to metaphor alone. I 
have shown how CAS may be considered a tool for organisational ontology 
and therefore one of the key philosophical insights of the chapter was that of 
an ontology where physical and social reality interpenetrate in an intertwined 
single reality, which in itself is open, emergent, mediated contextually and has 
the potential for transformation. I elaborated the model of strategic choice, 
chance and determinism of De Rond & Thietart (2007) in the light of CAS.  
Given that much of the strategy literature assumes that the key actors in 
strategy-making are in leadership positions, the field of strategy is closely 
related to that of leadership. The former assumption is critically analysed and 
contested in Chapter 6. A significant finding is that all agents are implicated in 
strategy and not only those who happen to hold positions of formal 
leadership in organisation. While it was shown that complexity theory poses 
significant challenges to conventional theories of leadership, I attempted to 
demonstrate how even authors whose point of departure is complexity theory 
and who have begun to frame a new “complexity leadership theory” tend to 
fall into the trap of reverting to conventional positions that are contradictory 
with logical inconsistencies. This is sometimes as a result of their relying on 
one or two characteristics of CAS at the exclusion of others. One important 
contribution of the chapter was therefore the lesson that all of the 
characteristics of CAS have to be taken into account, singly and together as a 
whole, if progress is to be made in advancing leadership theory in the context 
of organisations as CAS. 
The final contribution of this study is a tentative theory of strategic 
enactment. It is unique in that it integrates complex adaptive systems with an 
interpretive approach to organisational strategy. As was shown in the study, 
the dominant approaches to strategy are based on an objectivist ontology. 
Furthermore, I have not found evidence of previous work that integrates 
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CAS with an interpretive stance. Strategic enactment draws on and is 
therefore consistent with strategy-as-practice, strategising-organising, strategy 
as unfinished project and actor-network theory. The relationship of strategic 
enactment with that of other theories of strategy is addressed. It contests 
existing explanations of organisational phenomena made by strategic choice 
perspectives, and provides alternate explanations for them. It highlights 
important concepts such as agency, identity and organisational lifestory and 
the relationships between them in relation to strategy. These are generally 
neglected in the literature. Finally, some of the practical implications of 
strategic enactment are considered. 
Limitations of the study 
Since this study is a theoretical one there is not yet a firm empirical basis for 
the findings.  In order to address this, further research will be required. An 
appropriate research design will have to be constructed to test the theoretical 
propositions underpinning a theory of strategic enactment, which were 
developed in this research.  
While the study has considered the practical implications and provided some 
direction on concrete tools for application in strategy-making, much further 
work will need to be done. This is not a limitation of strategic enactment as 
such, but rather a challenge for any work that adopts an interpretive stance 
based on an ontology of social constructionism. It is not a straight-forward 
matter to provide normative prescriptions when the world and social reality is 
complex, ambiguous, turbulent and constantly in flux. 
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Conclusion 
This study has shown that the strategy field is diverse and fragmented. It is 
philosophically unreflexive and not self critical; shortcomings that this thesis 
has tried to address. It is not possible to identify a canonical set of rules or 
laws for strategy. It has even been suggested that the field is pre-paradigmatic. 
Researchers therefore have two main roads they can follow. They may adopt 
one perspective and work within the confines of that perspective. The second 
road, which this study has attempted to follow, was a more tortuous one. It 
meant going into the depths and details, the cliffs and ravines of the field to 
try and establish a sense of order. When one emerges from that journey one 
finds that such an order is not readily manifested. Some of the reasons for 
this are that unlike a base discipline such as economics or psychology, the 
field of strategy draws from a number of such base disciplines from both the 
physical and the social sciences. The best one can achieve is to highlight some 
of the key themes and attempt to order the field into a limited number of 
constructs and the relationships between them. The question is how does one 
do this? What variables or dimensions should one use? What are the criteria 
that must be applied to engage in this ordering mechanism? This study was 
based on an exploration of the field of strategy by taking a number of 
diversions outside the literature sets normally associated with strategy and the 
resulting work was, hence, eclectic out of necessity. It has proposed one 
ordering mechanism in the form of strategic enactment.  
The following may be identified as key findings of this study: 
 
• Strategy is still a pre-paradigmatic field and hence its theoretical 
underpinnings are of necessity eclectic. 
• While strategic choice is the dominant approach, many of its tenets 
are contested, especially when organisations are considered as 
complex adaptive systems. 
• Deliberate strategy is not possible as all forms of strategy are 
ultimately emergent. 
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• Agency is an important construct in strategy. Agency does not reside 
in the key power brokers alone, but extends to all organisational 
actors and their structural networks of relations. Agency is also 
invested in non-human actors in the form of artifacts. 
• Agency is limited to micro-level actions and does not embrace macros 
states of the system. 
• Identity is an important construct in strategy. The identity of agents is 
shaped in their interactions with other agents. Who they are impact 
on what they can and cannot do, and also impact who they construct 
themselves to be. In this sense there is a strong link between agency 
and identity. 
• Identity is also shaped in situated activity in practice and therefore 
strategy-as-practice is important. 
• Strategic enactment presents alternate explanations for the utility of 
strategy tools and strategic plans from strategic choice. 
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A p p e n d i x 1  
FUTURESCOPE 
In Chapter 4, I considered scenario-based strategy. In this Appendix, I 
describe the Futurescope process as one approach to engage in scenario work. I 
also discuss how it relates to other approaches to scenario planning.  The 
process described here is meant to be readily applied by practitioners who 
wish to benefit from scenario work in dealing and working with complexity 
and uncertainty. Figure A1.1 is a high level depiction of Futurescope. For ease 
of presentation, only the major steps are shown in the diagram. The figure 
does not reflect the iterative nature of the process. Furthermore, 
underpinning the entire process is research and immersion in the research 
data in order to detect patterns and new insights about the environment.  
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Figure A1.1 Futurescope 
 
Entry and project scoping 
Although scenario planning has been applied for many years, it is still 
relatively unfamiliar to many executives, managers, professionals and other 
practitioners. It is therefore important that there is appropriate upfront 
discussion with the client group on what it is, the opportunities and 
challenges, the costs and benefits, timeframes, nature of processes that will be 
involved, and what the outcomes are likely to be. It is useful to have a short 
framing document about scenario planning that may be discussed with and 
given to the client. This should be supported by a short presentation. It is 
particularly important to clarify to the client upfront that scenarios are not 
Entry and Project Scoping
Identify “System under Scrutiny” Determine Horizon Year 








 & validation 
Implementation 
Embedding the capability 
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about prediction, forecasting or optimisation, but about learning and 
preparedness for alternative futures. 
One needs to ensure that there is some level of organisational readiness for 
scenario work. If the client group and the organisational power brokers have 
a dominant paradigm of a future based on a single line forecast and are 
unwilling to entertain different possibilities then scenarios may not be 
appropriate for such an organisation. There is a caveat. Most organisations do 
have a dominant paradigm which results in an “official future”. This, in itself, 
does not render scenarios inappropriate. Sometimes it is important to 
demonstrate through scenario practice how such “official futures” may be 
logically inconsistent or implausible given the trends and uncertainties. The 
major criterion on whether scenario practice is appropriate for an 
organisation is the extent to which the official future is embedded, the 
readiness to question that official future and to entertain other possibilities. 
The nature of the project needs to be clarified and understood upfront, 
especially in relation to how the scenarios are to be used. Scenario work is 
used to help organisations work with complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty. 
A key question that must always be considered is what the scenarios are to be 
used for. We have to specify the purpose of undertaking scenario work. The 
following identifies some possibilities: 
• General understanding of driving forces and possible futures. 
• Decision making in relation to a key decision(s) that has to be 
made in the face of uncertainty. For example, market entry of a 
multinational company into a new country or some large 
investment decision. 
• Strategy making. 
• Organisational learning. 
• Policy formulation. 
 
Once the project scope and framing is clear, the project timing and activities 
have to be spelt out. This is project specific and is related to the magnitude of 
the project. Scenario projects can range from a one-day workshop leading to 
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ongoing actions, to work conducted over a period of several months. This 
depends on the nature, magnitude, and scope of the project. The timeframes, 
activities and workshops for a typical project intended for strategy making 
purposes is depicted in Figure A1.2 below. 
 
 
Figure A1.2 Typical scenario activities and timelines 
 
The facilitator needs to prepare the team beforehand about the requisite 
mindset, attitude and predisposition for effective of scenario practice. The 
following is a useful list to share and discuss with the team up front.  
• Inter-disciplinary 
• Suspend disbelief 
• “Think the unthinkable” 
• Let intuitions flow freely 
• Tolerate ambiguity 
• Open to surprises  
• Tolerate overload (cognitive and overwhelming amount of 
data) 
• Soft data may be more useful than hard data 
 
Research and data collection 
It is imperative that we engage in a rigorous research and data collection 
process if we wish to construct high quality scenarios. Ultimately, scenarios 
draw on real world data and imaginative possibilities by discerning patterns in 
the data. There are many data collection methods that may be applied. 
Project scoping and data 
collection 
Introduction, Identify 
“System under Scrutiny”, 
Horizon year, Trends, 
Issues, Events, Forces 
Research and task groups Trends, Issues, Events, 
Forces. Development of 
building blocks, scenario 
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validation 
Communication of 
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Examples include interviews, focus groups, participant observation, surveys 
and interactive data gathering workshops. Data may also be drawn from 
existing secondary research available in the form of reports, market and 
customer intelligence, newspaper cuttings, scientific articles, country and 
demographic information and any other relevant information. Initially the 
project scope and purpose, and later the key focus question and the “system 
under scrutiny” together with the horizon year will help define what types of 
research and information will be required.  
System under scrutiny 
In order to identify the system under scrutiny, we identify a key focus 
question. The key focus question and the selection of the horizon year go 
hand in hand. The determination of the key focus question influences the 
selection of the horizon year and vice versa. It serves as a boundary setting 
mechanism. It determines the scope of our scenarios in terms of identifying 
what is relevant and what is not. It acts as a filtering mechanism. There are an 
infinite number of cues and signals in the environment. The key focus 
question determines which ones we pay attention to and which ones we 
ignore. Alternatively, the key focus question is linked to a decision.  We 
engage in scenarios to help us with important decisions that need to be made. 
The key focus question therefore ensures that the entire scenario effort is 
geared towards such decisions. 
The following diagram is referred to as a systems holon and indicates that the 
system under scrutiny is made up of sub-systems and is itself embedded in a 
supra-system which we refer to as the environment. We may draw further 
boundaries that make a distinction between the transactional environment 
and the contextual environment. 
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Figure A1.3 Systems holon and the system under scrutiny 
 
The raw material of scenarios is events, trends, cues or signals from the 
external environment.  In principle, there are an infinite number of such 
forces and trends. The key focus question is the arbiter of which of these we 
consider significant. For example, if our key focus question is related to new 
customer parts in the automotive sector in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), it is unlikely that geopolitical forces 
related to oil in the Caspian Sea will be relevant. This is an extreme example, 
but it serves to illustrate the point. The key focus question also serves to 
determine the granularity of information that we shall use. I like to think of 
this as a fish-net with different net sizes. If the size of the holes in the net is 
very small we are looking for fine granularity, whereas larger size holes imply 
much coarser granularity. The key focus question is subtle in the sense that it 
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significance to the system under scrutiny. It is also important to realise that 
the definition of the key focus question is an interactive process done in an 
artistic way rather than in a mechanical way. By that I mean that there is not 
necessarily a right or a wrong key focus question, but rather one that is more 
relevant given the decision context, and the defined system under scrutiny. 
Horizon year 
As already noted, this is done in conjunction with the key focus question. The 
horizon year represents the end year of your future history. As such the 
scenarios will describe a trajectory from time now, tnow, to the horizon year, th. 
The selection of the horizon year will differ according to context, application 
and need. The horizon year will probably be at least 5 years into the future, if 
we wish to get the most benefit from the scenario process. The reason for 
this is quite simple. Scenarios help us deal with uncertainty. The shorter the 
duration to the horizon year, the more predictable is the likely future. The 
higher the predictability, the lower is the benefit from scenario planning, and 
the higher the benefit from conventional approaches such as single point 
forecasting. The 5 years is merely a guideline. There will be exceptions, say for 
example, if we are working in a sector that is characterised by higher levels of 
change. This would be applicable in some high tech sectors such as ICT. It 
would also apply in the case of high conflict zones, for example, Iraq or 
Zimbabwe. 
Sensemaking and data consolidation 
At the start of the workshop process there will already be extensive data 
available from the research and information gathering. There is therefore a 
need to engage in collective sensemaking and consolidation of such data by 
the scenario team. The following tools are useful for such a purpose. The 
Rich Picture is an integral part of soft systems methodology (SSM) 
(Checkland & Scholes, 1999), that is applied during the situation awareness 
phase. It may be detached from SSM and used in a stand-alone mode as a 
sensemaking device in its own right. The facilitator will ask the group to 
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construct a Rich Picture based on the data that is available. The participants 
are informed that the Rich Picture is a diagram that captures key elements of 
the situation and the relationships between those elements. It is a cartoon like 
picture using symbols, icons, speech-bubbles together with keywords, labels, 
captions and phrases. It includes static elements such as people (actors), 
buildings, machinery, institutions, policies as well as activities and dynamic 
processes embedded in the form of relationships between the various 
elements. Conflicts, disagreements and controversies are highlighted in the 
Rich Picture. Participants are advised to take the key focus question into 
account in developing the Rich Picture.   
Once the Rich Picture is constructed, participants are then asked to convert 
this into a Rich Narrative that describes the Rich Picture. The Rich Picture 
and the Rich Narrative are then iteratively extended. The Rich Picture and 
associated Rich Narrative together constitute shared conceptual 
understanding and consolidation of the major issues that are important in 
relation to the system under scrutiny. It offers a platform around which 
further data including events, issues, trends and uncertainties may be elicited 
in a workshop setting. In some cases it may be useful to include a short data 
generation phase immediately after the key focus question has been defined. 
This may be done by breaking the participants up into a number of small 
teams and to run one-on-one interviews between team members and, or small 
focus groups. The facilitator will have to frame a short set of questions to 
assign to the various sub-teams, in relation to the scope of the project and the 
key focus question. This is a very efficient form of data gathering, especially 
when the timeframes do not allow a more extensive data collection prior to 
the first workshop, or when key information is required from busy executives. 
In such cases the Rich Picture and Rich Narrative helps bring the various 
disparate data from the various teams together in a coherent way. 
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Environmental analysis 
Since scenarios are focused on how the world will evolve, an important 
element of the process is to scan and analyse the external environment. There 
are many approaches and tools for environmental scanning and analysis. A 
common approach is the PESTEL analysis. PESTEL is a mnemonic or 
acronym as shown below: 
P – Political Developments 
E – Environmental Developments 
S – Societal Developments 
T- Technological Developments 
E – Economic Developments 
L – Legislative Developments 
 
The term, development, is meant to give a sense of trajectory, or change over 
time, as opposed to a single event. You may notice that I have used the plural 
notation, developments. The reason is that ideally we want to be able to 
identify trends, issues, signals and forces under each of the categories. This 
does not preclude events, but our emphasis should shift towards identifying 
and understanding patterns and trends. It is also important to note that some 
categories will generate more data than others. This will depend on the key 
focus question. Our scope must determine which categories hold more 
weight than others. We should still stretch our thinking as much as possible, 
to consider all of the categories.  
The facilitator leads the scenario team to generate the forces and trends in a 
structured way.  Members of the team write down statements on cards or 
Post-it notes. The format should be full statements, as opposed to merely 
phrases, dimensions or factors. A useful approach is for the facilitator to ask 
the team members to write down statements under each of the PESTEL 
categories in sequence. Since the team members are doing this individually, 
there may be similar statements or duplicate statements. This ought not to 
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matter at this stage. The duplicates will be handled later in the data treatment 
stage. 
Once the PESTEL statements have been completed, the facilitator extends 
the stage of writing of statements by adding new categories or finer details of 
sub-categories of the PESTEL. For example, additional categories may 
include customer or citizen demographics, health issues such as HIV/AIDs, 
and educational developments. The facilitator pays particular attention to the 
key focus question in generating new categories. Experience shows that while 
team members readily generate statements easily at the start of the exercise 
they quickly find themselves overwhelmed and diminishing returns set in 
quite early. The facilitator has to be sensitive to this and find ways to motivate 
team members to continue writing statements. One way to do this is to set a 
high enough target but not one that is unrealistic. For example, it will be 
relatively easy for a team of 10 people to generate 200 statements in about 
half of an hour. A quick calculation shows that this requires an average of 2 
statements per individual for each of the PESTEL and four additional 
categories. The upper limit is probably about 300 statements in total. It is very 
important to note that there are usually diminishing returns in both the 
quantity and quality of the statements. The facilitator must therefore pay 
particular attention to the quality of the statements, offer assistance in 
improving them, making suggestions, probing what the team members wish 
to articulate and help formulate the statements. This has to be done in a firm 
but gentle and non-condescending way. The facilitator will draw the team’s 
attention to the interview transcripts, rich pictures and the rich narrative as an 
additional source of data for generating statements. 
The cards or Post-it notes are pasted on the board in full view of the teams as 
the participants are generating the statements. The visual display of the 
statements as they are generated, acts as a stimulus for team members to 
generate new data, by linking what they see with their own knowledge, 
experience and mental models. Since the team is inter-disciplinary, one 
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statement by a team member generates new insights by other team members 
who have different perspectives and knowledge bases. 
Once the full data-set has been generated the team is required to do a quality 
check on the data. This is a matter of first checking that the format of 
statements are correct, that there are no cards with just single words or 
factors, eliminating duplicates or separating duplicates into their own 
statements if the intent was different.  
When the team is made up of external researchers together with 
organisational team members it may be useful to have them use different 
coloured pens, as this will enable a meta-level analysis later. This has to be 
done with caution as there is the danger that this could lead to splitting of 
sub-groups in a dysfunctional way and could lead to game playing and other 
forms of destructive group behaviour. 
Scenario building blocks 
At this stage we will have a full set of data about the external environment. 
There is far too much data to be readily converted into scenarios. There are a 
variety of data treatment methods. The application of intuitive clustering is an 
effective approach. The purpose of this is pattern detection and pattern 
making. This technique is based on the affinity diagramming process. It 
requires large amounts of free wall space. The process begins with the 
facilitator inviting one participant to take a handful of statements and 
randomly assigning them to different parts of the wall space. The next 
participant will then take a few more statements and paste them based on 
whether there is a relationship between the statements already up on the wall. 
If there is a relationship then the new statement will be placed in close 
proximity to the one already on the wall. If there is no relationship a new 
group will be established. The facilitator then invites the rest of the team to 
proceed in this way, and clusters of statements will begin to form. Team 
members are free to move a statement if they disagree with its placing and to 
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place it in another cluster. This usually causes some consternation among 
team members as a statement may be moved from one cluster and then 
returned to its original cluster. This should not be a cause for concern, as it 
soon settles down into appropriate patterns of data.  At the start of the 
process the team members work silently without any discussion. After about 
10 or 15 minutes once some clusters start emerging the facilitator invites 
participants to engage in discussion if they wish, as they assign the statements 
to different clusters. During the process, the team is free to generate new 
statements as necessary. If this is done they should use different coloured 
pens or cards to enable a meta-analysis to be done later.  
Under certain circumstances the facilitator may allow the team to discard an 
existing statement from the clusters, but the statement should not be 
completely destroyed. This will also be useful in the event that a meta-analysis 
of the process is done. This form of pattern detection or pattern construction 
is an art and not a science. As such there are no hard and fast rules, but a 
useful guideline is to end up with between 9 and 13 clusters. The size of 
clusters does not need to be the same, but if a cluster is too big it may make 
sense to split it into smaller clusters. Similarly, if some clusters are too small 
they may be reduced into existing clusters or combined into a bigger cluster. 
Driving forces 
We now proceed to identify the driving forces in the external environment. 
We shall identify a driving force for each of the clusters. For the purposes 
here we may define a driving force as a variable that represents high 
explanatory power of the underlying data. There is an underlying logic that 
ties the data together in each cluster. This logic is often implicit as it was 
based on the relationships that were discerned by different members of the 
team, and although there was discussion, it is unlikely that there will be a 
shared understanding of the logic of the whole cluster. The task now facing 
the team is to ensure that this logic is explicit and shared amongst members 
of the team. The facilitator will ask the team to treat each cluster of data in 
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turn. The participants are to engage in discussion to try and identify the 
relationships amongst the data within the cluster. This is now a matter of 
understanding the pattern of relationships in the data for a given cluster. 
Once again, there is no restriction in generating new data or moving some 
data between clusters to fit better with the overall logic. Similar to defining 
headers in an affinity diagram, participants are asked to label each cluster by 
identifying the driving force.  The driving force must be framed as a variable, 
with polar values. The implication of framing it as a variable is that it can have 
different values. The notion of polar values is to capture extremes, which 
means that we are able to cover the full envelop of uncertainty (Ralston & 
Wilson, 2006) when addressing the whole set of driving forces. Examples of 
polar values are High-Low, Positive-Negative, Stable-Unstable, Cohesive-
Fragmented, and Implicit-Explicit. 
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The driving forces together with their polar values are summarised in a 
Driving Forces table as illustrated below. 
Driving Forces Values 
1. Service Capacity Provision Inadequate Adequate 
2. Taxes High Low 
3. Supply of water Inadequate Adequate 
4. Community Management of HIV/AIDS High Impact Low Impact 
5. Stakeholder perceptions Negative Positive 
6. Local Government Leadership Ineffective Effective 
7. Technical Skills Unskilled Skilled 
8. Level of entrepreneurial Skills Low High 
9. Land use management Ineffective Effective 
Table A1.1 Driving Forces Table 
 
Axes of Uncertainty 
Now that we have the driving forces, we proceed to rank them using the Axes 
of Uncertainty.  Each of the driving forces is written up on Post-it notes or 
cards. The facilitator draws up the set of axes on a whiteboard or flipchart. 
The participants are asked to rank the driving forces as follows. They are 
asked to assess the driving force firstly in relation to the impact it has on the 
key focus question, and then in terms of how unpredictable the driving force 
is. Once the first driving force has been placed on the board, the next one is 
taken and is ranked in relation to the first one on the board in terms of its 
relative impact and uncertainty. It is important to note that this is a relative 
ranking and not absolute ranking. There are no absolute values on each of the 
axes on the Axes of Uncertainty. 
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Figure A1.4 Axes of Uncertainty populated with Driving Forces 
 
Once the driving forces have been arraigned on the Axes of Uncertainty the 
team needs to select the two driving forces with the highest impact and 
uncertainty. The way that this is done is to redraw the axes such that a smaller 
subset of driving forces is in the High Impact-High Uncertainty quadrant.  
The team then engages in a discussion to select the two driving forces. There 
are a number of important considerations here. Firstly, the driving forces that 
are selected must be orthogonal (van der Heijden, 1996). By this it is meant 
that they should be mutually exclusive and have no correlation. If the driving 
forces selected are not orthogonal, we are effectively reducing the uncertainty 
to a single dimension. Secondly, the selection of the driving forces should not 
be done mechanistically. It needs to be done in the context of the key focus 
question and there should be licence to select a driving force that is not 
necessarily the highest ranked.  
Scenario logics and matrix 
By crossing the two driving forces selected in the last step, we automatically 
generate the scenario logics and matrix. Each of the quadrants in the matrix 
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matrix by crossing two driving forces, Stakeholder Perceptions and Land Use 
Management. 
 
Figure A1.5 Scenario Logics and Matrix 
 
Scenario plots 
We have now got the boundaries of four distinct futures, the extremes of 
which represent the envelope of uncertainty. In this step we apply systems 
thinking tools to help articulate the plots and development of the trajectory of 
each of the scenarios. 
The team is broken up into four groups each of which will work with one of 
the scenarios. The task is to identify a handful of important variables and the 
cause-effect relationships between them for each quadrant. The two driving 
forces from the Scenarios Logics and Matrix will automatically be two of the 
variables in the set. The identification of additional variables will be based on 
the other driving forces as well as studying the underlying data in each of the 
data clusters constructed earlier in the process. The team will hypothesise the 
behaviour over time (BOT) of each of the important variables until the 
Positive 
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horizon year. This is illustrated for a few variables in Figure A1.6 below. It is 
important to begin the BOT graphs with the time axes beginning at some 
time in the past, which represents historical data that is known. 
  
 
Figure A1.6 Behaviour over Time Graphs for Key Variables and Drivers 
 
The team will then proceed to develop the causal structure between variables 
that give rise to the BOT graphs. It is important to note that this is an 
iterative process, where the teams will alternate between the BOT graphs and 
the cause-effect diagrams. An example of a cause-effect diagram is given in 














































Figure A1.7 Cause–Effect Diagram 
 
When the exercise is complete the team will have generated a skeleton of the 
main plot merely by “reading” the cause-effect diagram. This is illustrated in 













Box A1.1 Skeletal Plot from reading the Cause-Effect Diagram 
Global environmental awareness leads to an increased level of activism and increasing power of 
global, national and local stakeholders. This is compounded by increasing in-migration, population 
growth that increases pressure on the natural resources, which in turn fuels the levels of 
environmental activism. The population growth leads to higher levels of unemployment and hence 
community survival in the surrounding areas are put at risk. This contributes to high levels of crime 
and social unrest. The costs of doing business increases as a result of crime, increased security 
requirements, hijackings and general social  fragmentation in the local area. Business has less 
discretionary spending available putting pressure on training and development as well as social 
responsibility spending, which exacerbates the already poor community relations. This results in a 
vicious cycle with further social unrest.  As community survival is at risk, pressure is brought to bear 
on government for alleviation and demands for royalties, compensation and equity participation in 
business. There is also pressure for land distribution, shifting of mining rights and new community 
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Although it is possible to generate the scenario narratives without engaging in 
this step, there are a number of benefits of doing it. It adds rigour by 
automatically building in internal consistency through the cause-effect 
relationships, helps stay rooted to the underlying data, and prevents the 
development of scenarios that are “fairy tales.” It is therefore a crucial step in 
ensuring that the scenarios are credible for the clients. 
Scenario narratives 
We may now proceed to generating the scenario narratives. The benefit of 
narrative is that it enables drawing in disparate sets of complex data in a 
coherent way and offers a framework for judgment. It enables us to 
incorporate non-linear relationships between variables in a system without the 
need to formulate complex mathematic equations, which in themselves would 
be intractable and unsolvable.  
The scenario team will construct a narrative offering a rich description and 
explanation of how the world has evolved from time now to the horizon year 
for a given future. It enables the reader to understand the trajectory of how 
the future history has come to be what it is. The facilitator will ask the team to 
begin by reading the main plot from their cause-effect diagram. Thereafter the 
team will embellish this plot into a rich story. An effective way to do this is 
for the team to draw a timeline to the horizon year. Thereafter they will 
identify key events or milestones that are plausible and consistent with the 
main plot. These will be depicted on the timeline. The story is then fleshed 
out further with these events, what led up to them, and what the 
consequences of these events were. The development of the narrative is a 
gestalt whole-pattern activity that draws on the BOT graphs, the scenario 
matrix and logics, the driving forces table and the underlying data in each of 
the data clusters. For example, by inspecting the BOT graphs we could frame 
events that help explain inflection points or discontinuities. 
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Although the two driving forces in the scenario matrix are important elements 
that frame the scenario, the other driving forces need to be drawn into the 
scenarios as well. Some of these will already feature as they have been 
incorporated in the cause-effect diagram and are therefore part of the main 
plot. Some of the other driving forces need to be incorporated into the 
narrative, and they may be used as the basis for sub-plots that relate to the 
main plot.  
Since the scenario is a story, it needs to have elements that are critical 
components of good story telling and narrative. Schwartz (1998, p. 327) 
offers useful advice in this regard: 
“Every good plot has characters. In scenarios characters 
are not persons, but ‘larger than life’ – institutions like 
corporations, government bodies or even entire 
industries, ecological forces like global or regional 
weather, mass entities like populations of eligible voters 
or high school age males, or societal trends like 
nationalism or religious movements.”   
(Schwartz, 1998)  
 
We note from this that we could actually cast some of the driving forces that 
do not feature in the scenario matrix as important characters in the story that 
represents sub-plots. It is useful to consider natural, physical and social laws 
when elaborating the stories. An example is how the economic laws of supply 
and demand impel certain outcomes. This contributes to making the 
scenarios realistic.  
“A well-told story has the same flow as reality itself, and 
we can (intuitively) see how its different parts hang 
together and form the whole.” 
(Nordfors, 2007, p. 203) 
 
Nordfors suggests that it is important to ground the scenario in narratives of 
the present. He cites the work of Denning (2005) and the use of “springboard 
stories” to achieve this. These have the advantage of simplicity, focusing on 
one place with one protagonist. A springboard story is true, the dates are 
provided and facts may be checked (Nordfors, 2007). The scenario narrative 
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works with the springboard story and then elaborates that into a rich narrative 
giving us a future history. Another benefit of the springboard story is that it 
helps “create pockets of future in the present” (Nordfors, 2007).  
There are series of standard plots that we could draw on in terms of 
constructing scenario narratives. These include (Schwartz, 1998): 
• Winners and Losers 




• Infinite possibilities 
 
Another possibility is to draw on messages embedded in popular fairy tales, 
parables, and other similar messages from the wisdom literature. The 
facilitator may also introduce participants to the techniques of free writing 
and generative writing (R. Murray, 2002) to enable them to begin writing up 
their narratives. 
When using the scenario matrix and logics, there is one important caveat to 
bear in mind. Given that the driving forces are framed as polar values, there is 
the tendency to interpret the matrix in a way that there is one very positive 
quadrant and an extremely negative quadrant. If applied mechanistically this 
could lead to one utopian and one doomsday (dystopian) scenario with two 
middle of the road or mediocre scenarios. This must be avoided, with one 
exception to be discussed later.  Another problem is that the diagonally 
opposite quadrants will tend to be mirror images of each other, and the 
adjacent quadrants mirror each other as opposites on one key dimension. As a 
set, the scenarios must be balanced, and individually, each scenario must have 
good and bad features. The scenarios must also represent distinctly different 
worlds. In order to overcome the problems highlighted above, the team will 
draw on different sub-plots and use the other driving forces and underlying 
data in creative ways. 
 Page 238 
The team must be encouraged to be as creative as possible in constructing the 
narratives. Once the narratives are completed and validated they will be 
supported by quantitative data, graphs, drawings, pictures, photographs and 
cartoons. One may think of a feature article in a high quality magazine to get a 
sense of how this supporting information may be used appropriately.  
The facilitator will ask each team to represent each of the scenarios in a 
different way. Some examples include: 
• Speech given by head of state or some important body 
• Newspaper article 
• Report on a conference related to the key focus question 
• Investigative journalism 
• Interview  
 
The scenario narratives must be vivid, evoke lots of imagery and must be 
compelling and engaging. They must be assigned highly evocative names. The 
purpose of this is psychological. Once the reader has read the scenario and 
associates the name with the scenario, the scenario name ought to conjure up 
the scenario in the mind’s eye of the recipient. It therefore represents a gestalt 
of the whole scenario. 
Scenario testing and validation 
One the scenarios have been developed they need to be validated. This is a 
process of checking for plausibility and internal consistency. This should be 
done by first reviewing each scenario on its own. This should be followed by 
assessing all the scenarios together as a set. One of the important checks is to 
conduct an Actor test for plausibility. The assessment considers that given 
how the future unfolds in the scenario, is there an actor or a set of actors who 
have the power to react and respond in a way that invalidates the scenario? If 
that is the case, the scenario has to be modified and refined accordingly. We 
can see from this example that scenario construction and validation are 
iterative steps. 
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Implementation 
The complete set of validated scenarios now provides the envelope of 
uncertainty.  The organisation has to consider the implications if each of the 
scenarios were to occur, and what its response ought to be. There are 
numerous possible actions, decisions, strategies and next steps that would 
need to be implemented. These will differ depending on the purpose of 
undertaking the project. 
If the primary aim of the project is for strategy-making, then it is a matter of 
identifying strategic options and adapting them such that the strategy is robust 
across all scenarios. Strategy-based scenario brings together thinking in the 
World of Business and thinking in the World of Management (Sharpe & van 
der Heijden, 2007). Thinking in the World of Business is encapsulated in the 
scenarios which circumscribes the environmental uncertainty. One of the 
ways that thinking in the World of Management is encapsulated is by way of 
the Business Idea (van der Heijden, 1996). The Business Idea is a self-
reinforcing positive feedback loop that represents the organisations “success 
engine” made up of its distinctive competencies which underlie its 
competitive advantage. Due to changes in the World of Business, the 
Business Idea erodes over time and may no longer be robust. Therefore, the 
current Business Idea is identified and then tested against the various 
scenarios, via a process referred to as wind-tunnelling. The focus is on how 
the Business Idea needs to be adapted or recreated such that it will be robust 
across all scenarios. This process gives rise to the strategic options that are to 
be pursued. This is well-covered in van der Heijden (2005). While the use of 
the Business Idea and wind-tunnelling against the scenarios is an effective 
form of strategy making, many other approaches to strategy making may 
equally be deployed subject to testing the strategy against the scenarios (Fink, 
Siebe, & Kuhle, 2004). 
Once the scenarios are developed there needs to be a communication 
initiative where the scenarios are shared widely across the organisation.  
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Embedding the capability and strategic conversation 
One of the benefits of scenario work is that it offers a framework for ongoing 
strategic conversation within an organisation. Although a scenario project 
may be a once-off initiative for strategy-making or policy formulation, ideally 
scenario work ought to become an embedded capability within an 
organisation, rather than just an “episodic occurrence” (Voros, 2003). It is 
therefore important for a transfer of skills and capability during Futurescope 
from the facilitators to participants within the client organisation itself. Since 
it is a transparent process it will be relatively easy to achieve such an outcome. 
If the first set of scenarios developed are at a relatively macro level within 
organisational terms, it is also conceivable that different sub-systems within 
the organisation could then create lower level scenarios that are consistent 
with the first set that have more relevance for those particular sub-systems. In 
this way we have interlocking sets of scenarios at different levels of hierarchy 
and granularity that then serve as the bounding mechanism for strategic 
conversation.  




























Figure A1.8 Interlocking set of macro and micro scenarios to stimulate 
strategic conversation 
 
This may be considered as a form of large scale action research as the 
organisational members engage in a reflexive loop of thinking and acting 
where the scenarios act as a mediating device in this reflexive loop. They 
continuously test their actions against the scenarios, and adapt their actions as 
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Discussion 
The preceding section presented the Futurescope approach. This is but one 
possible approach amongst many. Numerous authors offer suggestions on 
how to engage in scenario work. Some examples are given below: 
• O'Brien, Meadows, & Murtland (2007) 
• Ralston & Wilson (2006) 
• van der Heijden (2005) 
• Lindgren & Banhold (2003) 
• van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, Cairns, & Wright (2002) 
• Ringland (2002) 
• Schoemaker (1998) 
• Schwartz (1998) 
• van der Heijden (1996) 
• Schoemaker (1993) 
 
Although each of the proposed approaches differs in the number of steps to 
be followed, in the application of specific methods and techniques in each of 
the steps, and in their particulars, they are similar at a general level. They all 
look at the environmental trends, identify predetermined elements and key 
uncertainties, and generate scenarios in the form of narratives. Futurescope is no 
different in this sense, and I do not claim any special status for it. It is 
worthwhile to make some comparisons. Although several of the approaches 
highlighted above utilise some level of systems diagramming as one of the 
methods, not all of them do. For example, van der Heijden, Bradfield, Burt, 
Cairns, & Wright (2002) recommend the use of cause-effect diagrams. In their 
scheme, the scenarios are developed first, and then they attempt to apply 
systems diagramming to capture the structure of the scenarios. By contrast, I 
propose that systems diagramming is used prior to the construction of the 
scenarios. My rationale is that in this way we automatically build in 
consistency and it is a way to prefigure the scenario validation which comes 
later. Another difference is that whereas I begin with events and trends in the 
contextual environment, and then elicit relationships in the form of driving 
 Page 243 
forces with polar values, they begin with identifying driving forces with polar 
values. 
One area that requires further interrogation is the use of the so called 2x2 
box. This is a very common method to frame the scenarios. One of the 
reasons is that it is easy to grasp conceptually, especially for the client 
organisation, and those who wish to conduct scenario work for the first time. 
I have therefore also applied the 2x2 box in the discussion of Futurescope. It is 
important to note, however, that there are more sophisticated approaches that 
are less constraining and which may be more appropriate under some 
circumstances. This is especially the case when there is no clear logic to select 
the two driving forces with the highest ranking in the Axes of Uncertainty.  
Alternatively we may want to address a series of driving forces in a more 
flexible way. In such cases, we may use a more inductive way to construct the 
scenarios. We move straight into the rest of the steps of Futurescope without 
creating the scenario matrix and logics. In such a case the logics of the 
scenario are not bound a priori but emerges through an iterative an inductive 
process. This allows more flexibility and scope for creativity, and enables 
richer sets of scenarios. This is consistent with the complexity theory 
concepts of emergence and self-organisation. 
It has been posited that it is important to highlight the distinctions between 
scenarios when engaging in wind-tunnelling. The use of narratives while 
crucial can cause cognitive overload during this process. Hodgson & Sharpe 
(2007) suggest that drawing out the systemic structure by way of causal loop 
diagrams can help overcome this problem. This is similar to what is done in 
Futurescope except, the focus here is on the dominant feedback loops. They 
provide an example of a set of simple reinforcing and balancing feedback 
loops. This has merit if such dominant feedback loops can be identified.  By 
extending their argument, we could also adopt the full set of system 
archetypes (Senge, 2006), as the basis of the systemic structure of each 
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“scenario as system”. The systems archetype then becomes the basis of an 
archetypal story. 
One of the benefits of using the cause-effect diagrams and BOT graphs as in 
Futurescope whether in the form of systems archetypes or more specific causal 
structures is that we may move onto a next phase after the construction of 
the narratives. Each of the scenarios is a hypothesis about how the future may 
evolve. A set of system dynamics (SD) models may be constructed to 
represent each of the scenarios. The qualitative mapping is the first step in 
this process. In this way the hypotheses of the future may be tested by way of 
the SD model. In addition the SD model may be converted into learning 
laboratories and micro-worlds (Morecroft & Sterman, 1994) that enable the 
scenarios to be widely communicated, and experimented with. This is another 
means to facilitate strategic conversation and organisational learning. 
Earlier, I indicated that each of the scenarios ought to have both good and 
bad features, and that we should avoid a utopian and a dystopian scenario. 
There may be circumstances when a dystopian scenario may be acceptable. 
This is in the event that the “official future” is very entrenched and there is a 
need for a kind of shock-therapy to jolt participants to consider other 
possibilities. 
Ramirez & van der Heijden (2007) consider the changing boundary between 
the contextual and the transactional environments. They focus on extending 
the transactional environment into the contextual environment i.e. staking out 
new space in the contextual environment and colonizing it. This may be a 
good seed for innovation. However, they seem to have missed the value of 
more systemic boundary analysis.  
Heathfield (2007) refers to the use of a future map as a way to build a 
comprehensive strategic future management system. The issue is how to link 
in the scenarios with the everyday management system. One of the problems 
with scenarios and indeed other strategy approaches is how to keep the 
 Page 245 
attention of executives and other managers beyond the work done in the 
scenario workshops. In Hodgson’s (2007) terms the question is how to get 
decision-makers to “move” based on the scenarios, especially if they were not 
involved in the construction?  In one sense, this is the same question as 
asking how to ensure that organisations maintain a strategic conversation. 
This is a question that does require further research. 
Nordfors (2007) suggests that scenario work should draw on methods used 
by historians, for example, the method of colligation. This is a process of 
checking what binds together, or how things fit together, whereas cause-effect 
analysis focuses on what causes something. Here we look at how something 
fits in. This may be particularly useful in drawing the story around unfolding 
events as well as in determining sub-plots. A question that needs further 
research is to what extent the application of cause-effect diagramming as a 
way of representing systemic structure is consistent and compatible with 
methods such as colligation. 
I indicated in Chapter 4 that scenarios may be considered as an interpretive 
systems approach. It is also possible to apply it as a postmodern systems 
approach in relation to the SOSM. Although scenario practice evolved from 
modernism and many of the techniques have not changed, there is merit in 
re-interpreting it in relation to the postmodern turn. Every set of scenarios by 
definition involves multiple narratives that are structurally and interpretively 
different. Although not necessarily the case, this lends itself to shifting way 
from grand, totalising narratives that are dominant in what has been termed in 
scenario work as “the official future.” We may consider how the different 
scenarios represent small narratives that embody multiple realities. Scenarios 
are fundamentally participatory processes. Both of these are consonant with a 
postmodern approach. There is still the danger that the organisational elite 
who are often the clients in scenario projects use scenario work and its 
outcomes to continue power dominance in organisational settings, especially 
if there is a grand totalising ideology that circumscribes the overall scenario 
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set. For example, in commercial settings the profit motive still dominates at 
the expense of other organisational objectives, as it is a prevalent across the 
population of business institutions and hence permeates individual businesses. 
There is little in the form of emancipation and liberatory potential if scenario 
work is conducted in such a milieu, in which it often is. 
As we have seen there are multiple approaches to conducting scenario work, 
and there is not necessarily one best way. The methods range from fairly 
simple, structured ones, to more open, flexible and creative modes. While the 
former have been well tried and tested, there are exciting new possibilities in 
the latter. This is the in the realm of aesthetics, further work on narrative and 
storytelling (Boje, 2001; Rasmussen, 2005), and drawing on a wider set of 
methods and approaches from the social sciences and the humanities in 
particular. 
Conclusion 
In this Appendix, which draws on Chapter 4 of this thesis, I presented 
Futurescope as an approach to conduct scenario work. This is designed to 
enable managers and practitioners to readily apply scenarios in their work. I 
engaged in a discussion of Futurescope in relation to other approaches to 
scenario planning, and highlighted a number of areas that would benefit from 
further work. 
 Page 247
R e f e r e n c e s  
Achtenhagen, L., Melin, L., & Mullern, T. (2003). Learning and continuous 
change in innovating organizations. In A. M. Pettigrew, R. 
Whittington, L. Melin, C. Sanchez-Runde, F. A. J. van den Bosch, W. 
Ruigrok & T. Numagami (Eds.), Innovative forms of organizing: 
international perspectives (pp. 302-327). London: Sage. 
Agar, M. (1999). Complexity theory: an exploration and overview based on 
John Holland's work. Field Methods, 11(2), 99-120. 
Amason, A. C., & Mooney, A. C. (2008). The Icarus paradox revisited: how 
strong performance sows the seeds of dysfunction in future strategic 
decision-making. Strategic Organization, 6(4), 407-434. 
Amit, R., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993). Strategic assets and organizational 
rent. Strategic Management Journal, 14, 33-46. 
Anderson, P. (1999). Complexity theory and organization science. 
[Perspective]. Organization Science, 10(3), 216-232. 
Arthur, W. B. (1990). Positive feedbacks in the economy. Scientific American, 
262(92-99). 
Bakken, B., Gould, J., & Kim, D. (1994). Experimentation in learning 
organizations: a management flight simulator approach. In J. D. W. 
Morecroft & J. D. Sterman (Eds.), Modeling for learning organizations 
 (pp. 243-266). Portland: Productivity Press. 
Beinhocker, E. D. (2006). The origin of wealth: evolution, complexity and the radical 
remaking of economics. London: Random House. 
Birkinshaw, J. (Ed.). (2004). Strategic Managment: (Vol. 1). Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Boal, K., & Schultz, P. L. (2007). Storytelling, time, and evolution: the role of 
strategic leadership in complex adaptive systems. The Leadership 
Quarterly, 18, 411-428. 
Bodhanya, S. (2005, June 2005). Strategy making: traversing complexity and 
turbulence. Paper presented at the 7th International Conference on 
Foresight Management in Corporations and Public Organizations - 
New Visions for Sustainability, Helsinki, Finland. 
Bodhanya, S. (2008). Knowledge management: from management fad to 
systemic change. In E. S. Abou-Zeid (Ed.), Knowledge management and 
business strategies: theoretical frameworks and empirical research. Hershey: 
Information Science Reference. 
Bohm, D. (1980). Wholeness and the implicate order. New York: Routledge. 
Boisot, M., & Cohen, J. (2000). "Shall I compare thee to an organization?". 
Emergence, 2(4), 113-135. 
Boje, D. M. (2001). Narrative methods for organizational & communication research. 
London: Sage. 
Bradfield, R. (2007). Facilitating scenario development process: some lessons 
for facilitators. In B. Sharpe & K. van der Heijden (Eds.), Scenarios for 
success: turning insights into action (pp. 259-277). Chichester: Wiley. 
 Page 248
Brews, P. J., & Hunt, M. R. (1999). Learning to plan and planning to learn: 
resolving the planning school / learning school debate. Strategic 
Management Journal, 20, 889-913. 
Bryson, J. M., & Anderson, S. R. (2000). Applying large-group interaction 
methods in the planning and implementation of major change efforts. 
Public Administration Review, 6(2), 143-162. 
Burgi, P., & Roos, J. (2003). Images of strategy. European Management Journal, 
21(1), 69-78. 
Byrne, d. (2005). Complexity, configurations and cases. Theory, Culture & 
Society, 22(5), 95-111. 
Campbell-Hunt, C. (2007). Complexity in practice. Human Relations, 60(5), 
793-823. 
Canella Jr., A. A., & Monroe, M. J. (1997). Contrasting perspectives on 
strategic leaders: towards a more realistic view of top managers. 
Journal of Management, 23(3), 213-237. 
Capra, F. (2002). Complexity and life. Emergence, 4(1-2), 15-33. 
Carter, C., Clegg, S. R., & Kornberger, M. (2008a). S-A-P zapping the field. 
[Editorial Essay]. Strategic Organization, 6(1), 107-112. 
Carter, C., Clegg, S. R., & Kornberger, M. (2008b). Strategy as practice. 
[Editorial Essay]. Strategic Organization, 6(1), 83-99. 
Chakravarthy, B. S., & White, R. E. (2002). Strategy process: forming, 
implementing and changing strategies. In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas & 
R. Whittington (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management (pp. 182-205). 
London: Sage. 
Charmaz, K. (2000). Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist 
Methods. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (Second ed., pp. 509-535). California: Sage. 
Checkland, P., & Scholes, J. (1999). Soft systems methodology in action. Chichester: 
Wiley. 
Chettiparamb, A. (2006). Metaphors in complexity theory and planning. 
Planning Theory, 5(1), 71-91. 
Child, J. (1972). Organizational structure, environment and performance: the 
role of strategic choice. Sociology, 6, 1-22. 
Chiles, T. H., Meyer, A. D., & Hench, T. J. (2004). Organizational emergence: 
the origin and transformation of Branson, Missouri's Musical 
Theaters. Organization Science, 15(5), 499-519. 
Cilliers, P. (1998). Complexity and Postmodernism. London: Routledge. 
Cilliers, P. (2000). What can we learn from a theory of complexity? Emergence, 
2(1), 23-33. 
Cohen, D., & Prusak, L. (2001). In good company: how social capital makes 
organizations work. Boston: Harvard Business School. 
Coleman Jr., H. J. (2000). What enables self-organizing behaviour in business. 
Emergence, 1(1), 33-48. 
Colville, I. D., & Murphy, A. J. (2006). Leadership as the enabler of 
strategizing and organizing. Long Range Planning, 39, 663-677. 
 Page 249
Cornelissen, J. P., & Kafouros, M. (2008). The emergent organization: 
primary and complex metaphors in theorizing about organizations. 
Organization Studies, 29(7), 957-978. 
Cornelius, P., Van de Putte, A., & Romani, M. (2005). Three decades of 
scenario planning in Shell. California Management Review, 48(1), 92-109. 
Coyle, G. (2000). Qualitative and quantitative modelling in system dynamics: 
some research questions. [Research problems]. System Dynamics Review, 
16(3), 225-244. 
Cunha, M. P. e., & Cunha, J. V. d. (2006). Towards a complexity theory of 
strategy. Management Decision, 44(7), 839-850. 
Curry, A. (2007). Acting on the future. In B. Sharpe & K. van der Heijden 
(Eds.), Scenarios for success: turning insights into action (pp. 339-371). 
Chichester: Wiley. 
Czarniawska, B. (2006). Bruno Latour: Reassembling the social: an 
introduction to actor-network theory. [Book Review: New books in 
organization theory]. Organization Studies, 27(10), 1553-1557. 
De Rond, M., & Thietart, R.-A. (2007). Choice, chance and inevitability in 
strategy. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 535-551. 
Delgado Diaz, C. J. (2004). The political significance of small things. E:CO, 
Special double issue, 6(1-2), 49-54. 
Denis, J.-L., Langley, A., & Rouleau, L. (2006). The power of numbers in 
strategizing. Strategic Organization, 4(4), 349-377. 
Dent, E. B. (1999). Complexity science: a worldview shift. Emergence, 1(4), 5-
19. 
Dierickx, I., & Cool, K. (1989). Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of 
competitive advantage. Management Science, 35(12), 1504-1511. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy 
of Management Review, 14(4), 532-550. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases: 
opportunities and challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25-
32. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: what are 
they? Strategic Management Journal, 21, 1105-1121. 
Escobar, A. (2003). Other worlds are (already possible) in World Social 
Forum: Challenging Empires Available from 
http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/1557.html 
Farjoun, M. (2007). The end of strategy? [Soapbox]. Strategic Organization, 5(3), 
197-210. 
Faulkner, D. (Ed.). (2002). Strategy: Critical perspectives on business and management 
(Vol. I). London: Routledge. 
Ferlie, E. (2002). Quasi strategy: strategic management in the contemporary 
public sector. In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas & R. Whittington (Eds.), 
Handbook of Strategic Management (pp. 279-298). London: Sage. 
Fink, A., Siebe, A., & Kuhle, J. P. (2004). How scenarios support strategic 
early warning processes. Foresight, 6(3), 173-185. 
 Page 250
Ford, J. D. (1999). Organizational change as shifting conversations. Journal of 
Organizational Change, 12(6), 480-500. 
Galbraith, P. (2004). Organisational leadership and chaos theory: let's be 
careful. Organisational Leadership, 42(1), 9-28. 
Gerzon, M. (2006). Leading through conflict: how successful leaders transform differences 
into opportunities. Boston: Harvard Business School. 
Gioia, D. A., Thomas, J. B., Clark, S. M., & Chittipeddi, K. (1994). Symbolism 
and strategic change in academia: the dynamics of sensemaking and 
influence. Organization Science, 5(3), 363-383. 
Gladwell, M. (2000). The Tipping Point. London: Abacus. 
Gleick, J. (1998). Chaos: the amazing sciences of the unpredictable. London: Vintage. 
Goodwin, B. (2000). Out of control into participation. Emergence, 2(4), 40-49. 
Goulding, C. (1999). Grounded theory: some reflections on paradigm, 
procedures and misconceptions 
Unpublished Working paper. University of Wolverhampton. 
Grant, R. M. (1991). The resource-based theory of competitive advantage: 
implications for strategy formulation. California Management Review, 
Spring 1991, 114-135. 
Hafsi, T., & Thomas, H. (2005). The field of strategy: in search of a walking 
stick. European Management Journal, 23(5), 507-510. 
Hambrick, D. C. (2004). The disintegration of strategic management: it's time 
to consolidate our gains. [Soapbox]. Strategic Organization, 2(1), 91-98. 
Hamel, G. (1996). Strategy as revolution. Harvard Business Review,  
(July-August), 69-82. 
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1997). The population ecology of 
organizations. American Journal of Sociology, 82(5), 929-964. 
Harter, N. (2006). Leadership as the promise of simplification. [Philosophy]. 
E:CO, 8(4), 77-87. 
Hatchuel, A. (2005). Towards an epistemology of collective action: 
management research as a responsive and actionable discipline. 
European Management Review, 2, 36-47. 
Hazy, J. K. (2006). Measuring leadership effectiveness in complex socio-
technical systems. [Practitioner]. E:CO, 8(3), 58-77. 
Hazy, J. K. (2007). Computer models of leadership: foundations for a new 
discipline or meaningless diversion? The Leadership Quarterly, 18, 391-
410. 
Heathfield, D. (2007). Building a comprehensive strategic future management 
system: a future map approach. In B. Sharpe & K. van der Heijden 
(Eds.), Scenarios for success: turning insights into action (pp. 315-338). 
Chichester: Wiley. 
Heil, D. J. (2003). Understanding corporations and corporate management: a hermeneutic 
phenomenological interpretation. Unpublished thesis, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. 
Heil, D. J., Maxwell, T., & Whittaker, L. (2003). Towards the very nature of 
corporate strategy. South African Journal of Business Management, 34(1), 1-
11. 
 Page 251
Heugens, P. P. M. A. R., & Mol, M. J. (2005). So you call that research? 
Mending methodological biases in strategy and organization 
departments of top business schools. [Editorial Essay]. Strategic 
Organization, 3(1), 117-128. 
Hodgson, G. M. (2000). The concept of emergence in social science: its 
history and importance. Emergence, 2(4), 65-77. 
Hodgson, T. (2007). Appreciating the future. In B. Sharpe & K. van der 
Heijden (Eds.), Scenarios for success: turning insights into action (pp. 279-
314). Chichester: Wiley. 
Hodgson, T., & Sharpe, B. (2007). Deepening futures with system structure. 
In B. Sharpe & K. van der Heijden (Eds.), Scenarios for success: turning 
insights into action (pp. 121-143). Chichester: Wiley. 
Hoffman, A. (2004). Reconsidering the role of practical theorist: on 
(re)connecting theory to practice in organization theory. [Editorial 
Essay]. Strategic Organization, 2(2), 213-222. 
House, R. J., & Aditya, R. M. (1997). The social scientific study of leadership: 
quo vadis? Journal of Management, 23(3), 409-473. 
Hrebniak, L. G. (2006). Obstacles to effective strategy implementation. 
Organizational Dynamics, 35(1), 12-31. 
Jackson, M. C. (2000). Systems Approaches to Management. New York: Kluver. 
Jackson, M. C. (2003). Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers. Chichester: 
Wiley. 
Jarzabkowski, P. (2005). Strategy as practice: an activity-based approach. London: 
Sage. 
Jarzabkowski, P., & Fenton, E. (2006). Strategizing and organizing in 
pluralistic contexts. Long Range Planning, 39(2006), 631-648. 
Jarzabkowski, P., & Whittington, R. (2008). Hard to disagree, mostly. Strategic 
Organization, 6(1), 101-106. 
Johnson, G., & Scholes, K. (2002). Exploring corporate strategy (Sixth ed.). 
Harlow: FT Prentice Hall. 
Kauffman, S. (1995a). At home in the universe: the search for the laws of self-
organization and complexity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kauffman, S. (1995b). Technology and evolution: escaping the red queen 
effect. McKinsey Quarterly, 1, 119-129. 
Kilduff, M. (2006). Editors' comments: publishing theory. Academy of 
Management Review, 31(2), 252-255. 
Klein, J. T. (2004). Interdisciplinarity and complexity: an evolving 
relationship. E:CO, 6(1-2), 2-10. 
Knights, D., & Mueller, F. (2004). Strategy as a 'Project': overcoming dualisms 
in the strategy debate. European Management Review, 1, 55-61. 
Knudsen, S. (2003). Scientific metaphors going public. Journal of Pragmatics, 35, 
1247-1263. 
Kurtz, C. F., & Snowden, D. (2003). The new dynamics of strategy: sense 
making in a complex and complicated world. IBM Systems Journal, 
24(3), 462-483. 
 Page 252
Lane, D., & Maxfield, R. R. (1996). Strategy under complexity: fostering 
generative relationships. Long Range Planning, 29(2), 215-231. 
Langley, A. (2007). Process thinking in strategic organization. Strategic 
Organization, 5(3), 271-282. 
Levin-Rozalis, M. (2004). Searching for the unknowable: a process of 
detection - abductive research generated by projective techniques. 




Levinthal, D. A., & Wraglien, M. (1999). Landscape design: designing for local 
action in complex worlds. Organization Science, 10(3), 342-357. 
Levy, D. (1994). Chaos theory and strategy: theory, application and 
managerial implications. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 167-178. 
Levy, D. L. (2000). Applications and limitations of complexity theory in 
organization theory and strategy. In J. Rabin, G. J. Miller & W. B. 
Hildreth (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management. New York: Marcel 
Dekker. 
Lichtenstein, B. B., Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., Seers, A., Orton, J. D., & 
Schreiber, C. (2006). Complexity leadership theory: and interactive 
perspective on leading in complex adaptive systems. E:CO, 8(4), 2-12. 
Lindgren, M., & Banhold, H. (2003). Scenario planning: the link between future and 
strategy. Hampshire: Palgrave. 
Lissack, M. R. (1999). Complexity: the science, its vocabulary, and its relation 
to organizations. Emergence, 1(1), 110-126. 
Locke, K. (2001). Grounded Theory in Management Research. London: Sage. 
Maani, K., E, & Cavana, R. Y. (2002). Systems thinking and modelling: 
understanding change and complexity. Hanover: Prentice-Hall. 
Mackenzie, A. (2005). The problem of the attractor: a singular generality 
between science and social theory. Theory, Culture & Society, 22(5), 45-
65. 
Mahoney, J. T., & McGahan, A. M. (2007). The field of strategic management 
within the evolving science of strategic organization. Strategic 
Organization, 5(1), 79-99. 
Marion, R., & Uhl-Bien, M. (2001). Leadership in complex organizations. The 
Leadership Quarterly, 12, 389-418. 
Markides, C. (1997). Strategic Innovation Sloan Management Review, 38(3), 9-23. 
Mason, R. B. (2007). The external environment's effect on management and 
strategy. Management Decision, 45(1), 10-28. 
Maxfield, R. R. (1998). Complexity and organization and management (Vol. 
Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security,  Available from 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-
%201998/Complexity,%20Global%20Politics 
McGahan, A. M., & Mitchell, W. (2003). How do firms change in the face of 
constraints to change: toward an agenda for research on strategic 
 Page 253
organization. [Soapbox Editorial Essay]. Strategic Organization, 1(2), 
231-239. 
McKiernan, P., & Carter, C. (2004). The millennium nexus: strategic 
management at the cross-roads. European Management Review, 1, 3-13. 
Mezias, S. J., & Regnier, M. O. (2007). Walking the walk as well as talking the 
talk: replication and the normal science paradigm in strategic 
management research. Strategic Organization, 5(3), 283-296. 
Minocha, S., & Stonehouse, G. (2007). Towards a body-aware strategic 
organization. Strategic Organization, 5(4), 437-445. 
Mintzberg, H. (1990). The design school: reconsidering the basic premises of 
stratgeic management. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 171-195. 
Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., & Lampel, B. (1998). Strategy safari: the complete 
guide through the wilds of strategic management. Harlow: FT Prentice Hall. 
Mintzberg, H., & Waters, J. A. (1985). Of strategies, deliberate and emergent. 
Strategic Management Journal, 6, 257-272. 
Mir, R., & Watson, A. (2000). Strategic management and the philosophy of 
science: the case for a constructivist methodology. Strategic Management 
Journal, 21, 941-953. 
Moore, J. T. (2001). Writers on strategy and strategic management (Second ed.). 
London: Penguin Business. 
Morecroft, J. D. W., & Sterman, J. D. (Eds.). (1994). Modeling for learning 
organizations. Portland: Productivity Press. 
Morel, B., & Ramanujam, R. (1999). Through the looking glass of complexity: 
the dynamics of organizations as adaptive and evolving systems. 
Organization Science, 10(3), 278-293. 
Morgan, G. (1997). Images of organization. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Mumford, M. D., Zaccaro, S. J., Harding, F. D., Jacobs, T. O., & Fleishman, 
E. A. (2000). Leadership skills for a changing world: solving complex 
social problems. The Leadership Quarterly, 11(1), 11-35. 
Murray, A. I. (1988). A contingency view of Porter's "Generic Strategies". 
Academy of Management Review, 13(3), 390-400. 
Murray, R. (2002). How to write a thesis. Berkshire: Open University Press. 
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The knowledge-creating company: how Japanese 
companies create the dynamics of innovation. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Nordfors, L. (2007). The power of narrative. In B. Sharpe & K. van der 
Heijden (Eds.), Scenarios for success: turning insights into action (pp. 197-
215). Chichester: Wiley. 
O'Brien, F., Meadows, M., & Murtland, M. (2007). Creating and using 
scenarios: exploring alternative possible futures and their impact on 
strategic decisions. In F. A. O'Brien & R. G. Dyson (Eds.), Supporting 
strategy: frameworks, methods and models (pp. 211-247). Chichester: Wiley. 
Parry, K. W., & Hansen, H. (2007). The organizational story as leadership. 
Leadership, 3(3), 281-300. 
Pascale, R. T. (1999). Surfing the edge of chaos. Sloan Management Review, 
Spring 1999, 83-94. 
 Page 254
Pettigrew, A. M. (1990). Longitudinal field research on change: theory and 
practice. Organization Science, 1(3), 267-292. 
Pettigrew, A. M., Whittington, R., Melin, L., Sanchez-Runde, C., van den 
Bosch, F. A. J., Ruigrok, W., et al. (Eds.). (2003). Innovative forms of 
organizing: international perspectives. London: Sage. 
Pidd, M. (Ed.). (2004). Systems modelling: theory and practice. Chichester: Wiley. 
Plowman, D. A., Solanksy, S., Beck, T. E., Baker, L., Kulkarni, M., & Travis, 
D. V. (2007). The role of leadership in emergent, self-organization. 
The Leadership Quarterly, 18, 342-356. 
Porter, M. E. (1979). How competitive forces shape strategy. Harvard Business 
Review, (March/April 1979), 137-145. 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and 
competitors. New York: The Free Press. 
Porter, M. E. (1981). The contribution of industrial organization to strategic 
management. Academy of Management Review, 6(4), 609-620. 
Price, I. (2004). Complexity, complicatedness and complexity: a new science 
behind organizational intervention? [Academic]. E:CO, Special Double 
Issue 6(1-2), 40-48. 
Quinn, J. B. (1978). Strategic change: "logical incrementalism". Sloan 
Management Review, 20(1), 7-21. 
Rajagopalan, N., & Spreitzer, G. M. (1996). Toward a theory of strategic 
change: a multi-lens perspective and integrative framework. Academy of 
Management Review, 22(1), 48-79. 
Ralston, B., & Wilson, I. (2006). The scenario planning handbook: developing 
strategies in uncertain times. Mason: Thomson. 
Ramirez, R., & van der Heijden, K. (2007). Scenarios to develop strategic 
options" a new interactive role for scenarios in strategy. In B. Sharpe 
& K. van der Heijden (Eds.), Scenarios for success: turning insights into action 
(pp. 89-119). Chichester: Wiley. 
Rasmussen, L. B. (2005). The narrative aspect of scenario building: how story 
telling may give people a memory of the future. AI & Soc, 19, 229-
249. 
Remenyi, D., Williams, B., Money, A., & Swartz, E. (1998). Doing research in 
business and management. London: Sage. 
Richardson, G. P. (1986). Problems with causal loop diagrams. System 
Dynamics Review, 2, 158-170. 
Ringland, G. (2002). Scenarios in business. Chichester: Wiley. 
Rittel, H. W. J., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of 
planning. Policy Sciences, 4, 155-169. 
Roos, J., & Victor, B. (1999). Towards a new model of strategy-making as 
serious play. European Management Journal, 17(4), 348-355. 
Roos, J., Victor, B., & Statler, M. (2004). Playing seriously with strategy. Long 
Range Planning, 37, 549-568. 
Ruef, M. (2003). A sociological perspective on strategic organization. Strategic 
Organization, 1(2), 241-251. 
 Page 255
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993). Multiple scenario development: its conceptual 
and behavioural foundation. Strategic Management Journal, 14, 193-213. 
Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1998). Scenario planning: a tool for strategic thinking. 
In R. G. Dyson & F. A. O'Brien (Eds.), Strategic development: methods and 
models (pp. 185-207). Chichester: Wiley. 
Schreiber, C., & Carley, K. M. (2006). Leadership style as an enabler of 
organizational complex functioning. [Academic]. E:CO, 8(4), 61-76. 
Schwartz, P. (1998). The art of the long view: planning for a future in an uncertain 
world. West Sussex: Wiley. 
Selin, C. (2007). Professional dreamers: the future in the past of scenario 
planning. In B. Sharpe & K. van der Heijden (Eds.), Scenarios for success: 
turning insights into action (pp. 27-51). Chichester: Wiley. 
Senge, P. M. (2006). The fifth discipline: the art and practice of the learning 
organization. London: Random House. 
Senge, P. M., Kleiner, A., Roberts, C., Ross, R. B., & Smith, B. (1994). The fifth 
discipline fieldbook: strategies and tools for building a learning organization. New 
York: Doubleday. 
Sharpe, B., & van der Heijden, K. (2007). Scenarios for success: turning insights into 
action. Chichester: Wiley. 
Sheard, S. (2006). Complexity theory and continental philosophy 2: a 
hermeneutical theory of complexity. [Philosophy]. E:CO, 8(1), 50-66. 
Simon, H. A. (1991). Bounded rationality and organizational learning. 
Organization Science, 2(1), 125-134. 
Smirchich, L., & Stubbart, C. (1985). Strategic management in an enacted 
world. Academy of Management Review, 10(4), 724-736. 
Spee, A. P., & Jarzabkowski, P. (2009). Strategy tools as boundary objects. 
Strategic Organization, 7(2), 223-232. 
Stacey, R. D. (1995). The science of complexity: an alternative perspective for 
strategic change processes. Strategic Management Journal, 16, 477-495. 
Stacey, R. D. (2003). Strategic management and organisational dynamics: the challenge of 
complexity (Fourth ed.). Harlow: FT Prentice Hall. 
Stacey, R. D. (2007). Strategic management and organisational dynamics: the challenge of 
complexity (Fifth ed.). Harlow: FT Prentice Hall. 
Steen, J., Coopmans, C., & Whyte, J. (2006). Structure and agency? Actor-
network theory and strategic organization. [Editorial Essay]. Strategic 
Organization, 4(3), 303-312. 
Sterman, J. D. (2000). Business dynamics: systems thinking and modeling for a complex 
world. Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill. 
Surie, G., & Hazy, J. K. (2006). Generative leadership: nurturing innovation in 
complex systems. [Practitioner]. E:CO, 8(4), 13-26. 
Suteanu, C. (2005). Complexity, science and the public: the geography of a 
new interpretation. Theory, Culture & Society, 22(5), 113-140. 
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and 
strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509-533. 
Thompson, A. A. J., & Strickland, A. J. I. (1999). Strategic management: concepts 
and cases (Eleventh ed.). Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill. 
 Page 256
Thrift, N. (1999). The place of complexity. Theory, Culture & Society, 16(3), 31-
69. 
Tidd, J., Bessant, J., & Pavitt, K. (2001). Managing innovation: integrating 
technological, market and organizational change (Second ed.). Chichester: 
Wiley. 
Trethewey, A., & Goodall JR, H. L. (2007). Leadership reconsidered as 
historical subject: sketches from the cold war to post-9/11. Leadership, 
3(4), 457-477. 
Tsoukas, H., & Chia, R. (2002). On organizational becoming: rethinking 
organizational change. Organization Science, 13(5), 567-582. 
Urry, J. (2005). The complexity turn. Theory, Culture & Society, 22(5), 1-14. 
Van de Ven, A. H., & Poole, M. S. (2005). Alternative approaches for 
studying organizational change. Organization Studies, 26(9), 1377-1404. 
van der Heijden, K. (1996). Scenarios: the art of strategic conversation. Chichester: 
Wiley. 
van der Heijden, K. (1997). Scenarios, strategies and the strategy process. Breukelen: 
Centre for Organisational Learning and Change, Nijenrode University 
Press. 
van der Heijden, K. (2005). Scenarios: the art of strategic conversation (Second ed.). 
Chichester: Wiley. 
van der Heijden, K., Bradfield, R., Burt, G., Cairns, G., & Wright, G. (2002). 
The sixth sense: accelerating organizational learning with scenarios. Chichester: 
Wiley. 
Van Seters, D. A., & Field, R. H. G. (1990). The evolution of leadership 
theory. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 3(3), 29-45. 
Van Wart, M. (2003). Public-sector leadership theory: an assessment. Public 
Administration Review, 63(2), 214-228. 
Verity, J. (2003). Scenario planning as a strategy technique. European Business 
Journal, 185-195. 
Volberda, H. W. (2004). Crisis in strategy: fragmentation, integration or 
synthesis. European Management Review, 1, 35-42. 
Von Krogh, G., Roos, J., & Slocum, K. (1994). An essay on corporate 
epistemology. Strategic Management Journal, 15, 53-71. 
Voros, J. (2003). A generic foresight process framework. Foresight, 5.3, 10-21. 
Wack, P. (1985a). Scenarios: shooting the rapids. Harvard Business Review, 
November-December 2005, 2-14. 
Wack, P. (1985b). Scenarios: uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review, 
September-October, 73-89. 
Waldrop, M. M. (1992). Complexity: the emergeing science at the edge of order and 
chaos. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Warren, K. (2002). Competitive Strategy Dynamics. Chichester: Wiley. 
Warren, K. (2004). Why Has Feedback Systems Thinking Struggled to 
Influence Strategy and Policy Formulation? Suggestive Evidence, 
Explanations and Solutions. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 21, 
331-347. 
 Page 257
Warren, K. (2005). Improving strategic management with the fundamental 
principles of system dynamics. System Dynamics Review, 21(4), 329-350. 
Warren, K. (2008). Strategic Management Dynamics. Chichester: Wiley. 
Weick, K. E. (1989). Theory construction as disciplined imagination. Academy 
of Management Review, 14(4), 516-531. 
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the 
process of sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4), 409-421. 
Wheatley, M. (1992). Future Search Conferences and the new science. In M. 
R. Weisbord (Ed.), Discovering common ground (pp. 105-110). San 
Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. 
Whittington, R. (2003). The work of strategizing and organizing: for a practice 
perspective. [Soa!p Box: Editorial Essay]. Strategic Organization, 1(1), 
117-125. 
Whittington, R. (2004). Strategy after modernism: recovering practice. 
European Management Review, 1, 62-68. 
Whittington, R., & Melin, L. (2003). The challenge of organizing/strategizing. 
In A. M. Pettigrew, R. Whittington, L. Melin, C. Sanchez-Runde, F. 
A. J. van den Bosch, W. Ruigrok & T. Numagami (Eds.), Innovative 
forms of organizing: international perspectives (pp. 35-48). London: Sage. 
Whittington, R., Molloy, E., Mayer, M., & Smith, A. (2006). Practices of 
strategising / organising: broadening strategy work and skills. Long 
Range Planning, 39, 615-629. 
Whittington, R., Pettigrew, A., & Thomas, H. (2002). Conclusion: Doing 
more in strategy research. In A. Pettigrew, H. Thomas & R. 
Whittington (Eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management (pp. 475-488). 
London: Sage. 
Wilkinson, D., & Pedler, M. (2003). Strategic thinking in the public services. 
In B. Garratt (Ed.), Developing strategic thought: a collection of best thinking 
on business strategy 
 (Second ed., pp. 227-262). London: Profile Books. 
 
 
